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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to examine the consequences of board diversity in Kuwait. The objectives are 
to measure the impact of gender, age, national diversity on earnings management (EM), besides 
firm performance (FP). This research study raises the following question: Does board diversity 
affect earnings management and firm performance?  
 
This thesis uses data from 103 non-financial Kuwaiti listed companies in the period from 2010 
to 2017. The data was collected from secondary sources such as annual reports and S&P Capital 
IQ. The data analysis methods are correlation and multi-regression. Earnings management 
measured by using the model modified by Jones (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005). Firm 
performance measured by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. The independent variables are gender 
diversity, age diversity, nationality diversity. The findings show that there is no association 
between gender diversity and earnings management. Also, this study found a positive 
relationship between age diversity and earnings management, besides no relationship found 
between national diversity and earnings management. Moreover, the findings show a mix of 
results between gender, age, national diversity and firm performance, which is contrary to 
agency, resource dependency and social capital theories. 
 
Keywords: Earnings management, firm performance, board diversity, corporate governance 
code, Kuwait 
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1.0 Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background  
 
Due to the recent prevalence of issues of discrimination based on minority status and age in 
the workforce (The Public Authority for Civil Information, 2019), there have been changes in 
the pool of potential candidates for positions on firms’ boards of directors (BODs). The 
diversification of these top tier positions necessitates more in-depth research in order to 
establish if diversity affects firm performance (FP), or if such positions are only filled so that 
firms can demonstrate equality and a lack of discrimination (Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; 
Guest, 2019; Jafaar et al., 2019). There is a need to examine the impact of board diversity (BD) 
on earnings management (EM) while additionally gaining insights into how this affects FP in 
Kuwait. 
 
The members of BODs must display strategic decision making. This may lead to the 
assumption that firms with more diverse BODs experience higher levels of FP than less diverse 
boards. However, it is unclear whether BD is the sole contributor to this increased performance 
(Erhardt et al., 2003). The principles enshrined in corporate governance codes (CGCs) control 
directors’ behaviours and the size of boards as well as the independence of their members. 
These are the main variables that affect EM (Abed et al., 2012; García‐Meca & Sánchez‐
Ballesta, 2009). However, these studies neither take into account nor consider the role of BD 
as a variable affecting EM. 
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1.2 Research aim and objectives 
 
The aim of this study is to examine the consequences of BD in the form of gender (GD), age 
(AD) and nationality (ND) on EM and FP. 
 
 In order to achieve this aim, the objectives are as follows: 
 
Ø To examine the impact of board diversity on EM.  
Ø To examine the impact of board diversity on FP. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
This research investigates the effect of board diversity, in the form of gender, age and 
national diversity, on the levels of EM and FP of non-financial firms listed on Boursa 
Kuwait. Consequently, this study seeks to answer the following questions: 
 
Ø Does board diversity affect EM? 
Ø Does board diversity affect FP? 
 
This thesis studies non-financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait (further details can be found in 
section 5.3). In order to answer the first and second questions (for additional details, see Figure 
1), this study uses the modified Jones and Kothari models to measure EM and different types 
of FP in order to confirm the results and to strengthen the findings. 
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Figure 1: Diagram linking the research objectives and the questions used in the research process 
 
1.4 The study method  
In order to achieve its aim and objectives, this study conducts ordinary least squares (OLS), 
random effects, generalised method of moments (GMM), 2 stage least squares (2SLS) and 
Tobit analyses. More specifically, it uses OLS assumptions and random effects regression 
analysis to solve both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Arellano, 2003; Gujarati & 
Porter, 2009). The study uses GMM and 2SLS for FP models to address endogeneity problems 
(see section 5.7). Moreover, it uses Tobit regression for EM, because the dependent variable is 
limited, meaning that the modified Jones and Kothari models are non-negative variables (Jia 
et al., 2012; Lin & Luan, 2020; Xiao et al., 2014). 
 
1.5 Motivation 
From the literature review, it is apparent that many research studies have considered the impact 
of corporate governance codes on firms in different countries. Even though Kuwait was the 
first of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to have a stock market exchange, 
namely Boursa Kuwait, it was the last (in 2013) to implement a corporate governance code. 
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Although Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2014) examined Kuwait’s non-financial firms before the 
Kuwait corporate governance code (KCGC) was implemented, the Kuwaiti literature shows 
that the last investigation into BD was conducted in 2011. Consequently, this study updates the 
Kuwaiti literature following the KCGC’s implementation.  
 
Previous research studies by Adams and Ferreira (2009), Carter et al. (2007), Erhardt et al. 
(2003), Gordini and Rancati (2017), Gull, Nekhili, Nagati and Chtioui (2018), Peni and 
Vahamaa (2010) and Rose (2007) have investigated the impact of BD on EM and FP. However, 
few studies have focused on Kuwait, especially since the KCGC was implemented. 
Furthermore, very few research studies (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Lausten, 2002; 
Musyoka et al., 2015; Nyoka, 2018) have studied age diversity and earnings management and 
none have examined this relationship or measured age diversity in Kuwait. Moreover, they 
have used several means to measure EM and FP. As a developing country, Kuwait’s empirical 
studies are limited in terms of the significance of BD, EM and FP. In comparison to previous 
studies, such as those by Carter et al. (2003), Goodstein et al. (1994), Harjoto et al. (2015) and 
Stephenson (2004), the present research seeks to establish whether or not BD is important to 
Kuwaiti firms. Furthermore, other countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), the United 
States of America (USA), Canada, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, South 
Korea, Malaysia, India, Iraq, Palestine, Bangladesh and Nigeria claim that there is a need for 
more diverse BODs to improve decision making and FP (Goodstein et al., 1994; Neill et al., 
1995; Stephenson, 2004; Campbell & Minguez Vera, 2010; Kumai & Bala, 2013; Luckerath-
Rovers, 2013; Ittonen, Vahamaa, & Vahamaa, 2013; Alareeni & Aljuaidi, 2014; Harjoto et al., 
2015; Abdullah & Ismail, 2017; Gull et al., 2018; Jadiyappa et al., 2019). As shown in Figure 
2, Kuwait has achieved greater BD in recent years and with respect to the country’s population, 
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there are now more women, young people and non-Kuwaiti citizens than men, older people 
and Kuwaiti citizens on the boards (Central Statistical Bureau, 2020).  
 
Kuwait has been chosen for this study because the country has a distinctive democratic policy. 
Kuwait is the most democratic GCC country; in 2017, when its democracy was last tested, it 
was ranked 119th globally (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). In 1962, Kuwait became 
the first GCC country to have a Constitution (Cordesman, 2018). The Kuwaiti Constitution is 
the foundation of the state’s laws applicable to the country and its citizens (National Assembly, 
2015). Furthermore, in 1963 Kuwait became the first GCC country to establish a National 
Assembly, only being followed by Bahrain in 2002 (Cordesman, 2018). Then, in 2009, Kuwait 
became the first GCC country to admit Kuwaiti women into its Parliament (National Assembly, 
2015; Odine, 2013). In terms of gender, Kuwait’s population is 51% female and 49% male 
(The Public Authority for Civil Information, 2019). Consequently, this study’s motivation is 
to investigate whether gender diversity affects Kuwaiti non-financial firms’ EM and FP. The 
Kuwait National Assembly, which is the country’s legislative authority, consists of 50 
members elected by the Kuwaiti people. One of the National Assembly’s essential tasks is to 
study ministerial decisions (Herb, 2002). In comparison to other GCC countries, Kuwait has 
an open economy because all investors can seek entry to the country’s stock market, which 
discloses all the firms listed on Boursa Kuwait (Alotaibi, 2014; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 
2010). In addition, at the beginning of 2017, the Kuwaiti Government announced its vision for 
a ‘New Kuwait’ by 2035, with the aim of transforming the country into a regional commercial, 
financial and cultural centre, attracting investments from people of different nationalities (New 
Kuwait, 2020). Seventy per cent of the Kuwaiti population comprises non-Kuwaiti citizens 
(The Public Authority for Civil Information, 2019 and Figure 2), motivating this study to 
examine the effect of ND on non-financial firms’ EM and FP. According to the Public 
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Authority for Civil Information (2019), 81% of the Kuwaiti population is under 48 years age 
old and 19% are older people. Accordingly, Figure 2 shows the growing number of young 
directors on boards. Furthermore, in 1977, Kuwait became the first GCC country to establish 
a stock market, known as Boursa Kuwait. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and 
the United Arabic Emirates (UAE) followed suit in 1980, while Qatar did so in 1990 (Cheikh 
et al., 2018). Conversely, in March 2013, Kuwait was the last GCC country to implement the 
KCGC, which came into force in June of the same year (Capital Markets Authority, 2013). 
Following the implementation of the KCGC, there were some changes to firms’ BD, including 
greater numbers of women, young people and foreign directors.  
 
 
Figure 2: Changes to board diversity after the 2013 code was issued 
Source: Annual report, The Public Authority for Civil Information (2019) 
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1.6 Research contributions 
 
This study contributes to the growing body of literature on BD by investigating its effect on 
EM and FP. Further, this study builds on the broader literature on gender, age and national 
diversity by highlighting the important role that women, young people and foreign directors 
play in improving boards’ monitoring role on EM and FP. More specifically, this study first 
contributes to existing knowledge; second provides a theoretical contribution; and third makes 
a methodological contribution. 
 
Although some previous studies have examined the impact of GD, AD and ND on EM and FP, 
they have mainly focused on developed countries (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 
2003, 2007; Erhardt et al., 2003; Gordini and Rancati, 2017; Gull et al., 2018; Lausten, 2002; 
Musyoka et al., 2015; Nyoka, 2018; Peni and Vahamaa, 2010; Rose 2007). This study is one 
of the first to analyse the impact of GD, AD and ND on EM and FP in the Kuwaiti context. In 
addition, to date few empirical studies have examined the effect of AD on EM and used 
different measures to confirm their results.  
 
As shown in Figure 6 and Table 1, this study makes another significant contribution in its use 
of agency and resource dependence and social capital theories to develop its hypotheses. Many 
studies (e.g. Abdullah, Ismail, & Izah, 2017; Arioglu, 2018; Choi & Rainey, 2010; Darmadi, 
2011; Gull et al., 2018; Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013; Jurkus et al., 2011; Kim & Lim, 
2010; Low, Roberts, & Whiting, 2015; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013) have used such theories to 
develop their hypotheses. However, none use social capital theory to examine the impact of 
BD on FP and EM in Kuwait.  
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Finally, in relation to the methodology, most previous studies (e.g. Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Alshamari & Alsaidi, 2014; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2010; Erhardt et 
al., 2003; Gonzalez et al., 2014; Gordini & Rancati, 2017; Gull et al., 2018; Ittonen et al., 2013; 
Lakhal et al., 2015; Omoye et al., 2014; Peni & Vahamaa, 2010; Rose, 2007; Susanto, 2016; 
Zalata et al., 2018) have used the same model with the same control variables. However, this 
study uses new control variables, such as firm age, family firm, liquidity, dividends per share, 
sales growth and cash flow, all of which affect both EM and FP (for additional details, see 
section 3.2.3). Furthermore, many previous studies, such as Anderson and Reeb (2003), Bhatt 
and Bhattacharya (2017), Ebrahim and Abdel Fattah (2015), Markarian and Pozza (2008), 
Saito (2008) and Yang (2010), have confirmed that family firms affect EM and FP. In the 
specific context of Kuwait, this study uses a new measure of family firm: the founding family 
members of a family firm as a control variable (Ebrahim & Abdel Fattah, 2015). In addition, 
this study uses the largest sample and the longest period after the KCGC was implemented, 
increasing the validity of the finding.  
 
1.7 Summary of the key findings 
 
The findings of the first empirical study identify a significant relationship between BD and 
EM. When using the modified Jones model, the results show that although age diversity has a 
positive impact on EM, gender diversity and national diversity have no impact on EM. The 
Kothari model produces similar results concerning the relationship between BD in the form of 
gender, age and nationality. 
 
Furthermore, in terms of FP in the form of return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and 
Tobin’s Q (TQ), the study’s findings show a negative relationship between gender diversity 
and ROA. The findings also reveal a significant positive relationship between AD and ROA. 
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Moreover, the findings show that ND is not associated with ROA. However, when compared 
with previous performance measures, ROA and ROE produce the same results, while TQ 
produces different results. The findings show a positive association between gender diversity 
and TQ. This is consistent with this study’s hypotheses, theories and the previous literature. 
Negative relationships between both AD and ND and TQ are also identified. These results are 
inconsistent with this study’s hypotheses, theories and the previous literature. 
 
1.8 Research structure   
 
Chapter 1 introduces the topic of this research study. It details the background, explains the 
research’s focus, aim and objectives, presents the existing gap, highlights how this study 
intends to answer the research questions and clarifies the study’s main contribution. Chapter 2 
presents the specific context of the state of Kuwait. Chapter 3 is the literature review. Chapter 
4 details the theoretical framework used in this study. Chapter 5 sets out the research 
methodology. Chapter 6 details the research findings. Finally, Chapter 7 presents the study’s 
conclusions and limitations and makes suggestions for future research. 
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2.0 Chapter Two: The Kuwait Context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a background to the research study, set in the Kuwait context. It begins 
by explaining why the researcher has chosen Kuwait for the research study. It then provides a 
brief history of Kuwait, followed by information about Kuwait’s economy and stock market, 
known as Boursa Kuwait. Finally, it shares specific details about the KCGC and its effects on 
the corporate governance (CG) practices of the non-financial companies listed on Boursa 
Kuwait. 
 
2.2 Why Kuwait?  
 
Kuwait has been selected because the country is regarded as the most democratic GCC country; 
when last tested in 2017, it was ranked 119th globally (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). 
In 1962, Kuwait became the first GCC country to have a Constitution (Cordesman, 2018), 
which forms the basis of the laws that apply to all Kuwaiti citizens (National Assembly, 2015).  
 
In 1963, Kuwait became the first GCC country to establish a National Assembly; it is 
noteworthy that the next GCC country to do so was Bahrain in 2002 (Cordesman, 2018). In 
1977, Kuwait became the first GCC country to establish a stock market, known as Boursa 
Kuwait). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and the UAE did likewise in 1980, 
before Qatar followed in 1990 (Cheikh et al., 2018). 
 
From an economic standpoint, when compared with other GCC countries, Kuwait has an open 
economy. This means that all investors can seek entry to Boursa Kuwait and search its website 
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for comprehensive disclosure information on all the firms listed therein (Alotaibi, 2014; Al-
Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). 
 
Another example of Kuwait’s progressive nature is that in 2006, women were allowed to stand 
and vote in elections for the first time. Nevertheless, no women won seats in the National 
Assembly (Alnufaishan & Alrashidi, 2019). In 2009, Kuwait became the first GCC country in 
which women entered Parliament (Alnufaishan & Alrashidi, 2019; Kinninmont, 2012; 
National Assembly, 2015; Odine, 2013). The Kuwait National Assembly, which is Kuwait’s 
legislative authority, consists of 50 members elected by the Kuwaiti people. One of the 
National Assembly’s key tasks is to study ministerial decisions (Bashir, 2019; Herb, 2002). It 
is noteworthy that the Kuwaiti population consists of 51% women and 49% men (The Public 
Authority for Civil Information, 2019). Consequently, with regard to the make-up of the 
Kuwaiti population, the aims and objectives of this study are to investigate whether or not 
gender diversity affects the EM and FP of the Kuwaiti non-financial firms listed on Boursa 
Kuwait.  
 
In contrast to other GCC countries, which introduced CGCs much sooner, it was not until 2013 
when Kuwait implemented the KCGC. Its implementation resulted in some changes to the 
diversity of companies BODs and more specifically to increased numbers of women.  
 
It is also noteworthy also that in 2017, the Kuwaiti Government announced its vision of the 
country with the aim of transforming Kuwait by 2035 into a regional commercial, financial 
and cultural centre attracting investments from all parts of the world (New Kuwait, 2020). This 
vision takes account of the fact that 70% of Kuwait’s total population comprises non-Kuwaiti 
citizens (The Public Authority for Civil Information, 2019). Also, 81% of the Kuwaiti 
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population is below 48 years of age old and 19% are older people (Public Authority for Civil 
Information, 2019). 
 
2.3 Brief history of Kuwait 
 
Kuwait is a country that has a petroleum-based economy. Winstone and Freeth (2017) state 
that Kuwait is among the wealthiest countries globally, balanced between social welfare and 
the modern economy. Kuwait’s history provides a roadmap to its economic, political and 
sociocultural activities in the contemporary world. The Kuwaiti Royal family is descended 
from the Sabah Dynasty and has ruled the country since 1752 (Yom & Gause, 2012). Kuwait 
grew and developed rapidly in the eighteenth century as it became the central hub of 
commercial activities involving the transit of goods to other nations, including, among others, 
India and Arabia (Elsayed, 2020). By the mid-1700s, Kuwait had also become a vital trade 
route from the Persian Gulf to Aleppo in Syria. At around the same time, some merchants from 
Iraq took refuge in Kuwait following the Persian siege in Basra. Thereafter, they had a 
significant impact on the nation’s trading activities from the boat-building expansions that 
played a vital role in the boom of Kuwait’s maritime commercial activities (Zahlan, 2016). 
Moreover, between 1775 and 1779, countries such as India, Iran and Syria diverted their trade 
routes to Kuwait (Peterson, 2011). In 1792, The East India Company also amended its trade 
routes to include Kuwait and secured routes to the east coast of Africa and other parts of India 
(Peterson, 2011). The Great Depression resulted in a decline in demand for goods from India 
and Africa, which were Kuwait’s main trading partners and hence the country began to lose its 
prominence in international trade, profoundly affecting its economy (Al Moosan & McLachan, 
2017). The Persian siege, which ended at the end of the 18th century, shifted trade activities 
away from the Iraqi city of Basra and most of its traders fled to Kuwait (see Figure 3). This 
siege offered a new advantage to the country (Matthiesen, 2014). As a result of the region’s 
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instability, Kuwait grew economically and became very stable and prosperous at the expense 
of Basra. The country also became home to merchants fleeing from persecution in Iraq in the 
late 18th century (Matthiesen, 2014).  
 
In the 19th century, Kuwait proved successful in trading horses, with its now renowned ships 
in the Indian Ocean used to transport them to other countries such as India (Zahlan, 2016). 
During the 19th century, Kuwait became a British protectorate through the Anglo-Kuwaiti 
Agreement, which ensured its protection from the security concerns raised by the Ottoman 
Empire (Joyce, 2014).  
 
In the early part of the 20th century during World War I, the British Empire imposed a 
significant trade block against Kuwait due to the ruler’s involvement with the Ottoman Empire. 
This had a considerable effect on the country’s economy (Alessa, 2017). During the 20th 
century, Kuwait was drastically affected by the Great Depression, which caused a decline in 
international trade, Kuwait’s main economic activity before oil (Alessa, 2017). Following the 
end of World War II, there was an increasing worldwide need for oil and therefore Kuwait 
started to become prosperous from the oil industry (Joyce, 2014). More importantly, in 1962, 
Kuwait gained its independence from the protection of Britain. By mid-century, Kuwait had 
become the most significant regional oil exporter (Alessa, 2017). This economic development 
attracted individuals and corporations from across the globe (Crystal, 2016).  
  
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Kuwait had become relatively well established, 
with elite and wealthy families linked together as a result of marriage or mutual economic 
interest (Yom & Gause, 2012). This cosmopolitan elite and wealthy travelled extensively to 
Europe and other parts of the world and educated their sons to a greater extent than their fellow 
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Arab elites in other Gulf countries (Peterson, 2011). These wealthy families are now mostly 
trading merchants who, as their prime sources of wealth, primarily rely on pearling, building 
ships and long-distance trade. 
 
The term ‘Kuwait elite’ also applies to the European office system in their general trade 
activities, as they follow European culture in their daily activities. Al Hamad and Al Ghanim 
are examples of the wealthiest merchant families, who by the middle of the 20th century were 
already worth millions Kuwaiti Dinar (Peterson, 2011). Nonetheless, at the beginning of the 
current century, trade blocks and global economic depression had a significant impact on 
Kuwait’s regional importance.  
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Figure 3: Map of Kuwait 
Source: https://www.britannica.com/place/Kuwait 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
2.4 Kuwait’s economy  
 
Kuwait’s currency is the Kuwaiti dinar (KWD). Kuwait mostly relies on oil as the foundation 
of its economy. Such reliance on an exhaustible resource is likely to create issues for its 
economy in general in the future. Kuwait also depends on large numbers of skilled immigrant 
workers (Al-Moosa & McLachlan, 2017). Additionally, future problems related to the 
exhaustibility of its vital minerals could have an adverse effect on the country’s economy (Al-
Sabah, 2017). Moreover, Alessa (2017) states that the swift growth of the country’s economy 
has led to increased employment opportunities that cannot be filled by local people. Therefore, 
an expatriate workforce is needed to ensure the efficacy of the country’s oil industry. In May 
1982, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Finance closed the unofficial stock market due to a post-dated 
cheque being unable to be paid (Craig, 2019). Alanezi et al. (2016) and Almujamed et al. (2017) 
argue that mimetic and normative pressures, which led to the constant need to change the 
accounting system prior to the adoption of the International Financial Regulatory Standards 
(IFRS) in 1990, have primarily contributed to the country’s economic development. 
 
The Kuwait Investment Authority specialises in the international investment of the nation’s 
sovereign wealth (Elsayed, 2020). Nevertheless, the inclusion of women in oil wealth is one of 
the most noteworthy advances made to ensure that Kuwait develops accordingly (Almujamed 
et al., 2017). Kuwaiti society has seen a rapid growth in female education (Almujamed et al., 
2017). This social transformation has contributed significantly to Kuwait’s economic growth. 
According to AlDabbous (2012), when the Al Manark stock market crashed, Kuwait lost its 
overall discipline and financial stability. Investors blamed the Kuwaiti Government for the 
crash as it had failed to regulate the Al Manark stock market (Abdullah, Naser, & Fayez, 2018).  
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The World Bank ranks Kuwait as the fourth-most prosperous nation in the world based on per 
capita wealth. The country is also listed as the second-most productive country after Qatar 
among the GCC countries (Al Ali et al., 2018) and is regarded as a leader compared to the 
others in the group (Biygautane, Hodge, & Gerber, 2018). The Kuwaiti financial sector’s 
distinguished position dates back a few years, when the Kuwait stock Soul Al-Manakh traded 
well and market capitalisation became the third-largest after the USA and Japan (Haque, 
Patnaik, & Hashmi, 2017). In addition, Kuwait’s investment companies are renowned for their 
superior administration of assets compared to those elsewhere in the GCC countries. The 
Kuwaiti financial sector’s companies also account for roughly one third of the total assets 
managed by the GCC (Al Ali et al., 2018). Over the years, the listed Kuwaiti companies’ 
valuations have been much higher than those of companies in other GCC countries, with the 
exception of Saudi Arabia (Al-Sabah, 2017).  
 
Kuwait continues to accumulate its wealth from its substantial assets made abroad by its 
investment companies: over time, the country’s foreign investment assets have come to exceed 
their domestic counterparts. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Development, created in the 1960s, has 
become a significant source of economic aid to other GCC countries (Al Ghamen & Hegazy, 
2011). For instance, over the years, Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Jordan have all benefited from 
this organisation. From 2010 to 2016 and compared to all the other GCC countries, Kuwait 
issued the highest number of patent rights to its citizens (Koshy, 2016). In the Arab world, 
Kuwait is additionally recognised for its various programmes that facilitate creativity and 
innovation. 
 
The tourism and agricultural sectors of the Kuwait economy have been doing relatively well: 
the former accounts for 1.5% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) while the latter 
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accounts for 0.4% (Koshy, 2016). In 2016, the tourism sector generated $500million for the 
country’s economy (Koshy, 2016). The Hala Febrayer festival, which celebrates the country’s 
liberation, attracts tourists from the neighbouring GCC countries and, because it lasts for an 
entire month, brings in a significant amount of revenue (El Issawi, 2013). On the other hand, 
Kuwaiti agriculture remains limited by a lack of water and arable land. Nevertheless, in South 
Kuwait, the situation is complicated because most of the soil, which was initially friendly to 
agriculture, was destroyed when the oil wells were set on fire by Iraqi troops during the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 (Bachmann & Sanden, 2013). Fishing is another key 
Kuwaiti economic activity and is mostly carried out in the Indian Ocean (Koshy, 2016). 
Entrepreneurship has also gained popularity in the economy through the development of the 
informal sector. Most Kuwaiti entrepreneurs utilise online platforms such as Instagram to 
market their products (Al Ghanem & Hegazy, 2011). Kuwait’s vision for 2035 is a strategic 
plan that the country is taking towards a bright and promising future. Besides oil revenues, this 
plan aims to implement other profitable prospects on which the country can rely (Al Ali et al., 
2018). Since the plan’s launch a couple of years ago, Kuwait has embarked on new initiatives 
in the non-oil sector, including business and commerce, attracting investors (Elsayed, 2020). 
As per the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) predictions, the Kuwaiti economy is expected 
to grow by roughly 3% by the end of the current year (Elsayed, 2020). Therefore, non-oil sector 
companies are undergoing major changes in terms of their development.  
 
2.5 Boursa Kuwait 
 
Boursa Kuwait was previously known as the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE), formed in 1977 
to help Kuwait regulate its stock market, which is mainly controlled by four central bodies: the 
Ministry of Finance; Boursa; the Central Bank of Kuwait; and the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry (Al-Ghanem & Hegazy, 2011). In 2016, the KSE was transformed to Boursa Kuwait. 
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This change indicated that the benefits of connecting with evolving market indices include the 
increased desirability of the capital market, the entry of international investment; the 
enhancement of investment and an ability to reassure qualified investors of their contributions 
to the economy (Boursa Kuwait). Boursa Kuwait has evolved the criteria that new companies 
must meet to be listed (Algharaballi, 2013). According to Elkalla (2017), the adoption of the 
IFRS has contributed significantly to the high earnings enjoyed by many in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region. Investors face potential risks from share prices in companies 
listed on Boursa Kuwait (Al-Yatama et al., 2020). According to Al Ali et al. (2018), one of 
Boursa Kuwait’s main functions is to list companies, for instance, telecommunications 
corporations. Therefore, one can use Boursa Kuwait’s website to search for a company’s 
annual reports. 
 
The dissemination and the implementation of Boursa Kuwait’s new rule book since April 2018 
have resulted in the transformation of Kuwait’s capital markets (Biygautune et al., 2018). The 
new rule book’s main purpose is to clarify the regulations and the organisational structure of 
Boursa Kuwait and all its aspects. The new regulations have split the market into three parts: 
premier, auction and primary. Each segment tailors the most appropriate way to provide 
information to members about the requirements for a listing (Biygautune et al., 2018). In 
September 2018, as a result of these reforms, the FTSE upgraded Boursa Kuwait to secondary 
emerging market status (Sadeghi, 2011). Consequently, in December 2018, it was added to the 
S&P Dow Jones Global Benchmark Indices (Sadeghi, 2011). It has been predicted that, due to 
the improvement of the activities provided by the new framework, these kinds of upgrades will 
attract even more investors to Boursa Kuwait. Before being privatised in 2014, Boursa Kuwait 
was one of the oldest stock markets in the Arab region. This move was intended to modernise 
the whole sector. Therefore, the changes to Boursa Kuwait began to take place in 2014 when 
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the Kuwaiti Government made the decision. The capital markets authority (CMA) played a 
significant role in the process and in 2016 it facilitated the transfer of the KSE’s management, 
assets and licences to Boursa Kuwait (Koshi, 2016). In compliance with the CMA’s law, the 
second stage of privatisation began 2018 and was completed in February 2019 (Koshi, 2016). 
At present, major international corporations consisting of global principal stock market 
operators like the Athens stock exchange and Al Oula investments are working together with 
Kuwaiti financial institutions (Al Ali et al., 2018). This is a very promising position for the 
Kuwaiti economy generally, not least its local capital markets.  
 
2.6 Corporate governance in Kuwait 
 
Kuwait’s accounting rules are not intrinsically complex. The tax year begins on 1 January and 
ends on 31 December. Although Kuwait lacks a mandatory accounting system, numerous 
companies have been advised to use the IFRS (International Federation of Accountants, 2019). 
The leading regulatory bodies are Boursa Kuwait and the Public Authority for Industry. Law 
No. 5 of 1981 governs and controls the procedures of account certification (Ali, 2018). The 
Kuwait Association of Accountants and Auditors (KAAA) ensures that all Kuwaiti companies 
follow stipulated accounting and auditing standards (Altaher, Dyball, & Evans, 2014). In this 
respect, the KAAA works in collaboration with the Kuwaiti Government to uphold the 
standards. Kuwait has adopted a new financial execution strategy that was introduced in the 
Capital Markets Law No. 7 of 2010 (CML) and issued the code in 2013, although its 
implementation was postponed several times in 2014 and revised again in 2015, before finally 
being applied in 2016 (Ali, 2018; Capital Market Authority, 2015). Additionally, Kuwait has 
various requirements for the accounting reports. All commercial companies are required to 
keep several records in Arabic.  
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These records primarily include a stock shares evolution account, an inventory, a general 
ledger, a sales journal and an expenditures analysis manuscript. For fiscal analysis, each 
Kuwaiti corporation is obligated to make a statement regarding its financial position and a 
record of its profits and losses (Lessambo, 2016). Companies are given three months after their 
financial years to present these reports to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Alotaibi, 
2014). International corporations aiming to trade on Boursa Kuwait should ensure that they 
generate accounting publications (International Federation of Accountants). Therefore, they 
should conduct their journals two years before the date on which they wish to start to indicate 
their profits and their general structure (Alotaibi, 2014). Moreover, before sanctioning the firm, 
Boursa Kuwait’s Council of Directors has the legal capacity to demand other components 
(Almujamed et al., 2017). Following approval, companies publish their reports within the next 
three months after every fiscal year. By contrast, for periodic accounts, businesses are allowed 
a timeframe of two months after the end of the financial year (Alfaraih & Alanezi, 2011). 
Furthermore, independent bodies from the corporations listed by the Ministry of Commerce 
conduct auditing and certification. 
 
The efficiency of these operations results in a clear understanding of the management: there 
will be no conflicts and the management can focus on the company’s profitability and growth. 
If the company has a well-structured BOD and is consistent in its meetings whereby the 
members discuss the company’s long term and short- term strategies, both, then, the company 
will be successful. This process facilitates company planning, which is vital for growth. 
Corporate governance also involves the operation of risk management as well as having 
internal controls that assist in mitigating the various risks that arise with a company’s 
operations (Alfraih & Almutawa, 2017). Therefore, by developing alternative mechanisms, the 
entire risk management process provides assurances that a company is well managed.  
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Good corporate governance practices also represent a selling tool for diverse stakeholders and 
the general public. Such companies have an excellent reputation in the broader society and 
many investors are willing to be associate with them (Liu et al., 2019; Piskin & Kamanli, 2020; 
Santiago et al., 2019). The Kuwait Business Town (KBT) Real Estate Company is an excellent 
example of a company that has adopted corporate governance (AlDabbous, 2012). The KBT 
applies the guidelines issued by 2015 CMA Resolution 72 to ensure that the company’s 
decision-making process is reliable and transparent (Capital Market Authority). Its BOD’s 
main functions are to monitor the performance of the company’s management, to maintain the 
firm’s profitability, to ensure that stakeholders’ interests are taken care of and to achieve higher 
growth ratios. Importantly, the KBT’s BOD consists of three committees: the Audit 
Committee, the Risk Management Committee and the Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee. Notably, the KBT also has a code and ethics unit to regulate its BOD’s members, 
its staff and its other stakeholders, all of whom are expected to abide by the group (Al Mutairi 
et al., 2012). The code and ethics unit mainly outlines principles like integrity, equality and 
professionalism that have all contributed significantly to the company’s good reputation and 
image.  
 
The Audit Committee ensures the sound application of the CG rules. It also ensures compliance 
with the policies in terms of the transparency and the integrity of the company’s published 
financial reports (Chadha, 2016). Further, the Audit Committee is charged with ensuring that 
the company’s internal control systems are efficient and up to date. The Committee generally 
meets at least twice a year, unless in the case of an emergency (Capital Market Authority, 
2013). On the other hand, the Nomination and Remuneration Committee prepares 
recommendations from the nominations it deems best with regard to the members of the 
company’s BOD and management. The Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
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additionally develops policies and processes that regulate the company’s compensations or 
remunerations. The Nomination and Remuneration Committee meets annually or whenever 
there is a need for it to do so (Capital Market Authority, 2013).  
 
Before 2013 and the implementation of the KCGC, Kuwaiti companies and Boursa Kuwait 
grew significantly over time. However, Kuwaiti CG trends have not been consistent with the 
development of Kuwaiti companies. This lack of Kuwaiti CG practices has created serious 
challenges throughout the country. In addition, on the “Ease of Doing Business and 
Competitiveness”, Kuwait has been graded as one of the worst GCC countries. Indeed, Kuwait 
has many problems that continue to hinder the implementation of a proper CG structure. For 
instance, Kuwaiti CG practices involve a pyramid of large shareholdings based on multifarious 
CG structures whereby companies’ powers and authority are in the hands of their senior 
directors and managers. This has resulted in companies being less transparent and disclosing 
ineffectual information about their business activities (Capital Standards, 2010). 
 
The findings of Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari’s (2014) study on the KCGC reveal the benefits of 
the effective implementation of CG practices that provide equal value to all stakeholders. They 
also point out the flaws in Kuwaiti CG practices, which need to be rectified in order to be 
implemented effectively. Furthermore, the findings of Alshammari and Alsultan’s (2010) study 
of 170 firms listed on Boursa Kuwait in 2007 show the association between the KCGC and 
voluntary disclosure. These authors conclude that Kuwaiti CG practices need to improve 
market transparency. Moreover, through studying nine listed Kuwaiti banks in the period from 
2006 to 2010, Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013) have investigated the relationship between 
bank performance and board size. Their results show that in the absence of the KCGC, there is 
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a negative relationship between bank performance and board size. Moreover, Almujamed et al. 
(2017) have confirmed that no CG code was issued until 2012. According to Al-Saidi and Al-
Shammari (2014), board committees are deemed to be significant in Kuwait; moreover, 
companies’ BODs and dividends are matters that are said to be best addressed by companies’ 
main shareholders rather than all their stakeholders. Notwithstanding, various other CG 
practices are neither systematised nor controlled in Kuwait. For instance, banks with small 
roles and ownership structures pose difficulties for listed firms, especially those employing 
unproductive independent directors. On the other hand, Kuwait has CG practices that deal with 
the country’s legal system, stakeholders’ and shareholders’ rights and the protections given to 
shareholders. Moreover, Kuwaiti rules and regulations do not clearly identify and address 
accountability, which is a critical element of CG practices (Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2014).  
 
According to Alfaraih, Alanezi and Almujamed (2012), large numbers of countries have 
implemented a wide variety of laws, rules and regulations to govern and supervise their CG 
practices. On the other hand, Kuwait’s CG practices are controlled through state ownership 
and there is a predominance of family businesses in the country (Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 
2013). In short, concentrated ownership is the main feature of Kuwait’s CG practices. 
Furthermore, while it shares most of the viable features of the other GCC countries, Kuwait 
has an incompetent legal framework for its business sector. In fact, prior to the KCGC being 
implemented in 2013, it was the only GCC country without any CG rules and regulations 
(Alfaraih et al., 2012; Al-Shammari, 2005). Prior to Al-Shammari’s (2014) and Al-Saidi and 
Al-Shammari’s (2014) studies, few investigation on the effectiveness of Kuwait’s CG practices 
existed. These two studies have shown that one of the key features of Kuwait’s CG practices 
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is the requirement for joint auditors. Kuwait is one of only a few countries that requires joint 
auditors, as most other authorities simply need a single auditor.  
 
Another important feature of the KCGC is the implementation of a unique blockholder 
ownership structure. There are various types of ownership, such as institutional, government, 
family and royal family (Al-Shammari, 2015; Al-Shammari & Al-Saidi, 2015). In this scenario, 
family ownership predominates across all parts of Kuwait. The overall concept of CG practices 
requires that all associated stakeholders’ perspectives are considered and that equal importance 
is given to all of them. On the other hand, many Kuwaiti listed companies have substantial 
family ownerships, adding to the difficulty of implementing the KCGC (Al-Saidi & Al-
Shammari, 2013). Given that there is a single controlling power with responsibility for major 
decisions and bearing overall authority, the country has a distinctive kind of CG structure. 
Furthermore, during 2010 Hamdan and Al-Sartawi (2013) examined the relationship between 
CG practices and institutional ownership in Kuwait, revealing that institutional ownership 
reduces the quality of Kuwait’s CG structures. However, a variety of laws and regulations are 
in place concerning the implementation of such types of CG practices (Al-Saidi & Al-
Shammari, 2014; Al-Shammari, 2014). 
 
In March 2013, after the CMA board of the met to consider Law No. 10, they decided to issue 
the CMA corporate governance code, which was subsequently signed by the board chairman 
Saleh Alflah and implemented on 27 June 2013 (Capital Market Authority, 2013). Hence, 
before this time there was no KCGC for companies listed on Boursa Kuwait (Almujamed, 
Tahat, Omran, & Dunne, 2017). The 2013 KCGC brought various changes. In particular, it 
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provided solutions to CG issues experienced by companies prior to 2013, such as transparency, 
conflicts of interest and full disclosure (Capital Market Authority, 2013). First, it led to the new 
companies law stipulating that the CMA decree incorporates guidelines on the formation of a 
constant CG framework for corporations structured by the CMA (Al-Habshan, 2017). Second, 
under the CMA, the Sixth Rule expresses the need to encourage ethical standards and 
accountable conduct by members of BODs (Al-Habshan, 2017; Capital Market Authority, 
2013, 2019). Third, KCGC Regulation No. 212 of the CGC altered the minimum board size 
from two to five directors (Capital Market Authority, 2013). Fourth, the chairman of a BOD 
cannot be the company’s chief executive officer (CEO) at the same time, but as prescribed in 
KCGC Regulation No. 214, other members of the BOD can hold a dual position (Capital 
Market Authority, 2013). Furthermore, according to Principle No. 5/3, all companies must have 
an audit committee and they should use an external audit company to carry out a yearly 
evaluation and review of it (Capital Market Authority, 2013). However, the KCGC makes no 
mention of gender, age and national diversity. These changes have been used to promote the 
KCGC, especially to promote its accounting and auditing standards.  
 
2.7 Summary 
 
In summary, this chapter began by establishing the background to this research study. Next, it 
explained why the researcher has chosen Kuwait for this research study, followed by a brief 
history of Kuwait, along with information about the country’s economy and stock market, 
known as Boursa Kuwait. Finally, this chapter provided specific details about the 2013 KCGC 
and its effects on the CG practices of the non-financial companies listed on Boursa Kuwait. 
The following chapter is the literature review.
 27 
3.0 Chapter Three: Literature Review  
This chapter reviews the literature and consists of two sections. Section 3.1 explains the 
background and context of this research. Section 3.2 reviews previous similar research studies. 
 
  3.1 Background and research context  
This section first explains the background and research context of corporate governance (CG), 
board diversity (BD), earnings management (EM) and firm performance (FP). Second, it 
explains the principles and features of effective CG in Kuwait. 
1. Corporate governance 
In recent years, the concept of CG has emerged as an attractive trend for business organisations. 
The term provides business organisations with a wide range of advantages and opportunities 
that help them negotiate various challenges. There has been growing interest in CG since the 
1990s mainly due to the major collapses of giant corporations and the privatisation of the public 
sector in the UK as well as the increased importance of globalisation (Dreher et al., 2008; 
Vickers & Yarrow, 1991). In response to these corporate and financial crises and, in particular, 
the 2007 global financial crisis, there have been many significant parallel worldwide 
developments in CG practices. There are various concepts of CG available depending on the 
time of the definition, the country’s legal system and the country’s economic culture. Despite 
the diversity of definitions of CG, each shares a common element: CG is a set of mechanisms 
arranging the relationship between a firm’s management, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. For example, according to the Cadbury Code of Corporate Governance (1992, p. 
4), CG can be defined as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. 
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Aguilera (2005) defines CG as the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different 
parties involved in a corporate organisation, whereby the corporate organisation is a social 
system with pluralist interests and common objectives. Additionally, Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2009) define a CG code (CGC) as a set of best practice recommendations relating to 
the mannerisms and the organisation of the BOD. Furthermore, Aguilera and Jackson (2010, 
p. 487) note that a broad definition of CG would be “the study of power and influence over 
decision making within the corporation”. In addition, it has been argued that CG pertains to the 
organisation of rights and responsibilities among parties with shares in the firm, that this CG 
uses techniques to ensure that executives respect shareholders’ interests and that the 
shareholders act responsibly towards the wealth invested in the firm (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003; Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera, Florackis, & Kim, 2016). 
 
Filatotchev and Boyd’s (2009) definition of CG is similar to that of Aguilera et al. (2008) but 
more broadly ensures the effective and efficient running of firms. Filatotchev, Jackson and 
Nakajima (2013) argue that top managers’ interests and those of shareholders should be 
aligned. From this perspective, they define CG as the organisational practices that monitor and 
restrain managerial discretion (Filatotchev et al., 2013). CG may also be described as 
regulations designed to ensure a structure that underpins the relationship between a firm and 
stakeholders who may have financial claims against it (Filatotchev et al., 2007). 
 
CG is a set of regulations and policies that control a company’s BOD, shareholders and other 
stakeholder relationships (Al-Wasmi, 2011). It additionally provides a framework for a 
company’s goals and objectives and identifies the parties that are responsible for its general 
performance (Al-Wasmi, 2011). CG is a source of motivation for all of a company’s 
stakeholders and it also ensures the proper utilisation of its resources and the efficiency of its 
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operations (Almujamed et al., 2017). Under these circumstances, a company’s BOD and 
executive management are seen to have the company’s interests at heart (Almujamed et al., 
2017). CG has various functions in a company. The main one is that a company is more likely 
to obtain funding from outside lenders if it has implemented a proper governance system 
(Alfraih & Almutawa, 2017). By doing so, it can successfully grow. Companies that have 
sound policies in place are more likely to attract investors willing to pay premiums for their 
shares.  
 
Judge et al. (2008) provide an alternative definition by arguing that CG refers to a route through 
which a nation channels corporate influence for the fair and efficient distribution of wealth 
throughout its economy. Although La Porta et al. (2012) do not define CG, they note that the 
effectiveness of a financial system can be traced to the protection of investors against 
expropriation by insiders: when laws are protected and enforced, financial markets are wider 
and more valuable. 
 
On the other hand, Khan (2011) and Raut (2018) define CG in a broad sense as a process 
through which organisations assign business resources in such a way as to make the most value 
for all associated business stakeholders, such as investors, shareholders, customers, employees, 
the environment, suppliers and the general public, while additionally ensuring that those at the 
controls are accountable by assessing their decisions and judgements in terms of inclusivity, 
transparency, equity and accountability. Furthermore, La Portal et al. (2000) present CG as a 
set of mechanisms that a firm’s external stakeholders can use to protect their interests and the 
rights of internal stakeholders, such as the BOD and shareholders. Furthermore, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2004, p. 11) defines CG 
as follows:  
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“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance provides the structure through which the objectives of the company 
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide 
proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are 
in the interest of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring.”  
 
However, despite the fact that these definitions may help identify some essential elements of 
CG, they generally remain vague. Perhaps one of the clearest definitions has been provided by 
Solomon (2007), who states that CG is a set of mechanisms used to manage and control 
organisations in order to provide effective internal control systems and risk management. This 
study discusses the concept of CG in the context of a specific country – Kuwait – and the trend 
from this nation’s perspective. 
 
It is a widely acknowledged fact that by allowing all business stakeholders to play a part in 
their resolution, CG is an effective tool for addressing business issues. Despite the fact that CG 
can play a critical role in the development of an organisation, its performance, its EM and 
regardless of the ever-increasing worldwide value of CG practices, Kuwait’s acceptance and 
implementation of this model is still immature (Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2014; Capital 
Standards, 2010).  
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2. Board diversity 
According to Angelov (2015), BD in any firm is necessary to ensure excellent performance 
and global growth. This is due to the many benefits that accrue from BD. Based on Gentleman’s 
(2011) findings, all firms should strive to use all available means to attain the best possible 
levels of BD. A difference can be made only if a board disregards traditional corporate 
stereotypes and, with the full support of the other members, appoints at least three women to 
the board (Burton, 1991). Through being representative, such a board attracts more people to 
the firm and its business activities. As shown by Armstrong’s (2017) study, BD also helps to 
create healthy debate. This is due to the divergent nature of the views expressed by members 
of a board who come from different backgrounds. This represents a profitable attribute for a 
firm’s business activities. According to Wang and Huynh (2013), the key to good BD revolves 
around the appointment of the correct mix of members so that everyone can share in the firm’s 
objectives. 
 
BD is all about the board having the necessary experience and attitude and, most importantly, 
achieving and maintaining the correct balance in terms of its members’ gender, age, religion 
and background (Freeman, 1984). Boards must be able to understand and reflect the full 
dynamics of contemporary society so that they can prepare themselves for the evolving 
business arena (Chanavat & Ramsden, 2013). It is through such BD that ideas are discussed 
that help firms to develop and grow their business activities. Firms must be able to overcome 
the existing conscious bias in human resources, because this limits the scope within which they 
appoint members to the board and in turn carry out their business activities (Freeman, 1999). 
Furthermore, BD benefits the firm in being more receptive to other groups. By doing so, it is 
able to engage in arrangements that improve the firm’s business activities. NEVCO Education 
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and Kanopy (2017) state that BD also offers an advantage when the firm’s shareholders consist 
of diverse groups.  
  
Through meeting shareholders’ respective requirements, the firm’s reputation is able to 
improve and develop its operations to match the needs of the market. Furthermore, through the 
adaptability and the accommodating nature of the members on the board, the firm may achieve 
its objectives in growing its business. Gentleman (2011) also points out that a local community 
is more likely to work with a firm that has directors who form a specific diverse culture. This 
is because this attribute increases the local community’s level of confidence in the firm and its 
operations. According to Wang and Cliff (2009), good BD is based on how board members 
work together collectively, adapt to new environments and broaden their thinking by tackling 
all the issues that arise within the firm’s operations. 
 
According to Coffey and Wang (1998), boards that do not adapt to diversity tend to experience 
difficulties with current technological, social, economic and geopolitical issues. Consequently, 
they underperform because it is already too late when they realise that there is a problem. 
Diversity represents a key tool that firms can use to survive the evolution that has occurred 
over the past decade in the corporate arena (Erhardt et al., 2003). It provides boards with the 
opportunity to tackle and solve a given problem in diverse ways. It also enables firms to 
implement their ideas in different ways (El, 2018). In this regard, gender diversity forms the 
foundation of a firm’s better CG, leadership, competitiveness and performance (Carter et al., 
2003). Therefore, it is essential that firms put in place corresponding measures to facilitate BD. 
This acts to improve the firm’s performance. 
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3. Earnings management 
It is every firm’s goal and objective to develop its business activities and thrive in the 
marketplace. In order to realise its desired development and growth, it is essential that the firm 
has in place a proper framework to manage its earnings (Chapman, 2017). The best way to 
manage earnings is to employ someone responsible for the proper financial control of business 
activities. Based on Sutrisno’s (2017) findings, the firm’s accounts of its operations should be 
straightforward and consistent. Such a system ensures that its accounts contain accurate and 
representative amounts and figures, providing an accurate and fair reflection of its financial 
position and FP. By gaining investors’ confidence, the firm is able to make the best use of its 
investments and, through EM, ensure its profitability. On this basis, the firm obtains sufficient 
funds to grow and EM helps it to control its levels of expenditure (Bertelsen, 2011). For 
example, if the firm reduces its expenditure, it is likely to increase the net profits from its 
business activities. As mentioned by Bertelsen (2011), proper EM reduces the firm’s levels of 
wastage and misappropriation of funds. Furthermore, less wastage helps the firm to control its 
income and expenditure more effectively. The presence of someone responsible for EM 
provides the firm with many opportunities to grow its business. This includes ideas on how the 
firm can either invest its profits or plough them back into its operations and hence achieve 
better returns from its investments (Walsh, 2016). By doing so, the development and the growth 
of the firm’s business activities become an attainable objective. Therefore, EM is a key and 
vital element of a firm’s FP. However, evidence from a Kuwaiti study of 415 observations of 
Kuwaiti listed firms between 1995 and 2006 revealed that firms would manipulate their 
earnings to maximise their interests and to provide their shareholders with incentives to 
increase their investments (Algharaballi & Albuloushi, 2008).  
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On the other hand, many researchers (e.g. Alsharairi and Salama, 2012; Chapman, 2017; Chen 
et al., 2008; Chih et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 1996; Habbash et al., 2013, 2014; Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999; Klein, 2002; Prior et al., 2008; Schipper, 1989; Sun et al., 2010; Wild, 1996) 
have paid a great deal of attention to EM. In this regard, Healy and Wahlen (1999) define EM 
as being dependent on reported accounting numbers. These can either affect the firm’s 
contractual results or mislead stakeholders about the firm’s underlying performance 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Sun et al., 2010; Xie et al., 2003). Moreover, Barton and Simko (2002) 
define EM as the use of accounting techniques to produce financial statements and records that 
paint an exaggerated positive picture of a firm’s business activities and its financial position. 
Moreover, EM reduces the quality of the firm’s financial reports, on which shareholders base 
their investment decisions. In addition, EM practices diminish the reliability of the firm's 
accounts and do not provide a true picture of its FP (Habbash et al., 2013). Many corporate 
scandals have resulted in shareholders suffering massive losses to their investments (Dechow 
& Skinner, 2000; Habbash & Salama, 2014; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Ronen & Yaari, 2008). 
Particular examples are the dotcom bubble in 2000, Xerox, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Enron 
and Global Crossing. 
 
In summary, it is noteworthy that a firm’s management is able to manipulate the EM between 
different accounting periods and, by doing so in any given period, change investors’ 
perceptions of the firm’s FP (Alsharairi & Salama, 2012).  
 
4. Firm performance 
Chapman (2017) states that in order to gain the trust of actual and potential investors, a firm 
must undertake its operations in a manner that boosts its FP. The invested ROA should be 
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positive. All the invested assets must derive maximum returns to the business (Chapman, 
2017). Walsh (2016) asserts that, on this basis, the firm should clearly state its operations and 
work towards the attainment of these objectives. Likewise, the firm’s ROE should be high and 
profitable. By making good ROE, the firm’s equity holders and other investors will gain trust 
in the business (Walsh, 2016). Albrecht, (2004); El (2018) confirms that this is achieved 
through profitability, which is attained through the application of two strategies: profit 
maximisation and cost reduction. According to Amores (2014), profits are maximised through 
the firm, ensuring that its undertakings and operations are carried out efficiently. This can also 
be achieved through the firm’s diversification of its sources of income. Accordingly, through 
the reduction and control of its levels of expenditure, the firm increases its gross profits. A 
reduction in expenditure is achieved through the elimination of irrelevant costs in its operations 
(Gottardo, 2019). Efficiency is also achieved through other strategies, such as the recycling of 
products and materials; accordingly, the firm should derive maximum value from its returns. 
In such circumstances, the TQ ratio should be greater than one. The firm’s performance is 
additionally determined by the level of application of modern-day technologies (Wang et al., 
2018). On this basis, the firm should seek to use the most recent technological trends in order 
to benefit from greater efficiency and cost reductions in its operations (Ronen, 2011). 
Furthermore, technological advancement and application help to create a better reporting basis 
of the firm’s FP (Wang et al., 2018) and provide a clear picture on growth trends and overall 
development (Schimmer, 2012). Ronen (2011) states that FP is also enhanced through the 
analysis and the implementation of the latest global trends. Such trends can be determined by 
scrutinising the market and analysing FP (Schimmer, 2012). It is through such actions that the 
firm is able to make positive statements about shareholders’ total returns. Shareholders’ returns 
are increased by the firm’s ability to make returns from its investments through high levels of 
profitability (Mahr, 2010). On this basis, the firm should put in place trend prediction 
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mechanisms in order to determine the new trends so that it can act on them. By doing so, the 
firm is able to respond to the trending aspects of its business (Walsh, 2016) and achieve 
maximum profitability from its operations (Mahr, 2010). Yates’ (2016) findings show that FP 
is the crucial determinant of whether or not a firm achieves its operational goals. Accordingly, 
it is vital that the board puts in place measures to improve the achievement of such goals (Yates, 
2016). The next section presents a brief discussion of all the aspects of CG in the context of 
Kuwait. 
 
3.2 Review of similar research studies (empirical studies) 
3.2.1 Board diversity (gender, age and nationality) and earnings management  
 
Gender diversity (GD) and earnings management (EM) 
Peni and Vahamaa (2010) and Gull et al. (2018) assume that women on a board provide greater 
motivation because, among other aspects, they have moral values and follow more conservative 
EM strategies that reduce their firm’s EM. Moreover, Betz et al. (1989), Hoffman (1998) and 
Karandikar et al. (2019) have shown that while the main focus for men is gaining more money 
and reaching a higher position at work, women help others and possess superior moral values 
to men in relation to financial gain. Furthermore, Sanda, Mikailu and Garba (2006) have 
indicated that due to the conservatism of management in some developing countries, women 
comprise less than 5% of BOD and CEO positions. Peni and Vahamma’s (2010) and Sanda et 
al.’s (2006) findings provide clear evidence that where there is GD within firms, EM becomes 
more effective, because the gender parity is conservative and, compared to the other members 
of firms boards, their boards are more cautious about spending money.  
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However, Al-Mamun et al.’s (2013) and Guedes et al.’s (2018) findings show that there is no 
direct connection between either GD in the boardroom or the improved skills of the firm’s 
management in relation to EM in order to prevent unnecessary spending and, at the same time, 
promote good monitoring practices. Nevertheless, in relation to Nigerian banks, Issa et al.’s 
(2018) findings show that neither has any effect on existing practices on manipulating EM. 
 
The findings of studies conducted by Labelle et al. (2010), Lakhal et al. (2015), Omoye et al. 
(2014), Susanto (2016) and Zalata et al. (2019) reveal a negative relationship between GD and 
the probability of the firm engaging in practices of manipulating EM. Similarly, the findings 
of studies conducted by Geiger and Connell (2001), Enofe et al. (2017), Hinz et al. (1997), 
Powell and Ansic (1997), Riley and Chow (1992), Triki Damak (2018) and Zalata et al. (2018) 
confirm that GD reduces EM. In addition, the findings of Byrnes, Miller and Schafer (1999), 
Omoye et al. (2014) and Powell and Ansic (1997) show that men are more likely than women 
to take greater risks when making financial decisions and, therefore the number of women on 
the board reduces the firm’s EM Furthermore, the findings of Kaplan et al.’s (2009) and Labelle 
et al.’s (2010) studies of Canadian firms indicate that in terms of financial gain in their 
professional lives, men are less ethical than women and, when there is a higher number of 
women than men on the board, there is less manipulation of the firm’s EM. Such a situation 
also leads to higher quality in the information disclosed about the firm’s earnings (Srinidhi et 
al., 2011).  
 
In European countries, Kyaw et al.’s (2015) findings show that BD mitigates the adverse effects 
of EM. In addition, the findings of Labelle et al.’s (2010) 2004–2005 Jantzi Research (JR) 
study reveal a significant negative relationship between GD and firms’ EM companies. 
Gavious et al.’s (2012) findings agree that there is a negative relationship between women 
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directors and EM, because if the firm has a female CEO or chief financial officer (CFO), its 
EM is lower. Moreover, Arun et al.’s (2015) findings show that female directors of UK public 
organisations are increasingly conservative and are accordingly bound to be engaged in 
reducing the manipulation of EM. From their findings, Na and Hong (2017) make clear that, 
unlike their female counterparts, male CEOs use aggressive discretionary accruals that increase 
their firms’ EM. Furthermore, Gull et al.’s (2018) hypothesis is that demographic diversity 
(such as in terms of behaviour, educational background and experience) has the ability to 
monitor a firm’s activities and thereby reduce EM. However, Gull et al.’s (2018) hypothesis 
has been rejected because the majority of studies show that demographic diversity has a 
positive relationship with EM. Similarly, by using 2,279 firms and 15,842 directors of Turkish 
firms listed on Borsa Istanbul, Arioglu (2018) examined the relationship between GD and EM. 
His findings confirmed that, contrary to his expectations, there was a positive association 
between the number of female directors and EM. Arioglu justified his finding on the basis of 
Turkish culture not allowing significant GD on firms’ boards. 
 
From the psychological aspect, men are often more confident than women and so they take 
more risks in their decision making (Barber & Odean, 2001; Be'eri et al., 2019; Berthome et 
al., 2019). Furthermore, from examining 500 firms between 1996 and 2000, Krishnan and 
Parsons (2008) show that there is a significant relationship between GD and EM and that firms 
disclose more high-quality earnings when there are more women among their senior 
management (Bernardi & Arnold, 1997; Betz et al., 1989; Krishnan & Parsons, 2008). 
Furthermore, when making authoritative choices, women are less tolerant of opportunistic 
conduct because they wish to be more altruistic in helping other people (Krishnan & Parsons, 
2008). Moreover, akin to Srinidhi et al.’s (2011) findings, those of Musyoka et al.’s (2015) 
examination of Kenyan firms between 2010 and 2014 reveal a positive association between 
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GD and EM. However, Nyoka (2018) has tested the relationship between GD and EM in all 
listed manufacturing firms from 2011 to 2017 in Kenya, finding a statistically significant 
negative correlation, leading to reduced manipulation. Oegema (2017) has studied a similar 
relationship using a sample of eight European Union (EU) countries (Finland, Denmark, the 
Netherlands Sweden, Austria, Germany, Ireland and Italy) from 2012 to 2016, finding a 
significant negative relationship between GD and EM. Drawing on the theory of critical mass, 
Oegema (2017) also reported evidence that this relationship constitutes the significant effect 
when the percentage of females on boards is 30% or higher. In GCC countries the UAE 
government has increased female representation on boards by 20% (Dubai Women 
Establishment, 2020; Khaleej Times, 2017). Importantly, Hoffmann et al.’s (2018) findings are 
consistent with those of previous studies showing that a board with a balanced number of men 
and women can mitigate EM practices.  
  
Age diversity (AD) and earnings management (EM) 
From the literature, few studies have examined AD and EM systematically. AD refers to the 
existence of varied age groups in top management positions, such as CEO, the BOD and senior 
management (Carter et al., 2003; Lausten, 2002). The appointment of younger and older people 
to these positions brings about valuable management perspectives and enables boards to blend 
experience and creativity (Li et al., 2014). Indeed, while younger directors bring creativity to 
the monitoring process and make it less hectic and error-prone, older directors use their 
experience to ensure that the monitoring system is both accurate and effective (Wegge et al., 
2008). In this regard, from his examination of 77 Kazakhstani firms between 2010 and 2016, 
Umitey’s (2018) findings show that there is a negative relationship between AD and EM. 
However, from his examination of 65 firms listed on Kenya’s Nairobi Securities Exchange 
between 2010 and 2014, Musyoka et al.’s (2015) findings indicate a positive relationship 
 40 
between AD and EM. This confirms that a board’s AD increases the firm’s EM (Musyoka et 
al., 2015). However, from examining 80 listed Malaysian firms between 2008 and 2017, Victor 
and Edwin’s (2019) findings show that there is no relationship between AD and EM.  
 
National diversity (ND) and earnings management (EM) 
Few studies currently exist pertaining to national diversity (ND). In this regard, Hart’s (2014) 
findings show that the ND of a board’s members through their different backgrounds and 
experiences provides it with divergent views on management issues. From their respective 
studies, Isa and Farouk’s (2018) and Nyoka’s (2018) findings show that there is a significant 
positive relationship between foreign directors and EM. Furthermore, Nyoka’s (2018) findings 
indicate that in Kenya, there is a positive relationship between AD and EM. French and Raven 
(1960) and Ramaswamy et al. (2001) believe that foreign directors work in many positions 
and, due to the power of their exports, firms that have such good positions affect the 
management process. From examining the association between ND and EM in Kenya, 
Musyoka et al.’s (2015) findings show that there is a positive relationship between ND and 
EM, meaning that foreign directors increase a firm’s EM. Gull et al.’s (2018) and Jiraporn, 
Miller, Yoon and Kim’s (2008) findings show that, according to busyness theory, directors’ 
busyness is harmful to the firm. However, Baatour, Ben Othman and Hussainey’ss (2017) 
findings show that directors who have multiple directorships do not affect their firms adversely. 
Besides, Hooghiemstra et al.’s (2016) findings show that because of their knowledge of 
different accounting procedures, foreign directors have a positive and significant impact on 
firms’ level of EM. 
 
On the other hand, from their examination of Nigerian firms, Enofe et al.’s (2017) findings 
show that there is a negative relationship between international diversity and EM. Furthermore, 
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their findings confirm that foreign directors play an essential role in reducing the manipulation 
of EM. By contrast, from their examination of Malaysian firms, Rauf et al.’s (2012) findings 
show that foreign directors on the board do not affect EM. 
 
3.2.2 Board diversity (gender, age and nationality) and firm performance (FP)  
Gender diversity (GD) and firm performance (FP) 
Many authors have examined the relationship between GD and FP (e.g. Adams & Ferreira, 
2009; Carter et al., 2007; Erhardt et al., 2003; Giannetti & Zhao, 2019; Gordini & Rancati, 
2017; Rose, 2007; Schmidt, 2019). This relationship is of significant concern to the labour 
market and various practices have been adopted to improve firms’ effectiveness in this respect 
(Miller et al., 2009). Furthermore, Erhardt et al. (2003) agree that there is a positive relationship 
between GD and ROA and return on investment (ROI). In addition, Carter et al.’s (2003) and 
Gordini and Rancati’s (2017) findings reveal a positive relationship between the presence of 
women on the board and firm value as measured by TQ. 
 
In an American national survey, firms containing both men and women on their boards were 
found to enjoy higher sales, higher profit margins and consequently higher revenues (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009). A firm’s culture is mirrored by the link between GD and FP (Julizaerma & 
Sori, 2012). A diverse workforce has a more significant breadth of views and hence it appears 
to be well placed to deal with any given circumstance (Carter et al., 2007). Carter et al.’s (2007) 
conclusion seems to contradict his earlier view that there is a positive relationship between GD 
and FP. Pucheta-Martínez and Gallego-Álvarez (2019) and Robbiano (2019) make clear that a 
greater number of women on the board leads to an improvement in FP. According to Liu et al. 
(2014), in the ideal setting and particularly in managerial positions, GD encourages a firm to 
perform better. Furthermore, because they listen more than their male counterparts, women are 
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useful in solving problems. Consequently, GD on the board improves FP and makes a firm 
more successful (Martín-Ugedo & Minguez-Vera, 2014). 
 
It is noteworthy that women establish good relationship networks and create more business-to-
business links (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). In addition, women are good at mentoring employees 
and boosting their career growth and consequently their job satisfaction, ultimately leading to 
improvements in FP (Wahid, 2018). Moreover, in order to validate the results of other studies, 
Das (2019) tested the impact of women on listed Indian firms’ FP, revealing a positive and 
significant relationship because having more female board members improves these firms’ 
social outreach and financial viability through ensuring that they meet their objectives. 
 
On the other hand, GD and, more specifically, a more significant number of women on the 
board, can reduce FP arising from demographic demerits, interpersonal conflicts and their 
related effects (Jurkus et al., 2011). GD provides opportunities for more battles because of 
divergent views and stereotypical behaviours; consequently, conflicts cause a lack of cohesion 
between members of a group (Ferreira, 2015). When a conflict exists within a team, the firm’s 
operational functions become compromised, resulting in poor performance (Low et al., 2015). 
Conflicts can slow down the firm’s decision-making process and thus have an adverse effect 
on FP (Dwyer et al., 2003). According to Dutta and Bose (2007), stereotypical views, 
especially in countries where men are perceived to be at the top in every setting, affect 
cooperation between team members. However, Croson and Gneezy’s (2009) findings show 
that because of their emotions, characteristics and overconfidence and poorer performance in 
both negotiations and purely competitive situations, women are at greater risk than men 
(Croson & Gneezy, 2009). In addition, Rose (2007) asserts that although women have a very 
high representation on the boards of American and British firms, they are very poorly 
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represented on the boards of Danish firms. Moreover, Jaffar et al. (2019) have examined the 
relationship between GD and FP measured by ROA in Bahrain, finding a negative relationship 
between them, contradictory with their expectations. However, other studies have found no 
significant relationship between GD and FP (Carter et al., 2010; Rose, 2007). 
 
Age diversity (AD) and firm performance (FP) 
The relationship between AD and FP has suffered from an absence of detailed analysis. 
Moreover, owing to shared experiences and acquired skills, AD is an essential factor of FP. In 
addition, young board members include female directors because, compared to older board 
directors, they are more able to think in new and creative ways (Carter et al., 2003). According 
to Choi and Rainey (2010), there is a positive relationship in American firms between AD and 
FP. From using data relating to 205 European listed companies in 2009, Ferrero-Ferrero, 
Fernández-Izquierdo and Muñoz-Torres (2015) assert that there is a positive association 
between boards’ AD and FP. They explain that having people on the board from different 
generations results in AD that provides firms with rich knowledge, information and experience. 
For example, the older directors have wisdom and experience, the middle group of directors 
are more proactive in managing the firm and the younger directors are more proactive in 
providing ideas and plans for the firm’s future. Moreover, Darmadi’s (2011) findings show a 
similarly positive result in the relationship between young directors a firm’s increased FP. 
According to Pitts (2005), a firm with a high degree of AD will probably include employees 
with a greater amount of confidence because they believe that they have opportunities to grow 
their careers within its ranks. Interestingly, Dagsson and Larsson (2011) demonstrate that, 
while there is a positive relationship in Swedish firms between AD and ROA, there is a negative 
relationship between AD and TQ, because ROA measures accounting performance but not the 
value of market performance.  
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However, Tanikawa, Kim and Jung (2017) demonstrate that older board members are more 
motivated than younger directors. Additionally, most of the directors of Malaysian firms are 
between 50 and 59 years of age and the average age is 58 years. Consequently, there is a lack 
of AD on such firms’ boards (Abdullah et al., 2017). Furthermore, Kunze et al. (2013) and 
Shahata et al. (2017) have shown that there is a negative relationship between AD and FP. 
According to Diepen’s (2015) findings, there is a negative correlation between AD and FP with 
respect to firms whose directors are between 41 to 50 years of age. From examining German 
firms, Abdullah et al.’s (2017), Ali and Kulik’s (2014) and Ali, Ng and Kulik’s (2014) findings 
all indicated that, as measured by ROA, there is a negative relationship between AD and FP. 
Their findings show that, because of choosing the board’s age according to the age 
discrimination environment within firms, there is a negative correlation between AD and FP 
(Kunze, Boehm, & Bruch, 2011). In the UK, Shehata et al.’s (2017) findings show that there 
is a significant negative relationship between AD and FP. Eulerich, Velte and Van’s (2014) 
findings reveal that there is a negative correlation between AD and FP and that considerable 
AD may reduce a board’s decision-making process and communication between board 
members. On the other hand, Tanikawa et al.’s (2017) findings show that when the board 
members are relatively older, there is a significant negative relationship between AD and ROE, 
but this is not the case between AD and ROA. From examining the relationship between AD 
and FP in all Swedish firms listed between 2011 and 2015, Petersson and Wallin’s (2017) 
findings show that there is a significant negative relationship between AD and FP. This means 
that the lower the AD of Swedish listed firms’ boards, the greater the FP. 
 
Furthermore, Diepen’s (2015) findings show that in Dutch firms, there is no relationship 
between the AD on the board and FP. Rahman et al.’s (2015) findings show that if there is 
some AD within the board, it can improve FP, overcome the board’s problems and encourage 
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creative thinking. On the other hand, similarly aged board members reduce FP. In addition, 
from examining Australian firms, Carter et al., (2003); Ali and Kulik’s (2014) findings show 
that AD has no significant effect on employee productivity and various conclusions can be 
made about the impact of AD on FP.  
 
National diversity (ND) and firm performance (FP) 
In addition, from the literature, there are few studies about ND and FP. ND affects a firm’s 
economic performance in both a positive and negative manner. Authors such as Alesina and 
La Ferrara (2005), Diepen (2015), Hart (2004) and Kaczmarek (2009) have examined the 
relationship between ND and FP by focusing solely on employees’ perceptions and 
investigating only one country, revealing a positive correlation between ND and FP. 
Furthermore, Harjoto et al.’s (2015) conclusions show that internationally diverse boards of 
management are more likely to perform better because of their diverse knowledge and 
perspectives and members’ various experiences in problem solving. Moreover, Erhardt et al.’s 
(2003) findings show that in the USA, there is a positive relationship between ND and ROA 
and between ND and ROI. This means that by using their experiences and knowledge, 
ethnically diverse board members can affect FP. Similarly, Delis et al.’s (2016) findings show 
that an internationally diverse BOD is more likely to have a positive influence on FP, because 
employees seek to work diligently within the parameters of international standards. In addition, 
Diepen’s (2015) and Hart’s (2004) findings reveal that immigrant entrepreneurs have a 
negative effect on FP, especially when only international board directors occupy the top 
management positions. Such a firm creates an environment whereby all the top managers are 
of the same nationality and the employees have little or no confidence about working in the 
firm. Kaczmarek’s (2009) findings show that when a firm’s directors work with internationally 
diverse subordinate staff, they tend to have faith in the firm’s policies, leading to improved FP. 
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In addition, based on his study’s findings, Darmadi (2011) argues that international diversity 
does not influence either a firm’s marketing performance as measured by TQ, or as an 
accounting measure using ROA, which means that ND does not affect FP.  
 
Relevant studies in Kuwait 
 
To date, no study has discussed the relationship between gender, age, ND and EM in Kuwait. 
However, Algharaballi and Albuloushi (2008) have found that Kuwaiti listed firms use EM for 
their interest. Elkalla (2017) has studied the country-level and firm-specific determinants of 
the accrual-based EM of 802 non-financial firms listed on the stock markets of Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan from 1996 to 
2014. He has confirmed that firms use EM in the MENA region, leaning towards being 
opportunistic rather than efficient (Elkalla, 2017). Moreover, Algharabali (2013) has found that 
non-listed companies often manipulate their EM. Conversely, the same study did not find any 
evidence regarding the use of EM in the listing company. Nevertheless, there is evidence from 
a Kuwaiti study of 415 observations of Kuwaiti listed firms between 1995 and 2006 that firms 
manipulated their earnings to maximise their interests and provide shareholders with incentives 
to increase their investments (Algharaballi & Albuloushi, 2008).  
 
With regard to the situation in Kuwait, Alkazemi and Jackson (2019), Alowaihan (2004) and 
Sanad and Tessler (1988) have found that although Kuwaiti women are on average better 
educated than men, they do not have as much experience in the workplace. The Central 
Statistical Bureau (2020) has confirmed that from 2009 until 2019, women were more educated 
than men at the University of Kuwait, demonstrated by the fact that 76.5% of master’s students 
in 2019 were female (Central Statistical Bureau, 2020). Furthermore, Alowaihan’s (2004) 
findings show no significant differences in the number of men and women on the boards of 
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family firms. There are several reasons for this, including the fact that married women have 
more domestic responsibilities than men, particularly if they are caring for children (Adel & 
Alqatan, 2019). From examining 121 listed Kuwaiti firms in the period from 2009 to 2011, 
Alshammari and Alsaidi’s (2014) findings show that because ROA is an accounting measure 
and TQ is a market measure, Kuwaiti women directors have a negative relationship with ROA 
and an insignificant relationship with TQ. Furthermore, by using 23 Kuwaiti non-financial 
firms listed on Boursa Kuwait between 2012 and 2014 and 69 final observations collected from 
the Thomson Reuters database, Issa et al. (2019) have tested the relationship between GD and 
TQ, revealing a positive relationship. 
 
3.2.3 Influence of other characteristics on EM and FP 
 
This section reviews the literature related to the control variables used in the regression models 
when examining the impact of diversity on EM and FP. With the exception of FP, which 
excludes the firm’s loss variable, both models use the same control variables. 
 
3.2.3.1 Company size  
 
The findings of most previous studies (Gonzalez et al., 2014; Gull et al., 2018; Ittonen et al., 
2013; Lakhal et al., 2015; Omoye et al., 2014; Susanto, 2016; Zalata et al., 2018) show a 
relationship between firm size and EM. For instance, Ittonen et al.’s (2013) findings reveal a 
negative relationship between firm size and EM that is significant at the 1% level. Meek et al.’s 
(2007), Peni and Vahamaa’s (2010), Shu et al.’s (2015) and Teshima and Shuto’s (2008) 
findings confirm that because larger firms do not give their managers the same opportunities 
to manipulate earnings, there is a negative relationship between firm size and EM managers to 
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manipulate earnings. However, Moses (1987) adds that larger firms have more EM activities. 
Ahmad et al. (2006) and Kim et al. (2003) state that larger firms often have sturdier internal 
control systems and may have more experienced internal auditors than smaller firms. 
Consequently, an efficient internal control system helps with the preparation of consistent 
financial data for the public and probably minimises the management’s capacity to influence 
earnings. Alsaeed’s (2006), Bassiouny’s (2016) and Chung et al.’s (2005) findings show that 
in Egypt between 2007 and 2011, there was an insignificant association between firm size and 
EM. 
 
Furthermore, the findings of studies by Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), Chen et al. (2007), 
Klein (2002) and Xie et al. (2003), show that compared to small firms, large firms gives their 
managers greater opportunities to manipulate their earnings. In addition, from their study of 
the Pakistani textile industry, Ali et al.’s (2015) findings show that there is a significant positive 
relationship between firm size and EM. 
 
The findings of many other studies (Alshamari & Alsaidi, 2014; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 
2008; Carter et al., 2010; Erhardt et al., 2003; Gordini & Rancati, 2017; Jansen, 1986; Rose, 
2007) also present a relationship between firm size and FP. In this regard, Alshamari and 
Alsaidi’s (2014) findings show a negative correlation between firm size and FP at the 1% level 
of significance. These findings confirm those of Maury and Pajuste (2005) that a young firm 
that improves its margin of profitability can become larger than a mature firm’s margin of 
profitability. In addition, Jansen’s (1986), Lee’s (2009) and Yammeesri and Kanthi Herath’s 
(2010) findings confirm that there is a positive relationship between firm size and FP. 
Moreover, Short and Keasey’s (1999) findings show that smaller firms have less funding than 
larger firms because the latter avoid financial constraint situations and are therefore able to 
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invest in profitable businesses. Many studies (Carter et al., 2010; Chbib, 2015; Ittonen et al., 
2013; Rose, 2007; Short & Keasey, 1999) have used the logarithm of total assets to measure 
firm size. This can also be measured by the firm’s number of employees, but such data are not 
always available. Therefore, firm size, referred to in this study as CSZ, is the term most 
commonly used in the literature. 
 
3.2.3.2 Company age 
 
Similar to firm size and EM, the findings of most previous studies reveal a negative relationship 
between firm age and EM. Alsaeed’s (2006) findings also show evidence that the older the 
firm, the greater the earnings quality. Khanh and Nguyen’s (2018) findings show that most 
firms, which have long histories and vast experience, expect to have more reputation risk. In 
addition, Kim et al.’s (2003) findings show that compared with younger firms, older firms have 
better internal control systems. Moreover, Akhtaruddin’s (2005) findings show that long-
established firms take more care about their reputations and avoid performing EM. Having 
selected the 50 most active companies on the Egyptian stock market between 2007 and 2011 
to examine the relationship between firm age and EM, Bassiouny’s (2016) findings show that 
there is no relationship between firm age and EM. 
 
On the other hand, the argument about firm age and EM is similar to that between firm size 
and FP in that there is a negative relationship between them. This is because younger firms 
perform better than older firms (Begley & Boyd, 1985; Dunne & Hughes, 1994; Maury & 
Pajuste, 2005). However, having examined the association between firm age and FP in Spain 
from 1998 to 2006, Coad, Segarra and Teruel’s (2013) findings show that there is a positive 
relationship between them. They also report evidence that older firms continue to be 
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productive, leading to higher profits, fewer debts and increased FP. By contrast, having 
examined 400 firms listed on Iran’s Tehran Stock Market between 2006 and 2010, Pouraghajan 
et al.’s (2013) findings revealed no relationship between firm age and FP because the senior 
firms did not influence FP. Company age is measured by the number of years of business 
operations (Chavis et al., 2010) and is referred to in this study as CA. 
 
2.2.3.3 Family firms 
Prencipe, Markarian and Pozza (2008) postulate that there is a positive association between 
family firms and EM. Family firms are driven to manage earnings for leverage-associated and 
debt-covenant motives. However, Anderson and Reeb’s (2003) findings indicate a negative 
relationship between them by asserting that family firms are considerably less likely to manage 
their earnings. Further, Yang’s (2010) findings show that the greater the extent of the family’s 
ownership, the more likely there is to be EM. 
 
Bhatt and Bhattacharya (2017) have investigated the effect of family firms on the association 
between board characteristics and FP in Indian firms. Their results show that, when compared 
to non-family firms, the board structure of family firms has a negative impact on FP. From 
their examination of the relationship between family firms and FP in the USA, Anderson and 
Reeb’s (2003) findings show that family firms are better than non-family firms. Further, from 
his examination of Japanese family firms between 1990 and 1998, Saito’s (2008) findings 
indicate that family firms have superior FP to that of non-family firms, revealing a positive 
relationship. In addition, family firms measured by the founder of the family member (Ebrahim 
& Abdel Fattah, 2015), not by the family ownership due to such data being unavailable, this is 
referred to in this study as FF. 
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3.2.3.4 Board size 
According to Beasley (1996), the larger the board size, the lower the EM. Obigbemi et al. 
(2016) claim there is a negative and significant relationship between EM and board size, 
composition and gender. Daghsni, Zouhayer and Mbarek’s (2016) findings show a negative 
correlation between board size and EM. Furthermore, from their examination of 110 listed 
American firms between 1992 and 1996 using the S&P 500 Index, Xie et al.’s (2003) findings 
show that although large board size increases earnings quality, there is a negative relationship 
between board size and EM. However, from their examination of 113 Singaporean and 113 
Malaysian firms in 2000, Bradbury et al.’s (2006) findings show no relationship between board 
size and EM. 
 
From their examination of the link between board size and FP, Kalsie and Shrivastav’s (2016) 
and Xie et al.’s (2003) findings show that board size has a significant and positive effect on 
FP. However, Dalton et al. (1999) notes that a smaller board size can help avoid the problem 
and make BODs more focused and active.  Contrary to other studies’ results, from his 
investigation of the connection between board size and Turkish firms’ FP, Topak’s (2011) 
findings show that there is no relationship between board size and FP in Turkey. Further, from 
their investigation of a sample of Nigerian and Ghanaian firms, Badu and Appiah’s (2017) 
findings show that FP is enhanced by optimal board size, successful advice and control and 
disciplined management. Thus, there is a positive relationship between board size and FP. 
Additionally, from their study of the association between board size and financial and 
reputational corporate performance in Colombia, Orozco, Vargas and Galindo-Dorado’s 
(2018) findings show that large boards are related to greater corporate reputations and lower 
FP. Consequently, there is a negative relationship between board size and FP. In this study, 
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board size is measured by the total number of directors and is referred to as BSZ (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Zalata et al., 2018). 
 
3.2.3.5 Board independence  
Based on information regarding industrial companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange, 
Idris, Siam and Nassar (2018) conclude that there is a negative relationship between board 
independence and EM. They assert that a greater proportion of board independence is linked 
to more efficient control, minimising EM as a result. Moreover, from studying the same 
relationship in Hong Kong, Jaggi, Leung and Gul’s (2009) findings show a negative 
relationship between board independence and EM. They explain that the larger the number of 
independent directors on the board, the more effective the monitoring, leading to a reduction 
in the manipulation of EM. Furthermore, by using a unique data set of Egyptian firms to analyse 
the relationship between board independence, audit quality and EM, Khalil and Ozkan’s (2016) 
findings dispute the idea that a greater percentage of non-executive members on the board is 
related to less EM. Their findings show that board independence’s impact on EM practices 
depends on the ownership levels held by the executive directors and major shareholders and 
the composition of the audit committee. 
 
According to Sanda’s (2011) findings, there is a positive relationship between board 
independence and FP. In addition, according to their definition that, as a collective body, a 
BOD acts in the best interests of shareholders, Fuzi Halim and Julizaerma’s (2016) findings 
show that firms with the largest number of independent directors have better FP. Similarly, 
from their investigation as to whether or not board independence influences Bangladeshi listed 
companies’ FP, Rashid’s (2018) results show that there is no such relationship. Pan, Huang 
and Gopal’s (2016) findings evidence that firms with more independent board members 
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perform better than firms with fewer independent board directors. This study measures board 
independence as the proportion of independent directors to the total number of board members, 
referred to in this study as BID (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Zalata et al., 2018).  
 
3.2.3.6 Role duality 
Daghsni et al.’s (2016) findings show that the duality of the roles of the board chairman and 
the CEO has a positive influence on EM. This suggests that the duality of the former’s role and 
the latter’s function helps to increase a firm’s EM because the CEO can minimise the board’s 
efficiency and create a conflict between the board and the management, which in turn can 
reduce EM. According to Kamarudin, Ismail and Samsuddin (2012), the dual role minimises 
the efficiency of autonomous audit teams, reducing the effectiveness of monitoring financial 
statements. Additionally, being the chairman, a CEO has excessive power over the board’s 
choices, the observation role of independent audit boards to ensure the high quality of earnings 
in financial reports may be rendered ineffective. Thus, role duality is negatively related to EM. 
Furthermore, several studies (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Davidson et al., 2005; Kao and 
Chen, 2004; Xie et al., 2003) have found no relationship between role duality and EM. 
 
By using a sample of listed firms in Turkey, Dogan et al. (2013) have studied the effect of CEO 
duality on FP, finding a negative relationship between them. Furthermore, they found no 
significant association between CEO duality and FP. From their investigation of such an 
association and the moderating impact of the element of family control in Hong Kong, Yan 
Lam and Kam Lee’s (2008) findings show no relationship between CEO duality and FP. 
Moreover, Elsayed’s (2007) findings show that CEO duality does not affect Egyptian listed 
firms’ performance. However, from their examination of Malaysian firms, Abdulrahman and 
Haniffa’s (2005) findings show that, while there is no relationship between CEO role duality 
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and FP, the CEO reduces the effectiveness of the board’s mentoring and the FP in a company. 
This study measures role duality by the director holding the CEO position, referred to here as 
DUAL (Ebrahim & Abdel Fattah, 2015; Gull et al., 2018). 
 
3.2.3.7 Leverage 
As stated by Ali et al. (2008), Defond and Jiambalvo (1994), Guna and Herawaty (2010), Jiang 
et al. (2008) and Ma'ruf (2006), management is likely to perform EM practices if there is a high 
leverage ratio. Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) have reported evidence that the greater the firm’s 
indebtedness, the lower the manipulation of EM. Bassiouny (2016), Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) and DeGeorge, Patel and Zechhauser (1999) point out that investors are interested in 
positive earnings. Thus, firms with higher leverage ratios are expected to be more motivated to 
manage their earnings as they should give their financiers good outcomes from refinancing 
their firms’ debts. Matsumoto (2002) states that managers aim for earnings surprises; 
moreover, in order to reach the analysts’ goals, this can be done by EM. Therefore, there is a 
positive relationship between leverage and EM. However, many studies (Chung et al., 2002; 
Paesnell et al., 2000; Yang, Lai, & Tan, 2008) have found a negative relationship between 
leverage and EM. This finding is supported by Park and Shin’s (2004) examination of 469 
Canadian firms between 1991 and 1997. 
 
Ilyukhin (2015) has studied the link between financial leverage and FP for large Russian firms, 
using the ratio of firm debt to total assets as a measure of financial leverage and ROA, operating 
margin and ROE as measures of financial performance. His findings show that financial 
leverage has a negative effect on Russian FP. Furthermore, Ibhagui and Olokoyo’s (2018) 
findings show that, while there is a positive relationship between leverage and FP, this is 
subject to the firm’s size, with smaller firms having higher leverages. Moreover, Hutten (2014) 
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have found a positive relationship between leverage and FP. By contrast, from studying the 
impact of financial leverage on Pakistani firms’ FP, Javed et al. (2015) show a negative 
relationship between them. This study measures leverage by the firm’s total debt divided by its 
total assets; this is referred to in the present study as L (Gull et al., 2018; Ittonen et al., 2013). 
 
3.2.3.8 Liquidity 
Riahi, Lamiri and Arab (2013) have demonstrated the presence of a significant positive 
association between EM and market liquidity. Furthermore, Huang, Lao and McPhee’s (2017) 
findings show that stock liquidity increases accrual-based EM and that liquidity affects EM 
through magnifying the effects of equity compensation and takeover pressure. From studying 
the same relationship in America between 1999 and 2013, Gombola et al.’s (2016) findings 
also show a negative relationship between equity compensation and takeover pressure and a 
positive relationship between liquidity and EM. Gombola et al.’s (2016) findings show that 
banks with less liquidity do not use EM. On the other hand, from their examination of banks 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2001, Ascioglu, Hegde, Krishnan and 
McDermott’s (2012) findings a negative association between liquidity and EM in the listed 
bank. Consequently, they conclude that smaller market liquidity is related to firms with greater 
EM. 
 
Through their investigations, Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Khanna and Sonti (2004), 
Sanghani (2014) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) have established that liquidity (current 
ratio) has a positive effect on firms’ financial performance. Moreover, they conclude that this 
is the case when there is liquidity that encourages investors to buy a firm’s shares and that this 
is additionally useful for the firm’s stakeholders. Furthermore, from their investigation of the 
impact of liquidity on the Turkish retail industry’s financial performance, Demirgüneş’ (2016) 
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findings show a significant positive relationship between liquidity and financial performance. 
Similarly, from examining the relationship between liquidity and FP in the MENA region, Fang 
et al.’s (2009) and Farooq and Bouaich’s (2012) findings indicate a positive and significant 
relationship between liquidity and FP. By contrast, Baker and Stein’s (2004) and Goldstein and 
Guembel’s (2008) findings show a negative correlation between them as measured by TQ. This 
study measures the current ratio of liquidity as a proxy of risk, referred to in this study as LQ 
(Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey 2013). 
 
3.2.3.9 Sales growth 
Firms with high rates of growth may not manipulate incomes to report either positive or shifts 
in incomes. By contrast, those with low rates of growth may either manipulate or alter their 
earnings through EM. Myers and Skiner’s (2000) findings show a positive relationship between 
sales growth and EM and that high-growth firms can bias up their earnings after forming either 
a continuous sales growth or an earnings trend. In a reporting model, there is a connection 
between the level of managed earnings and the firm’s earnings performance as well as its 
anticipated growth. In this respect, the firm’s management manipulates its earnings in order to 
influence the company’s equity valuation, whereas the share price suffers when the sum of the 
managed incomes increases (Lee, Li, & Yue, 2006).  
 
Myers and Skiner (2000) have found a positive relationship between sales growth and firm 
management. Lee et al. (2006) have established that higher performance firms often over-report 
their earnings as in their study, growth and earnings performance overtook upsurges in price 
sensitivity. From studying the relationship between sales growth and FP from 1988 to 1955 
using the COMPUSTAT database, Brush, Bromiley and Hendricks (2000) have found that the 
former increases the latter. These researchers also noted that strong CG practices can positively 
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influence sales growth and FP. Similarly, from studying the relationship between the 2004 sales 
growth and FP of 116 Finnish firms collected from Thomson Financial Database, Bhattacharya 
and Graham’s (2007) findings show a positive relationship between sales growth and FP as 
measured by TQ, with the greater the sales growth, the higher the firm value. The present study 
measures the percentage change in aggregate sales, referred to here as SG (Ittonen et al., 2013; 
Zalata et al., 2018). 
 
3.2.3.10 Cash flow 
According to Alzoubi (2016), Chung et al. (2005) and Peasnell et al. (2005), higher cash flows 
from a firm’s operations lead to higher levels of EM. However, Chen et al. (2007) and Gul et 
al. (2009) have identified a negative association between cash flow and EM. Nekhili et al. 
(2016) have examined the controlling impact of ownership characteristics and firm CG 
practices in reducing EM activities in a free cash flow situation, indicating leaders’ current 
unscrupulous activities in terms of free cash flows. In particular, directors were found to be 
engaged in EM activities, thereby increasing their reported earnings. These findings have been 
confirmed by Cardoso et al. (2014), who show that firms with perceptions of low growth and 
excessive free cash flows are more likely to manage their earnings to augment profitability. 
 
According to Alzoubi (2016), Chung et al. (2005) and Peasnell et al. (2005), there is a positive 
relationship between cash flow and FP due to higher cash flows from a firm’s operations, 
leading to a higher level of FP. Studying the same relationship in Nigerian listed banks, 
Ogbonnaya et al.’s (2016) findings show a positive association between cash flow and FP. 
However, through their investigations, Chen et al. (2007) and Gul et al. (2009) have established 
a negative association between cash flows and FP. In addition, Cardoso et al. (2014) and 
Nekhili et al. (2016) have found that firms with low growth perceptions and excessive cash 
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flow are more likely to carry out EM in order to augment their profitability, leading to better 
FP. Moreover, from their examination of 370 firms listed on Turkey’s Boursa Istanbul from 
2009 to 2015, Kadioglu, Kilic and Yilmaz’s (2017) findings show a negative relationship 
between cash flow and FP as measured by TQ. In addition, Ali et al. (2013), Ashitam (2005), 
Nwanyanwu (2015) and Zhou et al. (2012) have found a similar negative relationship from 
their investigations of firms in China, Iran and Nigeria. The present study measures cash flow 
from the firm’s operations, referred to here as CF (Ittonen et al., 2013; Zalata et al., 2018). 
 
3.2.3.11 Dividends per share 
Kasanen et al.’s (1996) findings show a positive relationship between dividend-based target 
earnings and EM. From inspecting the association between price earnings as an EM proxy and 
dividend payout ratio, Ahmed, Advani and Kanwal’s (2018) findings demonstrate that the 
dividend payout ratio and price-earnings ratio exhibit a negative relationship and positive 
convexity and vice versa. Therefore, according to this study, there is a negative correlation 
between dividend per share and EM. If the dividend per share ratio increases, EM reduces. 
Furthermore, Elshandidy et al. (2013) and Mohammad et al. (2001) have found a negative 
relationship between dividends per share and EM.  
 
According to Kasanen et al. (1996), there is a positive relationship between dividend-based 
target earnings and FP. Kadioglu et al.’s (2017) study of this relationship in terms of Turkish 
firms supports this finding, as does a similar Nigerian study from 2006 to 2012. Moreover, 
from their investigation of 42 firms listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2011, 
Khamis, Elalo and Hamdan’s (2015) findings show a significant positive relationship between 
dividend-based target earnings and FP when measuring FP by TQ and a negative relationship 
when using ROA. Furthermore, Elshandidy et al.’s (2013) and Mohammad et al.’s (2001) 
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findings show a negative correlation between dividends per share and FP. The present study 
measures the dividend per share based on the actual number of shares, referred to here as DPS 
(Elshandidy et al., 2013; Mohammad et al., 2011). 
 
3.2.3.12 Firm losses 
Degiannakis et al. (2017) state that firms try to avoid losses in order to enhance their EM. Given 
that there is a negative relationship between a firm’s losses and EM, loss-making firms thus 
experience reduced EM. Furthermore from studying EM and the valuation of underperforming 
loss-making firms, Comiran, Fedyk and Ha (2016) have identified a negative relationship 
between EM and a firm’s losses. Moreover, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) have demonstrated 
that firms manage their reported earnings to avoid reductions in and loss of earnings. Therefore, 
loss-making firms manage their earnings better and, consequently, there is a positive 
relationship between a firm’s losses and EM. This is measured by a dummy variable that takes 
a value of 1 if the firm’s net income is negative and 0 otherwise. The present study also adds 
dummies to control for the possible effects of year and industry type. These measurements are 
referred to here as FL.  
 
3.3 Description of research gaps  
 
Having reviewed the existing literature, it is evident that there is a lack of significant research 
into BD and EM, BD and FP and ND in GCC countries, including in Kuwait specifically. The 
lack of studies since the issuance of the KCGC is also noteworthy. Moreover, there have been 
few studies pertaining to AD and EM. Furthermore, few studies have measured AD in different 
ways. More generally, there are few references in the literature regarding BD, EM and FP in 
Kuwait. 
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More specifically, there are few Kuwaiti studies with large samples and covering periods of 
time since the issuance of the KCGC. In addition, few Kuwaiti studies have used both the 
modified Jones model and the Kothari model to measure EM and FP in Kuwait. finally, few 
studies have used a new control variable when considering BD and EM in Kuwait. 
 
3.4 Importance of this research study’s contribution to the literature  
 
There is a growing body of literature on BD. This study contributes to this literature by 
investigating in Kuwait. It does so by considering, first, the effects of GD, AD and ND on 
boards and, second, their impact on the EM and FP of non-financial firms listed on Boursa 
Kuwait. In particular, this study contributes to the existing literature on GD by demonstrating 
the vital role played by women, young people and foreign directors on boards, thereby 
improving their monitoring role on EM and FP in Kuwait. 
 
The impact of gender, age and ND on both EM and FP has primarily been examined in the case 
of developed countries (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2003, 2007; Erhardt et al., 2003; 
Gordini & Rancati, 2017; Gull et al., 2018; Lausten, 2002; Musyoka et al., 2015; Nyoka, 2018; 
Peni & Vahamaa, 2010; Rose 2007). By contrast, this study explores this issue in Kuwait after 
the country implemented the KCGC in June 2013, through analysing the impact of GD, AD 
and ND on EM and FP. In conducting this analysis, different measures are used.  
 
As shown in Figure 6 and Table 1, this study uses agency and resource dependence and social 
capital theories to support its hypotheses and meet its research aim and objectives. Agency and 
resource dependence theories have been used by numerous authors to support their hypotheses, 
such as Abdullah et al. (2017), Arioglu (2018), Choi and Rainey (2010), Gull et al. (2018), 
Jurkus et al. (2011), Low et al. (2015) and Lückerath-Rovers (2013). However, in examining 
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the impact of BD on FP in Indonesia, Darmadi’s (2011) study is alone in using social capital 
theory to support its hypotheses.  
 
Finally, most previous studies (e.g. Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Alshamari & Alsaidi, 2014; 
Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2010; Erhardt et al., 2003; Gonzalez et al., 
2014; Gordini & Rancati, 2017; Gull et al., 2018; Ittonen et al., 2013; Lakhal et al., 2015; 
Omoye et al., 2014; Peni & Vahamaa, 2010; Rose, 2007; Susanto, 2016; Zalata et al., 2018) 
have used the exact same model and identical control variables for their methodologies. 
However, in order to establish their effects on EM and FP, this study uses new control variables 
such as firm age, family firm, liquidity, dividends per share, sales growth and cash flow (for 
further details, see section 3.2.3). Moreover, the findings of many previous studies, such as by 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), Bhatt and Bhattacharya (2017), Ebrahim and Abdel Fattah (2015), 
Markarian and Pozza (2008), Saito (2008) and Yang (2010) have confirmed the effects of a 
family firm on both EM and FP. In the context of GCC countries and, more specifically, 
Kuwait, this study includes among its control variables, a new measure of the founding family 
members of a family firm, following Ebrahim and Abdel Fattah (2015). It is also noteworthy 
that this study uses the largest sample of non-financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait. 
Moreover, it covers the longest period following the implementation of the KCGC in June 
2013. 
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3.5 Summary 
 
In summary, this chapter began by setting out the background and the context of this study. 
Next, it reviewed similar empirical research studies regarding the influence and impact of other 
characteristics on EM and FP, before describing the remaining gaps in the existing literature. 
Finally, it described the importance of this study’s contribution to the literature. 
 
The next chapter details the theoretical framework and the development of the hypotheses used 
in this study.  
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4.0 Chapter Four: Theoretical Framework and Development of the 
Hypotheses  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Previous research studies have used multiple theories, such as resource dependence, human 
capital, social capital, busyness, signalling, behavioural and agency theories, in order to 
investigate the association between BD and earnings management and the association between 
BD and firm performance (FP). These studies have additionally investigated the impact of 
corporate governance codes (CGCs). As shown in Table 1, 76 research studies have used 37 
theories. Moreover, as displayed in the chart below, 30 studies have used agency theory and 
17 have used resource dependence theory. However, as shown in Table 1 and the chart below, 
21 studies did not use any theory. 
 
This research study uses agency and resource dependence theories, which are also those most 
commonly used in the literature (see Figure 6). Darmadi’s study (2011) used social capital 
theory to explain the relationship between BD and FP, while Kim and Lim (2010) used it to 
study the relationship between the diversity of independent outside directors and company 
valuation. Nevertheless, few other studies have used this theory in Kuwait. This study uses 
social capital theory due to its relevance in explaining the relationship between BD and EM as 
well as the relationship between BD and FP. 
 
Consequently, social capital theory makes several contributions to this research study. The 
operations of a business firm increase both corporation and conflict. Conflict can occur 
between the owners and the managers of an organisation when it comes to the division of the 
value that the firm has created as well as among the BOD while struggling for power and 
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control of rights within the firm. Thus, agency theory, resource dependence theory and social 
capital theory have been selected to analyse conflict and diversification, from three different 
perspectives. From the agency theory perspective, conflict among the directors of a company 
exists when managers at the headquarters are connected in an agency relationship with those 
in the operating division. However, while there is the incorporation of autonomous decision-
making subsidiary managers, their decision-making autonomy may be categorised as discretion 
(Barroso-Castro et al., 2016). On the other hand, resource dependence theory posits that power 
is based on ruling over the resources that are considered to be strategic within an organisation 
and in most instances will be presented in terms of budget and the allocation of resources 
(Chisholm & Nielsen, 2010). The theory is externally focused and survival in a competitive 
environment will call for diversification in the BOD. Social capital theory seeks to create a 
connection between the internal and external environments of an organisation through 
diversifying the board by hiring females, young people and foreign directors. Thus, the three 
theories selected in the study provide a complementary framework within which we can 
understand the decision-making processes of diverse organisations based on gender, age, ND, 
those with resources and even the establishment of external connections. 
 
There is an integrated relationship between social capital theory and resource dependence 
theory. Resource dependence theory aims to hire directors who are powerful and have a 
connection and a good resource better than letting other companies hire him or her. On the 
other hand, social capital theory focuses on the situation whereby a company needs to hire 
female, young and foreign directors who have good connections so that the firm can these for 
its own interests. Thus, we can stipulate that both theories focus on establishing a connection 
as the main aim for the firm to be competitive (Johnson et al., 2013). In resource dependence 
theory, the firm is seen as a pool of resources, including intangible resources, which are vital 
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to creating a competitive advantage (Chisholm & Nielsen, 2010). Hence, social capital theory 
will figure prominently among the intangible resources in strengthening the analytical powers 
of the view of resource dependence theory in relation to several issues. Some of these issues 
include the relative merits of the firm and markets as the organisational form and the interfirm 
networks for connections.  
   
 
 
Figure 4: Theoretical framework 
Source: Kostopoulos et al. (2002) 
 
As shown in Figure 4, firm choices are guided by the perspectives offered by resource 
dependence theory and social capital theory. The two theories seek to create good connections 
with the external environment so that a firm can use these to its competitive advantage. These 
connections are developed through hiring powerful directors and/or female, young and foreign 
directors (Barroso-Castro et al., 2016). The resultant development of resources and capabilities 
will lead to the greater heterogeneity of the organisation and the creation of values within the 
management, in turn leading to sustainable growth (Kostopoulos et al., 2002).   
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Figure 5: Theories used by previous research studies 
Created by the author using Excel and Table 1 
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Table 1: Theories used by previous research studies 
Theories Authors 
Agency theory Alshammari & Alsaidi (2014), Arioglu (2018), Carter et al. (2003, 2010), Diepen (2015), Enofe et al. (2017), Erhardt et al. 
(2003), Eulerich, Velte, & Van (2014), Guedes et al. (2018), Gull et al. (2018), Hoffmann et al. (2018), Isa, & Farouk (2018), 
Jiraporn et al. (2008), Jurkus et al. (2011), Labelle et al. (2010), Lakhal et al. (2015), Low et al. (2015), Lückerath-Rovers 
(2013), Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez (2019), Rahman et al. (2015), Ramaswamy et al. (2001), Rauf et al. (2012), 
Robbiano (2019), Rose (2007), Sanda et al. (2006), Shehata et al. (2017), Susanto (2016), Triki Damak (2018), Zalata et al. 
(2018). 
Resource 
dependency 
theory 
Abdullah et al. (2017), Alesina & La Ferrara (2005) ; Ali & Kulik (2014), Arioglu (2018), Choi & Rainey (2010), Darmadi 
(2011), Diepen  (2015), Eulerich et al. (2014), Gull et al. (2018), Kaplan et al. (2009), Kunze et al. (2011), Low et al. (2015), 
Lückerath-Rovers (2013), Martín-Ugedo & Minguez-Vera (2014), Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez (2019), Robbiano 
(2019).  
Social identity 
theory 
Al-Mamun et al. (2013), Arioglu (2018), Shehata et al. (2017), Wegge et al. (2008). 
Human capital 
theory 
Arioglu (2018), Darmadi (2011); Gull et al. (2018). 
Attraction theory Choi & Rainey (2010). 
Social 
categorisation 
theory 
Choi and Rainey (2010), Tanikawa et al. (2017). 
Gender 
socialisation 
theory 
Clikeman, Geiger, & O’Connell (2001). 
Gender theory Gavious, Segev, & Yosef (2012), Guedes et al. (2018), Triki Damak (2018). 
Resource-based 
theory 
Guedes et al. (2018). 
Critical mass 
theory 
Joecks et al. (2013), Lakhal et al. (2015), Lückerath-Rovers (2013). 
Principal-agent 
theory 
Eulerich et al. (2014), Lausten (2002). 
Strategic 
management 
theory 
Ramaswamy et al. (2001). 
Organisation 
theory 
Adams & Ferreira (2009), Ramaswamy et al. (2001), Srinidhi et al. (2011). 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Abdullah et al. (2017), Harjoto et al. (2015), Lückerath-Rovers (2013), Sanda et al. (2006), Shehata et al. (2017). 
Similarity-
attraction theory 
Wegge et al. (2008). 
Social feminist 
theory 
Alowaihan (2004). 
Social capital 
theory 
Darmadi (2011), Johnson et al. (2013), Kim & Lim (2010).  
Social 
psychological 
theory 
Darmadi (2011). 
Organisational 
behaviour theory 
Darmadi (2011). 
Upper echelons 
theory 
Darmadi (2013), Dwyer et al. (2003), Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2015), Tanikawa et al. (2017). 
Contingency 
theory 
Dwyer et al. (2003), Shehata et al. (2017). 
Configurational 
theory 
Dwyer et al. (2003). 
Stewardship 
theory 
Eulerich et al. (2014), Low et al. (2015). 
Diversity theory Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2015). 
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Information 
processing theory 
Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2015). 
Human cognition 
theory 
Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2015). 
Tournament 
theory 
Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2015). 
Distributive 
justice theory 
Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2015). 
Free cash flow 
theory 
Jurkus et al. (2011). 
Self-categorisation 
theory 
Kunze et al. (2011). 
Categorisation 
theories 
Martín-Ugedo & Minguez-Vera (2014). 
Behavioural 
theory 
Miller et al. (2009). 
Signalling theory Miller et al. (2009). 
Generational 
theory 
Petersson & Wallin (2017). 
Game theory Rose (2007). 
Socioemotional 
selectivity theory 
Tanikawa et al. (2017). 
None Algharaballi & Albuloushi (2008), Arun et al. (2015), Betz et al. (1989), Carter et al. (2007), Croson & Gneezy (2009), 
Ferreira (2015), Gordini & Rancati (2017), Hart (2004, 2014), Julizaerma & Sori (2012), Krishnan & Parsons (2008), Kunze 
et al. (2013), Kyaw et al. (2015), Liu et al. (2014), Na & Hong (2017), Omoye et al. (2014), Peni & Vahamaa (2010), Pitts 
(2005), Powell & Ansic (1997), Strobl, Rama, & Mishra (2016), Wahid (2018). 
Total of the 
theories: 37 
Studies: 76 
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4.2 Theories 
4.2.1 Agency theory 
 
Agency theory is one of the main theories. At this point, it is essential to explain this theory in 
order to gain an understanding of the context in which the present study is examining CG 
practices. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory is a contract that describes 
the relationship between a firm’s shareholders and its BOD. This means that the first party (the 
shareholders) has an agreement with the second party (the BOD) whereby the second party 
manages the firm’s resources (both financial and human) and looks after the first party’s 
interests. Hence, agency theory differentiates between ownership and control, whereby the 
shareholders own the firm while the BOD is responsible for managing the firm and therefore 
the shareholders’ assets. Bhagat and Black (2002) explain how in an agency theory context, 
the managers-shareholders relationship presents a significant challenge, because it is linked 
with agency problems such as conflicts of interest and information asymmetry. 
 
Consequently, agency theory problems arise from the separation between a firm’s shareholders 
and its managers. The BOD, which sits between the shareholders and the managers, is 
responsible for solving problems and working on behalf of the former to protect their interests 
and wealth (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Rowley, Shipilov, & 
Greve, 2017). Given that the shareholders are a mixture of men and women, the BOD should 
also consist of a mix of men and women to provide ‘board diversity’ and solve the agency 
theory problem. Furthermore, Das (2019) agrees that it is necessary to use agency theory 
through BD for firms’ CG practices. Similarly, as supported by agency theory, GD has a 
negative relationship with EM. This means that GD reduces a firm’s EM (Hoffmann et al., 
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2018). Furthermore, Pucheta-Martínez and Gallego-Álvarez (2019) use agency theory to test 
the relationship between board characteristics, including GD and FP. 
 
Agency theory (managers-shareholders): 
Bhagat and Black (2002) explain how in an agency theory context, the managers-shareholders 
relationship constitutes a significant challenge because it is linked with agency problems. 
These problems range from information asymmetry to differentiating between ownership and 
control. According to Berle and Means (1930), when executive directors have a stake in the 
firm and the shareholders are inactive in monitoring those executives, there is a high risk that 
the former will direct the firm’s assets towards their interests rather than those of the 
shareholders. Thus, the issue of conflicts of interest, which are derived from the separation 
between ownership and control, represent one of the major problems of the agency theory. 
Therefore, it is argued that an effective mechanism that can mitigate the problem of conflicts 
of interest is the alignment of shareholders’ interests with the BOD’s interests. 
 
By using negative or positive mechanisms, a firm’s shareholders can fix the issues arising from 
conflicts of interest in the differentiation of control and ownership (Guest, 2019). For instance, 
negative actions are portrayed by the dismissal of underperforming managers, shareholders’ 
activism, a hostile takeover, or rejecting and challenging the BOD’s proposals. Conversely, 
positive mechanisms involve the provision of directors’ incentives as an approach to 
motivating them and integrating their interests with shareholders’ interests. This is achieved 
through the provision of long- and short-term financial rewards as a way of linking the BOD’s 
interests to shareholders’ concerns. The provision of share ownership to managers mitigates 
the problem of conflicts of interest and therefore aligns managers’ interests with shareholders’ 
interests.  
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An additional problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control is the issue of 
information asymmetry. In such circumstances, one party (the directors) has an advantage over 
the other (shareholders), as they have more private information that they can use to benefit 
their interests. Information asymmetry is a sensitive concern to shareholders because it is prone 
to manipulation by the BOD for their gains: manipulation results in shareholders lacking 
information, thereby translating to poor economic decisions. Depken et al. (2005) argue that 
the agency problem can be reduced through external mechanisms such as regulation and 
legislation. This may be achieved through compulsory disclosures in financial reports and 
standardised reporting formats. 
 
Moral hazard is another problem that arises from the separation of a firm’s ownership and 
management. This arises when the management works in good faith on behalf of the firm’s 
owners but makes some of its actions unobservable by the owners. Consequently, the owners 
come to be tied into contractual obligations such as risky projects/investments (Kolbjørnsrud, 
2017). In such circumstances, the managers use their skills and knowledge in risky investments 
of which the owners are unaware. However, in the end they are the providers of capital to be 
invested and the ultimate bearers of the total risk. The probability of the success or failure of 
such projects/investments is dependent on the management’s hidden actions. Therefore, it 
becomes very difficult for owners to measure the project’s progressive performance. 
 
Shareholders can address the management’s moral hazard malpractices through the 
introduction of risk incentives, such as taking some proportion of ownership in all the firm’s 
investments/projects. According to Ratnawati, Abdul-Hamid and Popoola (2016), through 
such a mechanism, the management is compelled to disclose all information concerning 
potential firm investment decisions to ensure that all key decision makers are well informed. 
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Therefore, by imposing some risk on the management, the owners’ concerns are secured in 
most if not all of the firm’s projects. 
 
The separation of ownership and management additionally brings about the agency problem of 
the time horizon. The owners have no definite time within which they will own the business 
and have a long-term view regarding the firm’s plans (Kim & Yi, 2006). They are the bearers 
of the firm’s vision and mission statement, which defines why the company exists and how its 
existence will be maintained. On the other hand, the managers are the firm’s employees’ 
company and their stay is defined by the contractual agreement between them and the firm. In 
addition to contractual obligations, they have their own interests and ambitions, such as 
climbing the corporate ladder or increasing their bargaining power for the next job opportunity. 
These two-timing perspectives bring about a severe conflict of interest between the firm’s 
owners and the managers. Consequently, there is a justifiable need to create a mechanism that 
harmonises the timing of these two perspectives (Kolbjørnsrud, 2017). 
 
The time horizon problem also arises in terms of when cash flows are expected from an 
investment. The management is concerned with projects that will generate cash flows in the 
short term and, more especially, within the period when performance appraisals will be carried 
out. In this regard, the firm’s management prefers projects that affect its remuneration in the 
shortest possible time. Nevertheless, Kim and Yi (2006) state that owners are more concerned 
with projects that result in long-term, sustainable cash flows. Most projects with such cash 
flows are long-term in nature and therefore require long-term capital commitments. These exert 
less pressure on owners and are hence preferable to them. 
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Similar to any other agency problem, the time horizon requires carefully considered 
mechanisms in order to ensure that it does not hinder the firm’s vision and mission statement. 
One way to achieve this aim is to align contractual management obligations, such as 
employment contracts, to the firm’s long-term plans (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). Another 
approach is to give the management shares in the firm and thereby turn them into the firm’s 
owners. Accordingly, the two groups’ interests are harmonised and thus the conflict between 
them is minimised. Moreover, the firm’s value is increased because all decisions are aimed at 
maximising the owners’ wealth. 
 
BD, particularly in the form of gender, age and nationality, has a significant impact on FP. 
Terjesen, Couto and Francisco’s (2016) multi-country study of BD has examined the effects of 
female BODs on FP. Their findings suggest that firms with more female directors report higher 
performance in terms of market and accounting measures. Moreover, their results suggest that, 
unless the board is gender-diversified, a non-diverse board is less likely to contribute towards 
improving the firm’s performance. Consequently, their study rejects the hypothesis by 
confirming that there is a positive association between GD and FP.  
 
Agency theory helps to highlight the inherent conflicts between the management’s needs and 
the owner’s interests. Terjesen et al. (2016) are among the authors to have used agency theory 
to explore whether or not the presence of female BODs affects FP. Their multi-country study 
of BD notes that the agency theoretical perspective suggests that board directors are less likely 
to have conflicts of interest with the firm. In turn, this ensures that they offer impartial 
judgments and provide greater integrity. However, although BODs both value and strive 
towards preserving their reputations, they are often required to represent the shareholders’ 
interests and potentially take a stand against the firm’s management (Adams et al. 2010). 
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Adams et al. (2010) have also used agency theory to examine BODs’ role in firms’ CG. These 
authors have developed a conceptual framework and survey showing that board of members’ 
concerns for their reputations are more likely to cause them (agents) to act more in their 
principal’s interests than standard approaches. For example, a strong as opposed to weak 
reputation presumably helps agents to obtain more seats on the board or retain existing ones. 
Consequently, diverse BODs bring their previous experience with them, enabling them to 
reinforce their firms’ FP. 
 
Agency theory is concerned with mitigating the problems within agency relationships caused 
by unaligned goals. Consequently, the theory can help address the challenges associated with 
the relationship between board and monitoring committees concerned with EM. According to 
Osma and Noguer (2007), board composition plays a significant role in determining the 
manipulation practices that should be enforced in EM. Further, Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) 
state that the presence of female on the audit committee increases negative discretionary 
accruals that reduce the firm’s income. In turn, this constrains EM.  
 
Thiruvadi and Huang’s (2011) study contributes four aspects to the existing literature on GD 
and EM. First, their study leverages agency theory to highlight the effects of unaligned goals 
on agency relationships within an audit committee. For example, the authors provide new 
evidence that suggests that, when compared to men, women are more risk-averse and ethical. 
As a result, female directors on the audit committee are more likely to exhibit caution when 
determining EM (Huang, 2011). Second, Thiruvadi and Huang’s (2011) findings highlight how 
sex-linked characteristics are transmitted and maintained across boards and organisational 
cultures. Third, their findings are crucial to developing a better understanding of BODs’ 
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contemporary CG practices and their impact on EM and FP. Fourth, this study highlights the 
importance of BD in reinforcing FP. 
 
4.2.2 Resource dependence theory 
Resource dependence theory refers to the impact of resource acquisition on a firm’s behaviour 
(Hillman et al., 2009). The theory is based on the principle that, in order to acquire resources, 
a firm must engage in transactions with other actors and firms in its environment (Pfeffer, 
1982). In this regard, as explained by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), through co-selecting the 
assets expected to survive, a firm’s BOD serves as the link between the firm and its external 
factors. Therefore, the board serves as an essential instrument in bringing necessary 
components of ecological vulnerability into the firm. With regard to the board, resource 
dependence theory addresses how it facilitates access to valuable resources. As Rondoy et al. 
(2006) have explained, the theory emphasises a firm’s ability to form links in order to secure 
access to critical resources, including capital, customers, suppliers and cooperative partners. 
Given that it is likely to have different insights, a more diverse board is deemed to have a 
greater ability to understand customers’ needs. According to Thomsen and Conyon (2012) with 
respect to nationality, education, experience and background, BD means that the BOD has a 
considerable range of knowledge and skills. Accordingly, its members can offer more 
significant insights into markets, customers, employees and business opportunities. This is 
likely to lead to a better understanding of business conditions and hence better FP (Hillman et 
al., 2000). For instance, given that women offer more insights, a more gender-diverse BOD is 
better able to understand the needs of the entire market. Therefore, female representatives on 
the board are better able to understand women’s requirements; the same is true of male 
representatives (Drees & Heugens, 2013 Hillman et al., 2007). The same can be said of AD, 
where having board members of different ages is essential for the firm being able to meet the 
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needs of all ages within the market. In addition, ND on the BOD brings different insights with 
regard to different nationalities. This is important in ensuring the firm’s ability to acquire 
various resources that are vital to its success (Carter et al., 2010). Based on resource 
dependence theory, Pucheta-Martínez and Gallego-Álvarez (2019) claim that an effective CG 
system attracts aptitude and investment and thereby increases the firm’s confidence. 
 
Resource dependence theory is significant to this study because it has implications regarding 
the recruitment of a firm’s board members and the optimal divisional structure of its EM and 
FP. Unlike the other theories, resource dependence theory helps in responding to all the 
research questions as well as testing this study’s hypotheses. In this way, it facilitates the 
development of an in-depth understanding of how a board’s GD, AD and ND affect both EM 
and FP. Resource dependence theory assumes that the BOD is an essential part of the firm and 
its environment. It provides the resources and information necessary to mitigate risks, which 
help to cushion the firm against any uncertainties within both its external and internal 
environments. Hessels and Terjesen (2010) argue that resource dependence theory reinforces 
the fact that, based on their respective backgrounds, board members bring information and 
resources to the firm. Therefore, resource dependency theory may be the most effective model 
in examining the consequences of BD. The theory accepts that there is a negative association 
between GD and EM in Kuwaiti non-financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait because it 
assumes that these firms are contingent on multidimensional resources. Consequently, a 
board’s gender quota does not play a central role in developing countervailing initiatives aimed 
at managing all the earnings generated through the firm’s multiple resources. As a result, these 
firms should put greater emphasis on the principles of scarcity and criticality rather than 
focusing on the effects of their boards’ GD on EM. 
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Singh (2007) draws on resource dependency theory to examine the human and social capital 
of ethnic minority directors. The theory helps Singh to explore how a firm’s external resources 
affect its tactical and strategic management. According to this author, the BOD has more social 
capital than its ethnic majority counterpart, rendering it a key driver in improving FP.  
 
In addition to linking ND with increased FP, resource dependence theory supports the 
hypothesis that, in the case of Kuwaiti non-financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait, there is a 
positive association between AD and FP. One of the theory’s primary assumptions is that board 
members perform an internal control function and that they can influence their firm’s efficiency 
through administrative efforts. Thus, the board’s AD can play a central role in determining FP 
because people often adopt policies that reflect their age groups. According to Makhlouf, Laili, 
Basah and Siam (2015), older directors are more likely to avoid making risky decisions, 
whereas their younger counterparts are more inclined towards developing and implementing 
riskier strategies. Therefore, firms with younger directors may experience higher rates of 
growth than those with older directors. In turn, this confirms that in the case of Kuwaiti non-
financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait, there exists a positive association between AD and 
FP. 
 
However, unlike FP, there is a negative association between AD and EM in such firms. For 
example, older directors have significant impacts on certain performance measures, such as 
cumulative returns and abnormal returns (Ararat, Aksu, & Tansel Cetin, 2010). According to 
Nakano and Nguyen (2011), while there is a significant negative relationship between a board’s 
AD and EM, it becomes even more significant after using ROA as the controlling variable. 
These research findings are also consistent with agency theory, whereby in strongly performing 
firms, older directors are more likely to retain their board positions. Thus, the proportion of 
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young board members is more likely to relate positively to the firm’s overall performance 
rather than its EM (Darmadi, 2011). 
 
Julizaerma and Sori (2012) consider GD an emerging issue in the corporate world. Omar and 
Davidson (2001) add that, despite the dramatic increase in the number of women seeking 
managerial careers, their representation on BODs remains low. Carter, Simkinsand and 
Simpson’s (2003) study provides evidence that, in the case of Kuwaiti non-financial firms 
listed on Boursa Kuwait, there is a positive association between GD and FP. The authors argue 
that BD is essential to increasing a board’s independence as women are more likely to ask 
questions that their male counterparts avoid. Moreover, due to the collaborative skills that 
women often bring with them, the presence of female directors on a firm’s board makes a 
significant contribution to the firm’s bottom line. Adams and Ferreira’s (2009) study on the 
impact of women in the boardroom with regard to CG and FP has found a significant positive 
relationship between a firm’s GD and ROA. This is consistent with hypothesis H4, which states 
that in the case of Kuwaiti non-financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait, there is a positive 
association between GD and FP. Moreover, resource dependency theory supports the 
hypotheses because it is more concerned with the humane resources that often originate in the 
firm’s environment, namely the board. Consequently, a gender-diverse board is more likely to 
be positively associated with higher levels of FP.  
 
While resource dependence theory helps to examine the consequences of BD, it has several 
problems that undermine its efficiency in measuring the impact of BD on both EM and FP. 
Resource dependence theory is less expansive than institutional and behavioural theories. 
Indeed, behavioural theories leverage a wider perspective and are more open to scholars 
interested in one of their central concepts (Ferreira, 2009). Its lack of open approach makes it 
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difficult for resource dependence theory to evolve quickly from explaining the rationalisation 
of the firm to a broader theory related to its macro-cultural environment. Consequently, 
resource dependence theory is less flexible, hence most management scholars shy away from 
it, not least when seeking non-economic explanations for a specific firm phenomenon. This is 
because behavioural and institutional theories are often perceived as being more flexible from 
a theoretical perspective. Consequently, these theories have become a formidable competitor 
to resource dependence theory. The various problems associated with resource dependence 
theory indicate that it may no longer be an effective theoretical model. However, this study 
uses resource dependence theory because it can inspire necessary insights and interpretations 
to appraise the impact of BD on EM and FP. Moreover, resource dependence theory provides 
this study with a window into understanding what makes a theoretical programme successful. 
 
 In addition, resource dependence theory is one of the most influential economic models of 
workplace diversity because it sets the framework of a firm’s policies, especially when 
determining EM and FP. One of the primary strategies in determining a firm’s economic 
performance involves employing a conception of board members as human capital and 
different economic metaphors such as innovation, technological change, productivity and 
competitiveness. 
 
The theoretical perspectives developed in strategic management focus on establishing why 
some boards consistently outperform others in the same industry (Barney & Clark, 2007). From 
a wider perspective, the resource dependence school of thought focuses on determining how a 
board is able to reinforce a firm’s competitive advantage from within its own resources. 
Resource dependence theory model assumes that if a board uses its resources effectively to 
utilise opportunities and neutralise threats, the firm’s competences and resources will serve as 
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a source of competitive advantage. Thus, the resource dependency paradigm is likely to 
dominate in the board’s decision-making processes. Barney and Clark (2007) note that board 
members are not expected to agree with every decision and instead are supposed to 
leverage their diverse backgrounds, opinions and inputs to achieve a holistic 
perspective of the issues at hand. Consequently, resource dependency theory 
supports BD and supports the hypothesis that, in the case of Kuwaiti non-financial firms 
listed on Boursa Kuwait, there is a positive association between GD and FP. 
 
In conclusion, resource dependence theory helps to show that, in the case of Kuwaiti non-
financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait, there is a negative association between GD and AD 
and between ND and EM. The theoretical perspectives developed for the resource dependence 
model indicate that a more diverse board is better positioned to make superior decisions 
through brainstorming to improve FP. Moreover, the theory helps to highlight the negative 
association between ND and EM in the case of Kuwaiti non-financial firms listed on Boursa 
Kuwait. The resource dependence model agrees with the theoretical assumption that, when 
compared with a non-diverse board, a diverse board uses more information and makes 
better contributions to discussions. Consequently, resource dependence theory shows 
that in the case of Kuwaiti non-financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait, there is a positive 
association between GD and FP, between AD and FP and between ND and FP. Moreover, the 
theoretical perspectives indicate that firms with more GD, AD and ND on their boards 
perform better and have superior financial returns. Thus, the theory supports the 
hypothesis that in the case of Kuwaiti non-financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait, there is a 
positive association between BD and FP. 
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4.2.3 Social capital theory 
Social capital can be defined as all the resources – whether real or implicit – that a person or 
group accrues through possessing a long-lasting network of institutionalised relationships of 
shared contact and respect (Hernández-Carrión et al., 2020; Sealy & Vinnicombe, 2007). It has 
also been defined as “the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social 
networks or social structures” (Portes, 1998, p. 6). Social capital encompasses the advantages 
that individuals or collective actors possess owing to their location in the social network 
structure. Age diversification assists in the utilisation of natural resources and threats that an 
organisation may encounter while establishing links with its external environment. 
Consequently, the theory advocates diversity given that a diverse BOD is able to bring in 
various types of social capital from its members (Niu & Chen, 2017). For instance, given that 
both genders differ considerably in terms of social capital, a gender-diverse board is likely to 
have more social capital than a single-gender board. The same case applies to ND boards 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009). This is because different nationalities present significant variations 
that are likely to result in substantially diverse social capital (Luckerath-Rovers, 2013). In 
addition, AD on a BOD brings with it a wealth of social capital. This is because different age 
groups offer different insights and the inclusion of every age group on a board brings different 
forms of social capital. Therefore, a board with various aspects is likely to possess more social 
capital and hence it is likely to perform better than a board that has no diversity (Carter et al., 
2010). 
Social capital on the board encompasses two types of relationships, namely internal and 
external connections. Internal social capital can be measured through the experiences of co-
workers on the board (Barroso-Castro et al., 2016). By contrast, external social capital can be 
determined through the links that the board has with outside organisations from the interlocking 
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directorates (Sealy & Vinnicombe, 2007). From the theory, we can stipulate that when 
organisations reconsider members of their boards, they should aim to increase internal 
connections, in addition to considering the primary role played by internal social capital. In 
order to increase external connections and use them to their advantage, organisations must hire 
female, young and foreign directors who have already established good connections externally 
(Barroso-Castro et al., 2016).  
Social capital theory is significant in this study because it encourages BD. The theory holds 
that diverse boards are better positioned to leverage various forms of social capital from their 
members. The concept of social capital helps to describe the board’s participation in EM and 
FP. This viewpoint tends to reinforce the hypothesis that, in the case of Kuwaiti non-financial 
firms listed on Boursa Kuwait, there is a negative association between EM and ND and the 
average age of the directors. The theory suggests that directors on less diverse boards possess 
significant social capital, which strengthens the firm’s ability to monitor earnings. Ooi et al.’s 
(2017) findings support the theory’s viewpoint by providing evidence that BD – especially in 
terms of human and social capital – does not significantly improve FP, but rather mitigates the 
negative impacts of crises that undermine it. Johnson et al. (2013) further support this 
perspective by stating that a board’s composition is crucial in contributing to its ability to 
determine an organisation’s outcome. While most of the arguments presented in different 
articles have focused on the size and the independence of the board, Johnson et al. (2013) 
emphasise the composition of the board based on demography. They suggest that there is no 
correlation between various demographic traits such as gender, age, race and ethnicity with the 
level of performance of the organisation (Johnson et al., 2013). However, social capital has a 
significant influence on the advice and counsel that the directors will provide; moreover, it will 
also affect the decision-making process. Tasheva and Hillman (2019) have presented an 
argument as to the benefits of diversification for team effectiveness. They suggest that diversity 
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is multifaceted, as it entails different sources, including demographic, human capital and social 
capital, all of which operate at different levels. Hence, the diversity that takes place at both the 
individual and the team level is not independent, as there should be a link ensuring the 
effectiveness of the performance of the directors of an organisation (Tasheva & Hillman, 
2019). Social capital is the conduit from the flow of resources and information in both the 
internal and external environment of an organisation.  
    
Unlike cultural and physical capital, social capital is contingent on the BOD being a part of the 
connections that they keep and the extent to which they engage with the firm’s management 
(Stevenson & Radin, 2009). For example, in a large multinational corporation, the chairman of 
the board possesses a significant amount of social capital because he or she maintains a large 
and influential social network developed throughout his or her career. The chairman enjoys 
even more social capital if the board is more diverse and this leads to more positive outcomes 
for the firm (Mabogunje & Kates, 2020; Stevenson & Radin, 2009). Consequently, social 
capital theory accepts the hypothesis that, in the case of Kuwaiti non-financial firms listed on 
Boursa Kuwait, there is a positive association between a firm’s performance and gender, age 
and ND. The approach establishes how social capital at the individual level will affect the 
choice of directors as well as the effectiveness of the board selected. At the personal level, 
social capital largely depends on the interpersonal linkages that each of the directors has both 
in the internal and the external environment of the organisation (Kim & Cannella, 2008). 
However, at the group level, social capital will represent an asset that incorporates both the 
relationships of the directors and other potential resources resulting from the link. Hence, 
theoretically, social capital can be divided into internal and external types based on locus and 
function. Chisholm and Nielsen (2010) support the argument by stipulating that both internal 
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and external social capital are in a position to generate unique resources that will prove relevant 
to the level of effectiveness of the BOD.  
 
The benefits of BD in terms of AD and ND can be categorised into five distinct business 
rationales: market rationale, talent rationale, employee relations rationale, litigation rationale 
and governance rationale (Booth-Bell, 2018). In this regard, Booth-Bell (2018) argues that, if 
social capital theory’s viewpoint regarding a director’s ability to secure crucial human 
resources for his or her firm is taken into consideration, the social capital rationale becomes 
one of the primary benefits associated with BD. First, the market rationale suggests that boards 
with both younger and older directors are more likely to maximise their market share by 
leveraging the innovative and risk-oriented mindset of the younger directors while taking into 
account the risk factors (which have the potential to undermine the firm’s success) often 
highlighted by the older directors. Second, diverse boards with directors from different age 
groups are more likely to have varying talents, a key driver in making successful strategic 
decisions. For example, younger directors may offer crucial insights about fostering 
innovations. Older directors may share their views but also know how to maintain such 
innovations sustainably, in turn improving overall FP. Moreover, talent has become the 
primary competitive advantage for firms (Booth-Bell, 2018). Third, BD in ND helps to improve 
overall employee relations, especially in multinational companies (Dore, 1973). Successful 
employee relations strategies leverage diversity and inclusion programmes in the workplace. 
However, a firm cannot have a comprehensive employee relations programme if the board 
itself does not lead by example. Therefore, diverse boards are more likely to motivate 
employees by reducing the risks of racial or ethnic segregation. Finally, diverse boards with 
directors from different age groups and nationalities are more likely to report better outcomes 
when addressing their litigation and governance issues.  
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Giannetti, Liao and Yu (2015) present an argument on the implication of the foreign 
experiences of foreign directors regarding the level of FP in the upcoming market. They 
suggest that foreign directors transmit knowledge to the organisation concerning various 
management practices and corporate governance. Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) offer a similar 
argument, as they try to establish the effects that the board membership of foreigners has for 
the level of corporate performance of an organisation. Their argument suggests that superior 
performance is an indication that a company has completely broken from the partially 
segmented domestic capital market. Other than the market rationale and different age groups, 
Kim (2005) suggests the need to consider the network characteristics of the BOD. The two 
main network characteristics are the board network density and the board’s external social 
capital. Density will determine the extensiveness and the cohesiveness of interaction between 
members. External social capital, on the other hand, will establish the level to which the 
members of the board have connections with the outside world. Having a moderate level of 
board network density is crucial to enhancing a firm’s value, as an excess will lead to 
destruction (Kim, 2005). Corporate boards are the focal point for the strategic and investment 
decisions of a firm. Boards that are more diverse and that include individuals with different 
nationalities perform positively, and in most instances they are connected with stakeholders’ 
heterogeneity and the various international market operations available (Estélyi & Nisar, 
2016).    
 
Seibert, Kraimer and Liden (2001) note that firms can improve their social capital irrespective 
of their financial situation, age or future plans by appointing more educated directors, exploring 
beyond their industry, being more versatile and gaining more experience. While the debate 
continues on whether or not certain levels of education among directors are worth the 
investment, often the return on investment in social capital is contingent on the quality of the 
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human resources. Thus, a firm’s return on an educational investment has far-reaching 
implications and has the potential to improve its overall outcomes (Kraimer & Liden, 2001). 
However, older directors are often more educated than younger counterparts. Consequently, it 
is necessary to maintain a diverse board to ensure sustainability in EM and FP. Gaining more 
experience opens up a firm to more opportunities for advancement (Seibert et al. 2001). In this 
way, different groups of people bring with them varying experiences. Consequently, 
maintaining a diverse board may be one of the most effective ways of increasing a firm’s 
overall social capital. Finally, a versatile board is more likely to explore opportunities for 
growth beyond the firm’s industry. A board comprising directors from diverse genders, ages 
and nationalities means that it is valuable in more than one area. Therefore, diversity plays a 
central role in helping a firm to excel at multiple facets even beyond its industry. In turn, this 
results in better earnings quality and FP. There is a clear connection between the valuation of 
an organisation and the proportion of the outside BD who are independent (Kim & Lim, 2010). 
The diversification of the outside directors focuses on the academic degree and age, which is 
believed to have a positive effect on the valuation process of the firm. Not only will the quantity 
be implicated, but also the quality of the outside independent directors will affect the valuation 
process of the organisation. Peck-Ling, Nai-Chiek and Chee-Seong (2016) support this opinion 
by suggesting that an increase in the number of foreign directors sitting on a board plays a key 
role in increasing the ROE. However, only when foreign investors dominate the voting rights 
will the ROE increase. Polovina and Peasnell (2015) provide an outcome that strongly supports 
the need for having foreign directors as board members. The presence of foreign board directors 
has a positive impact on the profitability level of the majority of foreign-acquired banks and 
an increase in income creates on the interest operations. Foreign directors have a significant 
positive impact on a firm’s performance, measured by ROA, ROE and market value (Rahman, 
2018). However, in line with many people’s expectations, foreign directors have created 
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negative implications for the monitoring role of boards due to their different languages and 
backgrounds.  
 
Social capital theory can help to develop a better understanding of the consequences of BD 
(Aguilera, 2005). The theory highlights the importance of diversity in increasing a firm’s 
ability to recognise and value the differences that each director brings to the board (Lin, 2002). 
Although the primary aspects of workplace diversity revolve around obvious traits such as 
gender, age and nationality, there are other less noticeable aspects. These include employees’ 
thinking and working styles (Gul et al., 2011; Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017). One of social 
capital theory’s primary arguments is that firms should leverage these differences to drive FP 
(Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). For example, a highly diverse board is more likely to remain 
open-minded, progressive and unbiased when making critical decisions. In turn, these qualities 
reinforce innovation and the level of employee engagement and motivation (Adler & Kwon, 
2002; Lin et al., 1981). Highly engaged employees play a central role in providing a firm with 
a competitive edge over its rivals. Moreover, especially in the short term, a board’s decisions 
become easier to implement (Cyert & March, 1963; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Haynes & 
Hillman, 2010).  
 
The need for boardroom diversity has grown over the past three decades with firms today 
seeking directors with diverse skills and perspectives. Miller and del Carmen Triana (2009) 
note that the broad acceptance of the need for BD has been fuelled primarily by strong evidence 
from theoretical studies showing a strong correlation globally between BD and FP. The 
importance of increased BD has been further reinforced by the need to mitigate growing 
schisms, especially for firms in polarised societies. Parker’s (2016) findings into the ethnic 
diversity of UK boards show that boards must now earn a licence to operate. This makes it 
 88 
necessary to align the board’s composition more broadly with its customer base and the local 
community. Parker (2016) adds that firms that have made use of diverse multi-ethnic and 
multicultural boards have not only successfully increased their overall FP but also managed 
workplace conflicts.  
 
The analysis conducted on the consequences of BD suggest that public companies have taken 
the lead in championing the advantages of BD. This is partly because public companies are 
expected to be more socially responsible than private ones. Moreover, public companies have 
a larger social capital that makes it necessary to encourage diversity, especially among the top 
management. State Street Global Advisors is one of the companies taking the lead in promoting 
BD. One of the implications of firms advocating boardroom diversity is that now other firms 
have publicly joined the movement, stimulating investors to seek to conduct business with 
firms that are inclusive in terms of gender, age and nationality. Most of these firms utilise the 
concepts advocated by social capital theory, which views social capital as an essential 
component in improving FP. 
 
Diverse boards in terms of age and nationality exhibit higher levels of expertise and experience. 
Thus, some firms have made it mandatory to have highly diverse boards, especially with 
respect to GD. Although social capital theory remained a vague concept in the mid-19th 
century, it is now the driving concept behind the networks of relationships between people who 
live and work within a society (Lin et al., 1981; Portes, 1998). Haynes and Hillman (2010) 
argue that social capital plays a central role in enabling firms to function effectively. Thus, the 
theory holds that a person’s position within a particular group provides unique benefits that 
work to their advantage as well as that of the firm (Miller & Triana, 2009). For example, when 
choosing to hire between two directors with identical levels of experience and qualifications, 
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shareholders choose the one who is either better known within the company or serves on more 
committees, this being essential to the company’s income (Hitt et al., 2002; Khoury et al., 2013; 
Palmer & Barber, 2001; Sundaramurthy et al., 2014). Consequently, the job should be awarded 
on the basis of social capital. In this case, the director is awarded the job based on his/her level 
of association with other directors as well as with the firm, the extent to which he/she 
participates and, occasionally, his/her popularity within the group (Fondas & Sassalos, 2000, 
p. 172). Social capital theory holds that because it works to their advantage, people are more 
likely to participate in improving firm outcomes and in bonding with those around them 
(Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017). Therefore, one of social capital’s potential benefits is that 
directors will focus on participating towards the well-being of the firm while seeking to create 
and maintain stronger social bonds with those around them, helping the company to survive 
and improve its networking (Terjesen et al., 2009).  
 
Although social capital theory helps to highlight the positive association between GD, AD and 
ND on FP, there are some limitations that undermine its effectiveness in examining the 
consequences of BD. Erhardt et al. (2003) argue that social capital theory’s characteristics, 
which highlight the productive benefits of leveraging diversity, also result in negative 
externalities. One of the potential downsides of the theory is its potential to foster behaviours 
within boards that exacerbate rather than improve EM. Carroll and Stanfield (2003) argue that 
social capital can undermine a firm’s economic performance because it often acts as a barrier 
to social mobility and inclusion. Moreover, social capital is more likely to divide rather than 
unite members of a board along the lines of age groups, ethnicity and gender.  
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Social capital is often defined as the outcome of social relationships. Thus, it not only 
comprises the financial benefits accrued by a firm but, also the expected benefits often derived 
from cooperation between individuals and various groups. The primary difference between 
social capital and financial capital is that the former promotes positive relationships that in turn 
enhance the confidence and fulfilment of board members. However, despite its numerous 
benefits, social capital also results in unwanted outcomes. Portes and Landolt (2000) have 
identified some of the negative effects of social capital, including restrictions on individual 
freedoms, the exclusion of outsiders and excessive claims on board members. Moreover, the 
social capital model emphasises the importance of bridging the gap between GD, AD and ND 
rather than focusing on creating and maintaining the inherent bonds between different people. 
Consequently, social capital may further widen the gap between people, especially those 
experiencing reduced social mobility. 
 
Portes and Landolt (2000) state further that directors who work in social enterprises should 
abide by the set rules and regulations and carry out only the assigned tasks. Thus, new ideas 
and personal views are not welcome in most cases. Consequently, social capital may be 
regarded as a liability, especially when the board consists of younger directors who are likely 
to propose different ways of doing things. Although social capital plays a central role in 
bridging the gap between the BOD and the firm’s CEO, the individuals who benefit the most 
from social capital tend to lose their mobility. Portes and Landolt (2000) note that the resultant 
change from social capital is negligible in relation to the mobility trade-off. This often leaves 
them stuck in the same employment or board position for most of their career. 
 
Another limitation of social capital theory is that, unlike in the case of the firm’s employees, it 
takes no consideration of the impact of outsiders on FP. For example, only a particular section 
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of the top management tends to avail itself of the benefits of social capital and this in turn 
discourages other employees from actively participating in the firm’s decision-making 
processes. According to Kostova and Roth (2003), most firms’ democratic and administrative 
arrangements are frequently overwhelmed by particular social groups, resulting in adverse 
outcomes. The situation is regularly exacerbated by workplace diversity, whereby people are 
more likely to form social groups based on their GD, AD and ND.  
 
From the literature, it can be concluded that both internal and external social capital exist in 
connection with the composition of the board through direct selection, despite the casual logic 
differing entirely. Furthermore, the influence of social capital on direct selection varies based 
on the context of the application (Johnson et al., 2013). Both internal and external social capital 
create resources that are unique and necessary to a board’s effectiveness. However, social 
capital does not only contribute positively to a board, as there are negative implications such 
as restrictions on freedom and outside members. Board diversification is necessary as it 
increases the level of performance and operational efficiency within an organisation (Kim & 
Lim, 2010).  
 
4.3 Development of hypotheses 
This quantitative study consists of several independent variables that affect both EM and FP 
with regard to the non-financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait. Against this background, this 
study utilises different hypotheses to test whether the different aspects of BD in the form of 
gender, age and nationality have either a positive, negative or no association with EM and FP 
in these firms. 
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4.3.1 Gender diversity (GD) and earnings management (EM) 
As discussed in section 3.2.1 from an empirical studies perspective, there is a negative 
association between GD and EM. This means that the greater the GD on the board, the more 
able the firm is to conduct its business activities effectively. Furthermore, a gender-diverse 
board means that the firm’s collective management skills are enhanced and, in turn, the board 
has a more effective monitoring system, which ensures that the firm does not spend money on 
things that have an adverse effect on its FP.  
 
From the literature review, this study has noted that the findings of most previous articles reveal 
a negative relationship between GD on the board and EM. This justifies less manipulation of 
EM. This is because women are more careful and cautious than men in making ethical decisions 
(Clikean et al., 2001; Enofe et al., 2017; Hinz et al., 1997; Labelle et al., 2010; Lakhal et al., 
2015; Omoye et al., 2014; Powell & Ansic, 1997; Riley & Chow, 1992; Susanto, 2016; Triki 
Damak, 2018; Zalata et al., 2018). 
 
4.3.2 Age diversity (AD) and earnings management (EM) 
As discussed in section 3.2.1 from an empirical studies perspective, there are few previous 
research studies pertaining to the association between AD on boards and EM. AD refers to the 
age range of a firm’s BOD, the CEO and others who hold senior management positions. The 
appointment of younger and older people to these positions means that the board has a blend 
of experience and creativity, very helpful in ensuring the existence of an effective and accurate 
system in monitoring the firm’s business activities. 
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4.3.3 National diversity (ND) and earnings management (EM) 
As discussed in section 3.2.1 from an empirical studies perspective, the ND of a board’s 
members means that the board possesses a range of different backgrounds, skills and 
experiences that can prove beneficial in carrying out the firm’s business activities. The findings 
of many previous studies show that foreign directors bring a variety of skills and experiences 
from having worked in a range of export markets. Consequently, there is a negative relationship 
between ND and EM. However, the findings of other studies show that there is a positive 
relationship between ND and EM because foreign directors are often overly involved in other 
businesses and do not spend sufficient time in ensuring that the firm has an effective and 
accurate system for monitoring its business activities.  
 
4.3.4 Gender diversity (GD) and firm performance (FP) 
 
As discussed in section 3.2.2 from an empirical studies perspective, many previous research 
studies (e.g. Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2007; Erhardt et al., 2003; Gordini & 
Rancati, 2017; Rose, 2007) have examined the relationship between GD and FP. This 
relationship is of significant concern in the labour market and firms have adopted various 
practices to improve their effectiveness in this area. There is a general recognition that by 
making the best use of the skills and experiences of the firm’s men and women in arriving at 
well-informed decisions, GD can improve FP (Damardi, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, Erhardt et al.’s (2003) findings show that there is a positive relationship between 
GD and ROA. This is because women bring a different perspective to the board and so 
decisions are made that ensure that the firm is well placed to deal with any given circumstance. 
Similar findings demonstrate that there is a positive relationship between GD and ROE. In 
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addition, Carter et al.’s (2003) and Gordini and Rancati’s (2017) findings show a positive 
relationship between the presence of women on the board and FP as measured by TQ.  
 
A firm’s culture reflects the link between GD and FP (Julizaerma & Sori, 2012). A diverse 
workforce has a more significant breadth of views and hence GD encourages a firm to perform 
better. By contrast, Carter et al.’s (2007) conclusion seems to contradict these authors’ earlier 
view that there is a positive relationship between GD and FP. 
 
4.3.5 Age diversity (AD) and firm performance (FP) 
As discussed in section 3.2.2 from an empirical studies perspective, the findings of several 
studies (e.g. Choi & Rainey, 2010; Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2015) show a positive association 
between AD and FP. Firms have AD are likely to have more confident employees because 
these individuals believe that they have opportunities to grow their careers within its ranks. 
Interestingly, Dagsson and Larsson’s (2011) findings demonstrate that, while there is a positive 
relationship between AD and ROA in Swedish firms, there is a negative relationship with TQ, 
because ROA measures FP and not the market’s performance value. 
 
By contrast, Kunze et al.’s (2013) and Shahata et al.’s (2017) findings show that there is a 
negative relationship between AD and FP. This view is supported by Eulerich et al.’s (2014) 
findings that there is a negative correlation between AD and FP because considerable BD can 
reduce the decision-making process and communication between board members. 
Furthermore, Tanikawa et al.’s (2017) findings show that where board members are relatively 
older, there is a significant negative relationship between AD and ROE but not between AD 
and ROA. 
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4.3.6 National diversity (ND) and firm performance (FP) 
As discussed in section 3.2.2 from an empirical studies perspective, many studies have 
examined the relationship between ND and FP by determining advantages and disadvantages. 
The findings of several studies (e.g. Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005; Diepen, 2015; Erhardt et al., 
2003; Hart, 2004; Kaczmarek, 2009) conducted in various countries confirm that there is a 
positive relationship between ND and FP. These studies’ main focus is on determining the pros 
and cons of ND and FP by considering employees’ perceptions of each other across countries. 
They show a positive relationship between ND and FP. By contrast, Darmadi (2011) argues 
that international diversity has no influence on either a firm’s marketing performance measured 
by TQ or its accounting performance measured by EM. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, Bhagat and Black (2002), Donaldson and Davis (1991), 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Rowley et al. (2017) have clarified that in agency theory, 
the managers-investors relationship provides a significant challenge because it is connected 
with agency issues, for example, information asymmetry and conflicts of interest. As the 
investors are a blend of people, the top managerial staff should similarly comprise a mix of 
men and women in order to provide ‘board diversity’ and to take care of the agency theory 
issue. Furthermore, resource dependence theory examines the influence of resource acquisition 
on a company’s behaviour (Hillman et al., 2009). Through co-selecting the assets expected to 
survive, a firm’s BOD fills in as the connection between the firm and its external factors 
(Pfeffer, 1982; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Rondoy et al., 2006). With regard to the board, 
resource dependence theory considers how boards facilitate access to significant assets. With 
respect to BD in terms of gender, age and nationality, the BOD possesses a wide variety of 
skills and knowledge (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012) into businesses, employees, customers, 
markets and business opportunities. Furthermore, social capital theory considers board 
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members’ connections for firm needs and support through shared respect and love (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Hernández-Carrión et al., 2020; Niu & Chen, 2017; Portes, 1998; Sealy & 
Vinnicombe, 2007). The social capital that emerges when establishing relationship networks 
from gender, age and ND thus becomes strategic assets and a form of intangible capital deriving 
from relationships as well as further resources dependent both theories, focus based on true 
competitive advantage with other firms, which led to better FP and earnings quality 
(Hernández-Carrión et al., 2020; Johnson et al., 2013). The present study develops the 
following hypotheses based on the review of existing literature and theory: 
 
H1: There is a negative association between gender diversity and earnings management. 
H2: There is a negative association between age diversity and earnings management. 
H3: There is a negative association between national diversity and earnings 
management. 
H4: There is a positive association between gender diversity and firm performance. 
H5: There is a positive association between age diversity and firm performance. 
H6: There is a positive association between national diversity and firm performance. 
 
With regard to the literature review, Table 2 shows the expected results as to whether or not 
each hypothesis is accepted or rejected. Chapter 6 details this study’s findings. 
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Table 2: Expected results 
With regard to the literature review, the author obtained these expected results 
Research hypotheses Expected relationship Source 
H1: There is a negative 
association between gender 
diversity and earnings 
management in Kuwait. 
- 
Agency theory, resource 
dependence theory and 
social capital theory 
H2: There is a negative 
association between the 
average age and earnings 
management in Kuwait. 
- 
Resource dependence 
theory and social capital 
theory 
H3: There is a negative 
association between nationality 
diversity and earnings 
management in Kuwait. 
- 
Resource dependence 
theory and social capital 
theory 
H4: There is a positive 
association between gender 
diversity and firm performance 
in Kuwait. 
+ 
Agency theory, resource 
dependence theory and 
social capital theory 
H5: There is a positive 
association between the 
average age and firm 
performance in Kuwait. 
+ 
Resource dependence 
theory and social capital 
theory 
H6: There is a positive 
association between nationality 
diversity and firm performance 
in Kuwait. 
+ 
Resource dependence 
theory and social capital 
theory 
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4.4 Summary  
 
In conclusion, the literature review has shown that BD, particularly in the form of GD, AD and 
ND, has a significant impact on FP. The present study uses agency theory, resource dependence 
theory and social capital theory to measure the impact of BD on EM and FP. First, agency 
theory has helped to explain and resolve issues in the relationship between firm principals and 
their agents. Most commonly, the relationship refers to that between the firm’s executive as 
the agent and the shareholders as the firm’s principals. The agency theory has helped to confirm 
H1 and H4 by arguing that embedding gender quotas on the membership of a firm’s BOD and 
on its top management may help to increase the values of Kuwaiti non-financial firms listed on 
Boursa Kuwait.  
 
Second, resource dependence theory studies have shown how a firm’s external resources affect 
its behaviour. Resource dependence theory has demonstrated that in the case of Kuwaiti non-
financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait, there is a negative association between AD and EM. 
Thus, the proportion of young board members is more likely to be positively related to a firm’s 
overall FP rather than its EM, helping to confirm H1, H2, H3, H4, H5 and H6.  
 
Third, social capital theory has proved equally important in encouraging BD by arguing that 
diverse boards are better positioned to leverage various forms of social capital from their 
members. Social capital theory has shown that BD, particularly in the form of GD, AD and 
ND, has a significant impact on FP. Hence, social capital theory has helped to confirm H1, H2, 
H3, H4, H5 and H6. 
 
Fourth, the results from using agency theory, resource dependence theory and social capital 
theory have shown that GD is essential to increasing a board’s independence, as women are 
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more likely to ask questions that their male counterparts avoid. Moreover, due to the 
collaborative skills that women often bring with them, the presence of women directors on a 
firm’s board contribute significantly to its bottom line.  
 
The next chapter explains this study’s methodology.  
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5.0 Chapter Five: Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the methodology used in this study. It begins with the research 
methodology, continues with a description of the sample and data and subsequently presents 
information concerning the dependent, independent and control variables utilised. Next, these 
variables are described in detail and are followed by information about the research models 
and the OLS assumptions used in this study. The chapter concludes by addressing endogeneity 
and causality problems.  
 
5.2 Research methodology  
 
This paper’s methodology is rooted in a positivist philosophy. While I understand criticisms of 
positivism related to its limited ability to represent BD, this paper holds the view that this 
approach is able to demonstrate over time its effect on measurable objectives such as the 
relationships between BD and a company’s EM and between BD and a company’s FP. As its 
research method, this thesis utilises a deductive approach, beginning with the theory. Having 
already developed its hypotheses, this thesis proceeds by collecting secondary data in order 
that these can be either accepted or rejected. This thesis adopts a quantitative rather than a 
qualitative method of data collection using various databases, such as Capital IQ, books and 
journals. Having collected the data, the thesis uses SATA software to conduct a statistical 
analysis of my observations in order to establish how BD affects the EM and FP of Kuwaiti 
non-financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait (see Figure 1).  
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5.3 Sample and data description 
The data are collected from secondary sources such as Boursa Kuwait, the Public Authority for 
Civil Information, Capital IQ databases and annual reports. The quantitative analysis method 
is of the regression type. The reason for adopting this method is that almost all previous 
empirical studies regarding BD, EM and FP have used quantitative methods (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Alshamari & Alsaidi, 2014; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 
2010; Erhardt et al., 2003; Gonzalez et al., 2014; Gordini & Rancati, 2017; Gull et al., 2018; 
Ittonen et al., 2013; Lakhal et al., 2015; Omoye et al., 2014; Peni & Vahamaa, 2010; Rose, 
2007; Susanto, 2016; Zalata et al., 2018), rendering this study’s findings consistent. 
 
The data come from 103 listed Kuwaiti non-financial firms. The exclusion of the country’s 47 
financial enterprises from the sample owes to two main reasons. First, they are governed and 
operated through other sectors and the central bank (Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2012; Opler et 
al., 1999). Second, their CG structures and practices differ from those of non-financial firms 
because they follow the Kuwait Central Bank’s CG practices. Consequently, it is difficult to 
compare their operations with those of non-financial firms. Indeed, these issues have resulted 
in some confusion when interpreting data (Chbib, 2015; Chen et al., 2008; Cohen, 2008; 
Damodaran, 2009; Guest, 2019; Hail, 2002; Kouaib & Jarboui, 2014; Sun et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, most previous studies (Gonzalez et al., 2014; Gull et al., 2018; Ittonen et al., 
2013; Lakhal et al., 2015; Omoye et al., 2014; Peni & Vahamaa, 2010; Susanto, 2016; Zalata 
et al., 2018) examining the impacts of BD, EM and FP (Alshamari & Alsaidi, 2014; Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2010; Erhardt et al., 2003; 
Gordini & Rancati, 2017; Rose, 2007) have excluded financial firms. Therefore, in order to 
ensure consistent analysis, it is essential to apply the same process. Table 3 shows nine Boursa 
Kuwait classifications: basic materials; consumer goods; consumer services; health care; 
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industry; oil and gas; real estate; technology; and telecommunications. Table 4 presents the 
number of delisted firms provided by Boursa Kuwait during the study period and this thesis 
removed it from the data, that contained only the listed companies that survived during 2010 
to 2017 period, for reasons of data availability.  
 
 
Table 3: Boursa Kuwait classification 
Industry type (non-financial) Number 
Basic materials 4 
Consumer goods 3 
Consumer services 14 
Health care 3 
Industry 27 
Oil and gas 6 
Real estate  40 
Technology 1 
Telecommunications 5 
Total 103 
 
 
Table 4: Number of delisted firms 
Year Number of delisted firms 
Percentage of total 
population (33 firms) 
2010 0 0 
2011 0 0 
2012 3 9.09 
2013 2 6.06 
2014 2 6.06 
2015 2 6.06 
2016 7 21.21 
2017 17 51.52 
 33 100 
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The data collected for this study are generally classified into four categories. The first category 
is data related to the CG mechanisms relevant to the BOD (gender diversity, family firm, board 
size, board independence and role duality), including the firm’s leverage, losses, year and 
industry type. The second category contains data related to directors’ AD and ND. The third 
category contains data related to firm age and firm size. The fourth category contains data 
related to EM and FP and includes both accounting-based and market-based measures of 
performance. As shown in Table 5, these data were collected from different sources. 
 
Table 5: Data sources 
Variables Source 
Gender diversity, family firm, board size, board 
independence, role duality,  leverage, losses, 
year, industry type 
Annual report 
Directors’ age and ND The Public Authority for Civil Information 
Firm age Boursa Kuwait 
Liquidity, firm size, sales growth, cash flows, 
dividend per share, FP, EM 
Capital IQ database 
 
The period of study is from 2010 to 2017. The first reason for choosing this period is that it 
follows the significant development of various CG practices since the 2007 financial crises and 
therefore the data reflect the latest CG practices. The second reason is that it provides data from 
the latest available period. The third reason is that this period includes the implementation of 
the KCGC in June 2013. 
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5.4 Definition of variables 
This study uses three key types of variables: dependent, independent and control. The 
dependent variables are EM and FP. The independent variables are gender, age and ND and 
reflect the diversity of the BOD. The control variables are firm size, firm age, family firm, 
board size, board independence, role duality, leverage, liquidity, sales growth, cash flows, 
dividend per share, losses, industry type dummy and year dummy. Additional details are given 
in Tables 11 and 12, while section 3.2.3 provides further information about the control 
variables. 
 
5.4.1 Dependent variables 
5.4.1.1 Earnings management (EM) measurements 
Effective reporting processes and disclosure reduce the challenges for businesses with valuable 
economic reasons. A company’s management may influence its financial reports as well as its 
disclosure, in turn introducing an additional risk for investors and minimising capital 
allocation’s effectiveness (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, & Lodh, 2010). Finance and accounting 
experts have pinpointed the significance of exploring EM from various viewpoints to create a 
framework possible for encountering such behaviours (Roychowdhury, 2006). Building an EM 
framework may help establish an effective way for managers to communicate internal 
information to stakeholders. The disclosed information must meet certain qualitative elements, 
such as comprehensibility, generalisability, reliability and relevance. 
 
In theory, EM is explained by two different accounting theories. Manipulating earnings may 
be seen as beneficial/effective or opportunistic as per the contractual perspective of financial 
reporting (Jiraporn et al., 2008). The effective viewpoint asserts that EM may be employed as 
a managerial tool for confiding internal information to outsiders and thus increasing the value 
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of financial reporting for investors (Jiraporn et al., 2008; Subramanyam, 1996). The 
opportunistic view suggests that management utilises EM as a tool for maximising their utility; 
for instance, managers maximise their bonuses, incentives and build a better picture of their 
performance for themselves to grantee stockholders’ votes (Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 
1995; Jiraporn et al., 2008). Furthermore, firms may meet capital market expectations by 
managing earnings, such as by using initial public offerings (IPO) that let them increase their 
stock prices (Erikson & Wong, 1999; Jiraporn et al., 2008; Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b). 
 
When managers use EM opportunistically, companies whose agency costs are more severe 
must show a higher degree of EM. That is, the extent of EM is positively connected to the 
weight of agency conflicts (Abdullah & Ku Ismail, 2012; Goel, 2012). On the other hand, EM 
can be aimed at conveying private information and therefore improve the information content 
for earning, benefiting shareholders as a result (Vladu, 2015).  
 
Management may manipulate the financial data reported to primary users and the market. 
Accruals management is an integral aspect of possible management manipulations, as per 
previous research in the EM field (Cohen, Pandit, Wasley, & Zach, 2011; Srivastava, 2019). 
Accruals exist because there is no single unified definition of economic income and profit. The 
implications of transactions must be recorded as they occur and reported in the period to which 
most economic activities relate. Accruals comprise an element of uncertainty because they are 
not fully appreciable and observable (Enomoto, Kimura, & Yamaguchi, 2015). This element 
is often termed ‘discretionary accruals’. Managers may use accruals as a tool for attaining a 
desired earnings objective (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008). Furthermore, managers may affect 
earnings directly through activities that influence operating cash flow (Ho, Liao, & Taylor, 
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2015). Real activities manipulation occurs once the actions of the management diverge from 
established normal business practices to attain an earnings benchmark.  
 
Earnings manipulation can occur through several EM strategies, such as discretionary or real 
EM and classification shifting. Accrual-based EM aims at obscuring actual economic 
performance through altering accounting techniques or estimates within the generally accepted 
principles of accounting (Al-Absy, Ismail & Chandren, 2018; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). Real 
EM changes the performance of actual business transactions. Under real EM, companies alter 
their operating activities to fulfil short-term earnings targets by adapting the structure or timing 
of real transactions. This activity has direct cash flow implications and potential long-term 
impacts on economic value (Braam et al., 2015; Kothari, Mizik, & Roychowdhury, 2012). Real 
EM is regarded as more challenging to observe than accrual-based EM, making it easier for 
companies to hide the gains made. Classification shifting is an EM device used to misclassify 
income statements so as to manipulate main earnings, while net earnings stay equivalent 
(Athanasakou et al., 2009; Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006; Zalata & Roberts, 2016). According 
to Fan et al. (2010) and Zalata and Roberts (2016), boards are inspired to misclassify repeating 
costs as non-repeating when such practices permit them to meet/beat foreordained income 
benchmarks. 
 
However, in most developing economies, modified Jones (1995) falls short because firms tend 
to use current accruals for the sole reason that current accruals entail cash flow implications in 
subsequent years (Yoon, Jiraporn, & Miller, 2006). From examining the types of accruals used 
by South Korean firms to increase or reduce their reported earnings, Yoon et al.’s (2006) 
findings show that earning-increasing firms used non-cash revenues whereas earning-reducing 
firms employed non-cash expenses. Overall, their findings conclude that the modified Jones 
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model (1995) is ineffective in the South Korean market. However, Algharaballi and 
Albuloushi’s (2008) findings show that Kuwaiti firms practise EM to maximise incentives and, 
accordingly, EM is effective in Kuwait. Islam, Ali and Ahmad (2011) have analysed the 
effectiveness of the modified Jones model in detecting EM in the Dhaka Stock Exchange’s 
(DSE) initial public offerings. Their study follows on from a previous study demonstrating the 
modified Jones model’s ineffectiveness in measuring EM in the South Korean market. Islam 
et al.’s (2011) findings show that the modified Jones model was ineffective in the Bangladesh 
market because its explanatory power was only 9%. In an attempt to establish the optimal 
model, Chen (2010) has analysed 77 Chinese stock market ST companies by using various 
accrual-based EM models. His conclusions show that, although the modified Jones model 
needs to be improved in some areas, it is the best model and above all other EM measures of 
discretionary accruals.  
 
There have been arguments in favour of performance-matched discretionary accruals models, 
like the Kothari model. Proponents have suggested that performance matching on ROA 
controls for the effect of the performance on the measured discretionary accruals. Therefore, 
the use of the Kothari model increases the reliability of the EM results. Empirical studies 
suggest that the factors that determine EM in emerging markets are dependent on the model 
used to estimate the discretionary accruals (Charfeddine, Raheb, & Omri, 2013). This 
perception has been supported by their investigation into the Tunisian market where they used 
the modified Jones model, the Dechow Model (1995) and the Kothari model (Charfeddine, 
Raheb, & Omri, 2013). Furthermore, empirical studies support using the Kothari model 
because there are no fraudulent activities associated with the use of this model in measuring 
EM (Jones, Krishnan, & Melendrez, 2007). 
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A vital component of the traditional accruals measure of EM is its ability to be adjusted to the 
accruals performance when a firm’s assets and performance are matched with the ROA and the 
industry index. In this respect, Kothari et al. (2005) explain that the inclusion of either ROA or 
ROA matching accruals can improve other models. Chen, Yang and Huang (2010) agree with 
this assertion but conclude that the addition of the life cycle to the variables further improves 
these models. Therefore, it is evident that as much as the Kothari model improves a certain 
aspect of other models, other variables still need to be included in order for these measures of 
EM and their results to be completely reliable. 
 
According to Jackson (2018), discretionary accruals measures have their limitations. He states 
that although discretionary accruals are recognised as being noisy proxies for EM, they are still 
broadly used in the literature. This viewpoint condemns the use of discretionary accruals 
without really discrediting their value or significance in the cash flow framework of an 
organisation (Huchet-Bourdon et al., 2017). Thus, like the previous argument, it lacks the solid 
backing of the principles of accounting. In retrospect, accruals are part of the transactions that 
an entity enters in the cash flow system (Jackson, 2018). Moreover, Jackson (2018) claims that 
discretionary accruals are not appropriate for measuring EM owing to how they are calculated. 
Peer companies’ decisions tend to influence regression coefficients and thus residuals in 
accruals models, potentially resulting in false calculations regarding EM in other companies. 
Jackson presents three reasons why discretionary accruals are inappropriate to measuring EM. 
First, discretionary accruals are necessarily affected by the conditional means of all variables 
in the model. Second, discretionary accruals amounts are generally not plausibly associated 
with the size of earnings (ROA). Third, discretionary accruals as EM measures lead to EM 
manipulation.  
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Furthermore, there are limitations with the Jones model (1991), which relates total accruals to 
changes in sales, plants, property and equipment. This is because sales can be subject to how 
managers treat earnings (Arun et al., 2015; Gull et al., 2018). In the light of this limitation, the 
modified Jones model suggests that managers use accruals to manipulate earnings, as accruals 
are not easily detectable by stakeholders (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Gull et al., 2018; 
Jones, 1991; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005). Furthermore, short-term accruals are always 
simpler to manage than long-term accruals (Arun et al., 2015; Becker et al., 1998; Gull et al., 
2018). To conclude, the viewpoint on EM practices are diverse. However, not the incentive for 
their undertaking but rather the motive should be questioned, because in practice they are 
beneficial to the entity. Although the interests of long-term investors might not align with those 
of the management, they share a common goal of monitoring the progress of the organisation. 
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Table 6: Articles on EM 
Number Author/s and year Region EM measured 
1 Gull et al. (2018) France Modified Jones (1995) 
2 Ittonen et al. (2013) Finland and Sweden Dechow 
& Dichev (2002) and 
Jones (1991) 
3 Peni & Va ̈ha ̈maa (2012) USA Dechow & Dichev 
(2002) (DD model) and 
McNichols (2002) 
(modified DD model). 
4 Osma & Noguer (2007) Spain  Jones model (1991) 
5 Talab, Flayyih, & Ali (2018) Iraq De Angelo (1986), 
Healy (1989), Jones 
(1991), Jones Rectifier, 
modified Jones (1995) 
and Beneish M-score  
6 Kumai & Bala (2015) Nigeria Dechow (1995), 
modified Jones (1995) 
7 Park & Shin (2004) Canada Jones (1991), modified 
Jones (1995) 
8 Sanda et al. (2008) Nigeria Modified Jones (1995) 
9 Azutoru et al. (2017) Nigeria Kothari (2005), 
modified Jones (1995) 
10 Mohd, Iskandar, & Rahmat (2005) Malaysia  Kothari (2005), Jones 
(1995)  
11 Alareeni & Aljuaidi (2014) Palestine Yoon and Miller 
models (2006) 
12 Neill et al. (1995) South Korea Jones (1991) 
13 Yoon & Miller (2006) Bangladesh Dechow (1995), 
Kothari (2005), 
modified Jones (1995) 
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Earnings management (EM) 
This study uses discretionary accruals measured by modified Jones (1995), and Kothari (2005) 
models were chosen because, according to previous studies, the use of a different type of 
measurement for EM does not change the results (Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 1991; Kothari 
et al., 2005). Furthermore, the modified Jones and Kothari models are generally used in the 
literature to measure discretionary accruals, facilitating this study’s comparability (see Table 
6) (Arun et al., 2015; Fan et al., 2012; Gull et al., 2018; Jackson, 2018; Kim & Jung, 2020; Shu 
et al., 2015; Yu et al., 2020). This thesis uses EM as the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(Abdelwahed, 2018; Ittonen et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2010). Data were collected from the Capital 
IQ database and Excel was used for the following calculation: 
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Where: 
	!"!" is the total accruals of firm i in year t; 
 ∆-./!"	is the change in revenues of firm i between years t and t-1; 
 ∆"-!"	is	 he change in receivables of firm i between years t and t-1 
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	"!!"#$	is	the total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
 The a1, a2 %@: a3 are obtained by estimating the equation using each year and firm in the 
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The second measurment is the Kothari model (2005) (Abdelwahed, 2018; Ittonen et al., 2013; 
Kothari et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2010). 
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Where: 
!"!" is the total accruals of firm i in year t; 
∆-./!"	is the change in revenues of firm i between years t and t-1; 
∆"-!"	is	the change in receivables of firm i between years t and t-1 
33.!"	is	the level of gross property, plant and equipment of firm i in year t; 
-E"!"	is Return on Assets of firm i in year t 
"!!"#$	is	the total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
The a1, a2 %@: a3 are obtained by estimating the equation using each year and firm in the 
industry. This study uses time effects and the potential industry as dummy control variables. 
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5.4.1.2 Measurements of firm performance (FP)  
Several organisations use market measures and accounting measures to determine their overall 
FP. The phenomenon of FP is a matter of some concern, as divergent measures such as market 
to book, value ratio, ROE, ROA TQ, net present value, cash to assets, stock return, return on 
capital employed, market return and labour productivity all exhibit some variations (see Table 
7). In order to address this study’s research objective and the research question concerning 
whether or not BD affects FP, this study measures FP by using the accounting measures of 
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ROA and ROE and the market measure of TQ. Most previous studies have used these measures 
to monitor the effectiveness of FP in maximising shareholders’ wealth. The main aim of CG 
practices is governance to improve FP and managers should use many theories, such as agency 
theory, to maximise shareholders’ wealth. 
 
While firms use ROA and ROE as an accounting measure of FP and TQ as a market-based 
measure of FP (Abowd, 1990), various studies have used the functionality differently. 
Although ROA, ROE and TQ are accredited indicators of FP, there has been a fierce debate 
about their relationship. Furthermore, most articles (see Table 7) have used these 
measurements, which are today available on numerous databases such as Capital IQ and 
Bloomberg. There are also now demands for firms to disclose their information and for them 
to be transparent in order to minimise the information asymmetry problem, which results from 
the problem between the principal and the agent (Chbib, 2015). 
 
Abowd (1990) and Singh, Tabassum, Darwish and Batsakis (2018) conceptualise TQ as either 
a long-term market measure or a future reflection of FP. On the other hand, Carnes, Xu, Sirmon 
and Karadag (2019) consider ROA and ROE to be either short-term accounting-based measures 
or past reflections of FP. While there is no consensus on the connection between future long-
term FP and past short-term FP (Ardi & Murwaningsari, 2018), Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes 
(2003) perceive both accounting and marketing measures as reflections of a firm’s FP. 
 
ROA is commonly used as an indicator of net income relative to the capital cost of the original 
investment (Khadafi, Heikal, & Ummah, 2014). ROE is calculated by dividing net income by 
shareholders’ equity. A high ratio portrays benefits and vice versa (Chandani, Mabood, & 
Mahmood, 2018). ROA and ROE are metrics that are used to determine a firm’s profitability 
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in relation to its gross assets. The significant objective of the firm’s assets is to produce profits 
and to generate revenue. Therefore, by using assets to generate profits, the ROA and ROE 
ratios help investors and the firm’s management to discover effective approaches. Notably, 
firms invest money in the form of capital assets and the return is valued in terms of profits. 
Wang et al. (2018) claim that the ROA ratio is determined by the margin of profit margin as a 
percentage of the firm’s total asset turnover. However, Spierdijka and Zaourasa (2018) assert 
that average total assets are the costs of historical assets reflected in the balance sheet without 
taking account of the accumulated depreciation. Davis et al. (2018) claim that all assets are 
funded either by debt or equity and, by adding back interest expenses, some investors disregard 
the asset acquisition costs in the calculation of the firm’s return. Epstein (2018) asserts that, by 
disregarding the firm’s assets, the acquisition cost results in an attractive ROA that is favoured 
by investors. A high ratio shows that compared to its industry rivals, a firm’s management of 
its assets generates surplus income (Liu, Lee, & Zhang, 2018). According to Aktan (2018), 
different industries use divergent assets. 
 
On the other hand, a market-based measure such as TQ does not escape from the debate. 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) deem the TQ market measure to represent the ratios between the 
market values of the physical assets relative to their replacement values. Burgman and Van 
Clieaf (2012) assert that Nicholas Kaldor introduced TQ in 1966 in relation to marginal 
productivity and macroeconomic theory. Singh et al. (2018) argue that James Tobin 
popularised the market measure in 1977, with TQ described in two quantities. To start with, 
the numerator represents the market valuation, where the market going price is used in the 
exchange of existing assets. Second, the denominator is either the reproduction or the 
replacement cost, which is the market price for newly produced commodities. Hughes, 
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Hodgkinson, Elliott and Hughes (2018) claim that the ratio is extremely useful and significant 
because it relates financial markets to a market for services and goods.  
 
Trabelsi and Chikh (2018) argue that it is difficult to determine a firm’s replacement value of 
its assets. As shown below, TQ is a common term used in the financial literature to calculate 
the ratio by comparing a firm’s equity and liabilities with correspondent book values the 
company’s asset replacement value. 
 
Tobin′s	Q	 = 	
Equity	market	value	 + Liabilities	market	value
	equity	book	value	 + Liabilities	book	value	
 
 
Langenstein, Uzik and Glova (2018) claim that financial analysis also applies an inverse ratio 
known as the ‘book to market ratio’, shown below: 
 
Book	to	Market	Ratio =
Equity	Book	Value
Equity	Market	Value
 
 
With particular regard to stock-listed firms, financial records place considerable emphasis on 
the capitalisation of the market. This is normally calculated for a specified time and is depicted 
as the share price relative to a number of shares. Cupic and Todorovic (2011) assert that TQ is 
used to determine whole market valuation relative to aggregate corporate assets. 
 
Blundell, Bond, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1992) claim that, when TQ is greater than 1.0, the 
market value is higher than the firm’s declared assets. This means that the market value mirrors 
certain unspecified firm assets. According to Connolly and Hirschey (2005) and as shown 
below, a significant TQ value stimulates a firm to focus more on investing in capital that is 
imperative relative to the price paid: 
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!] =
Market	Value	of	Installed	Capital
Replacement	Cost	of	Capital	
 
 
Conversely, if TQ is lower than 1, then the recorded value of a firm’ assets is higher than the 
market value. This suggests that the market is undervaluing the firm (Peters, Smith, & Thomas, 
2018). However, in low-TQ ratio scenarios, there is no straightforward balancing mechanism, 
suggesting that the assets’ market value is less than the replacement cost (TQ<1) (Talab, 
Flayyih, & Ali, 2018). Such a scenario is an indicator that the market effort to deploy real assets 
earns insufficient returns and therefore people who wish to sell their assets in the market are 
subject to the value of their discounted assets. 
 
Mujahid and Akhtar (2014) assert that if real assets are sold far above their replacement costs, 
for instance through liquidation, the aforementioned action benefits the shareholders because 
it drives the TQ ratio back upwards towards parity (TQ->1). According to Boguth and Simutin 
(2018), a low TQ ratio for the entire market indicates investors’ pessimism about future returns 
on the asset. Carnes, Xu, Sirmon and Karadag (2019) assert that various firms with lower TQ 
ratios are targeted due to the fact that the market penalises the value of their assets.  
 
The evaluation of TQ reveals that it experiences various drawbacks. For instance, the 
measurement of TQ depends on the effectiveness of the accounting items included in the firm’s 
balance sheet. Second, while TQ shows the firm’s growth potential, a change in the firm’s TQ 
value within a given period may translate to changes in the valuation of the projected growth 
prospects, which may result from exogenous factors that only the firm’s management can 
assess. These factors may include issues such as the improvement of the economic and 
industrial tracks (Sarin & Summers, 2018). Peters et al. (2018) add that although TQ is a 
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reliable measure that has been used for many years to display the existing connection or 
relationship between the ownership structure and FP, users ought to test either the authenticity 
or the efficiency of the obtained results by using an alternative approach to performance 
measurement. 
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Table 7: Articles on board diversity and firm performance 
Number Author/s and year Region 
Performance 
measured 
1 Abdullah (2004) Kuwait Firm’s gross revenue 
and income 
2 Alshammari & Alsaidi (2014) Kuwait Tobin’s Q & ROA 
3 Campbell & Mínguez-Vera (2008) 
 
USA Tobin’s Q 
4 Carter et al. (2010) USA Tobin’s Q & ROA 
5 Carter et al. (2003) USA Tobin’s Q 
6 Adam & Ferreira (2009) 
 
USA Tobin’s Q & ROA 
7 Zahra & Stanton (1988) 
 
USA ROE & ROA 
8 Erhardt et al. (2003)  USA ROA & ROI 
9 Campbell & Minguez Vera (2010)  Spain  Tobin’s Q 
10 Jadiyappa et al. (2019) 
 
India ROA & ROE 
11 Abdullah & Ismail (2017) Malaysia ROA & TQ 
12 Abowd (1990) USA ROA, ROE, ERET 
& TSR 
13 Lückerath-Rovers (2013) 
 
Amsterdam ROE, ROS, ROIC, 
EBIT, TSR & stock 
price growth 
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Firm performance (FP) 
This study uses two types of FP, namely accounting-based measures and market-based 
measures, to test the impact of BD on FP and its effect on short-term and long-term FP. This 
study uses ROA and ROE as the accounting-based measures and TQ as the market-based 
measure. The latter was calculated by dividing the firm’s market value by the replacement 
value of its assets. The reasons for using TQ are that it includes a long-term element in its 
calculation and most CG and FP studies have used this measure. In addition, TQ includes long-
term FP, represented by a percentage over a particular period of time, as reflected in the values 
of its various stocks and shares.  
 
5.4.2 Independent variables 
 
The use of FP follows the recent direction in the CG literature. This study classifies the 
independent variables into three groups. One of the independent variables is GD, which is 
measured by the percentage of women on the board (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 
2007; Croson & Gneezy, 2009;  Liu et al., 2014; Peni & Vahamaa, 2010; Wahid, 2018). The 
measurement of GD by education and experience is not available. As shown in Table 8 below, 
between 2010 and 2017 the number of directors on all non-financial firms’ boards totalled 
4,968. This included 4,762 male directors representing 95.85% and 206 female directors 
representing 4.15%. It is also good to know that 10.68% of the total number of female directors 
took a chairman position on the board and 12.62% an assistant chairman position. Thus, 23% 
of the total number of women on Kuwaiti firms’ boards took a top position.  
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Table 8: Gender and female positions on boards 
All directors 4,968 100% 
All males 4,762 95.85% 
All females 206 4.15% 
Total female chairman directors 22 10.68%  
Total female assistant directors 26  12.62% 
Percentage of females in top positions out of 
all female directors 48 23% 
 
The second group is AD, which is measured by taking the average age of all board members 
in each year and for each firm. Thereafter, the sample average age is compared to each board’s 
average age by using a dummy that equals one for 48 years of age and below (reflecting a 
young director) and zero for directors aged 48 and above (as a proxy for experience) (Abdullah 
et al., 2013; Amran, 2011; Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Higgs, 2003; 
Kunze et al., 2011; Post et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2017). Bilimoria and Piderit (1994b) found the 
average age of board members to be 50, which is close to this study’s average age. Furthermore, 
Johnson et al. (2013) reviewed the study of board composition that the most age diversity 
measure is by average. Age reflects the background and experience that a director accumulates 
over time. Senior directors are more knowledgeable, because their age provides evidence of 
their overall experience in guiding a business (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994). As shown in Table 
9, the number of Kuwaiti non-financial firms’ boards totalled 824 from 2010 to 2017; on 459 
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of them the average age of the board members was below 48 years, while on 365 of them the 
average age was above 48 years. 
 
Table 9: Average board age  
All boards from 2010 to 
2017 824 Percentage 
Average board age > 48 365 44 
Average board age < 48 459 56 
 
The third group is ND, which is measured by the percentage of foreign directors on the board 
out of the total number of board directors (García-Meca et al., 2015; Gull et al., 2018). As 
shown in Table 10 below, the total number of directors on the boards of all Kuwaiti non-
financial firms from 2010 to 2017 was 4,968. Of these, 4,416 directors were Kuwaiti, 
representing 88.89% of the total directors, while 552 directors were non-Kuwaiti, or 11.11% 
of the total directors. 
 
Table 10: The percentage of Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti directors 
Director type Number of directors Percentage 
All directors 4,968 100 
Kuwaiti directors 4,416 88.89 
Non-Kuwaiti directors 552 11.11 
 
Tables 11 and 12 summarise the definitions of the independent variables that follow (French 
& Raven, 1960; Hart, 2014; Harjoto et al., 2015 Kaczmarek, 2009; Ramaswamy et al., 2001). 
The data for these variables were collected from two sources. GD comes from corporate annual 
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reports from 2010 to 2017. Both the directors’ age and ND data come from the Public Authority 
for Civil Information for the same period. The control variables of firm size, age, ownership, 
board size, board independence, role duality, leverage, liquidity, sales growth, cash flow, 
dividends per share and loss all follow the literature review (see section 3.2.3 in the literature 
review chapter). 
 
5.5 Research models 
The proposed quantitative analysis is robust and uses descriptive statistics, a correlation matrix 
and a multi-regression. This study uses the following models to examine the influence of the 
independent and control variables on EM and FP. The main model of the study follows the 
below authors, but this thesis adds new control variables (for further details, see section 2.2.3):  
 
Model 1 is based on Francis and Wang (2004) and Gonzalez et al. (2014), as shown in Table 
11. 
 
de = 	f% + 	f$gh + 	f&"h + 	f'ih + f(jkl + 	f)j?h + 	f*hm"n + f+77 + f,okl +	
f,o" + f-n + f$%n] + f$$kg + 	f$&o7 + f$'h3k + f$(7n + f$)hAppB	B5%6
+ f$*hAppB	;86p + q		
 
 
Model 2 is based on Adams and Ferreira (2009), Carter et al. (2003) and Gull et al. (2017), as 
shown in Table 12.  
 
rs = 	f% + 	f$gh + 	f&"h + 	f'ih + f(jkl + 	f)j?h + 	f*hm"n + f+77 + f,okl +	
f,o" + f-n + f$%n] + f$$kg + 	f$&o7 + f$'h3k + f$(7n + f$)hAppB	B5%6
+ f$*hAppB	;86p + q		
Where:  
*!	"#	$ℎ&	+(,#$-,$; 	/0	"#	1&,2&'	2"3&'#"$4; 	50	"#	-1&	2"3&'#"$4; 	60	"#	,-$"(,-7	2"3&'#"$4		
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89:	"#	;(-'2	#"<&; 	8=0	"#	;(-'2	",2&>&,2&,+&; 	0?5@	"#	'(7&	2A-7"$4; 	BB	C-)"74	C"');		
B9:	"#	C"')	#"<&; 	B5	"#	C"')	-1&; 	@	"#	7&3&'-1&; 	@D	"#	7"EA"2"$4; 	9/	"#	#-7&#	1'(F$ℎ;		
GB	"#	+-#ℎ	C7(F;	DPS	is	dividends	per	share;	FL	is	firm	loss&#, -,2	\	"#	$ℎ&	&''('	$&')		
 
Table 11: The variables of the earnings management model 
Variable Measurements References Sources 
Dependent variables   
Earnings 
management 
(EM) 
Kothari model (2005) and 
modified Jones model (1995)     
 Capital IQ 
Independent variables   
Gender diversity 
(GD) 
The ratio of women directors to 
total board size 
 Annual report 
Age diversity 
(AD) 
The ratio of the director’s age 
to the average age of the 
directors on the board. It is a 
dummy variable that equals 
one if the age is below 48 and 
zero if the age is 48 or above 
 The Public 
Authority for 
Civil 
Information 
National 
diversity (ND) 
The ratio of foreign directors 
(non-Kuwaiti) to board size 
 The Public 
Authority for 
Civil 
Information 
Control variables   
Firm size (FSZ) Log total assets Gonzalez et al. (2014), Gull 
et al. (2018), Ittonen et al. 
(2013), Lakhal et al. 
(2015), Omoye et al. 
(2014), Peni & Vahamaa 
(2010), Susanto (2016), 
Zalata et al. (2018).  
Capital IQ 
Firm age (FA) Number of years of business 
operation  
Zaluki et al. (2008). Boursa 
Kuwait 
Family firm (FF) Dummy variable for founding 
family members, equalling one 
if the board has at least one 
Ebrahim & Abdel Fattah 
(2015). 
Annual report 
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founding family member and 
zero otherwise 
Board size (BSZ) Total number of directors  Gonzalez et al. (2014), Gull 
et al. (2018), Ittonen et al. 
(2013), Lakhal et al. 
(2015), Omoye et al. 
(2014), Peni & Vahamaa 
(2010), Susanto (2016), 
Zalata et al. (2018). 
Annual report 
Board 
independence 
(BID) 
The proportion of independent 
directors to total board 
Gonzalez et al. (2014), Gull 
et al. (2018), Ittonen et al. 
(2013), Lakhal et al. 
(2015), Omoye et al. 
(2014), Peni & Vahamaa 
(2010), Susanto (2016), 
Zalata et al. (2018). 
Annual report 
Role duality 
(DUAL) 
Director also holds the CEO 
position 
Gonzalez et al. (2014), Gull 
et al. (2018), Ittonen et al. 
(2013), Lakhal et al. 
(2015), Omoye et al. 
(2014), Peni & Vahamaa 
(2010), Susanto (2016), 
Zalata et al. (2018). 
Annual report 
Leverage (L) Total debt divided by total 
equity 
Gonzalez et al. (2014), Gull 
et al. (2018), Ittonen et al. 
(2013), Lakhal et al. 
(2015), Omoye et al. 
(2014), Peni & Vahamaa 
(2010), Susanto (2016), 
Zalata et al. (2018). 
Annual report 
Liquidity (LQ) Measured by current ratio Elshandidy et al. (2013). Capital IQ 
Sales growth 
(SG) 
Percentage change in aggregate 
sales  
Gonzalez et al. (2014), Gull 
et al. (2018), Ittonen et al. 
(2013), Lakhal et al. 
(2015), Omoye et al. 
(2014), Peni & Vahamaa 
Capital IQ 
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(2010), Susanto (2016), 
Zalata et al. (2018). 
Cash flows (CF) Cash flow from operations Gonzalez et al. (2014), Gull 
et al. (2018), Ittonen et al. 
(2013), Lakhal et al. 
(2015), Omoye et al. 
(2014), Peni & Vahamaa 
(2010), Susanto (2016), 
Zalata et al. (2018). 
Capital IQ 
Dividends per 
share (DPS) 
Dividing the dividend on the 
actual number of shares 
Elshandidy et al. (2013), 
Kasanen et al. (1996), 
Mohammad et al. (2001).  
Capital IQ 
Firm losses (FL) Dummy variable that equals 
one if the firm’s net income is 
negative and zero otherwise 
Gonzalez et al. (2014), Gull 
et al. (2018), Ittonen et al. 
(2013), Lakhal et al. 
(2015), Omoye et al. 
(2014), Peni & Vahamaa 
(2010), Susanto (2016), 
Zalata et al. (2018). 
Annual report 
Industry (CID) Industry type ‘Dummy’ Gonzalez et al. (2014), Gull 
et al. (2018), Ittonen et al. 
(2013), Lakhal et al. 
(2015), Omoye et al. 
(2014), Peni & Vahamaa 
(2010), Susanto (2016), 
Zalata et al. (2018). 
Annual report 
Years Dummy Gonzalez et al. (2014), Gull 
et al. (2018), Ittonen et al. 
(2013), Lakhal et al. 
(2015), Omoye et al. 
(2014), Peni & Vahamaa 
(2010), Susanto (2016), 
Zalata et al. (2018). 
Annual report 
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Table 12: The variables of the firm performance model 
Variable Measurements References Source 
Dependent variables   
1- Return on 
Assets 
(ROA) 
Profits divided by total assets  Capital IQ 
2- Return of 
Equity 
(ROE) 
Net income divided by shareholders’ 
equity 
 Capital IQ 
3- Tobin’s Q 
(TQ) 
The ratio of the market value of a 
firm’s assets (as measured by the 
market value of its outstanding stock 
and debt) divided by the 
replacement cost of the business’ 
assets (book value) 
 Capital IQ 
Independent variables   
Gender 
diversity (GD) 
The ratio of women directors to total 
board size 
 Annual report 
Age diversity 
(AD) 
The ratio of the director’s age to the 
average age of directors on board. It 
is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the age is below 48 and zero if the 
age is 48 or above 
 The Public Authority 
for Civil Information 
National 
diversity (ND) 
The ratio of foreign directors (non-
Kuwaiti) to board size 
 
 The Public Authority 
for Civil Information 
Control variables   
Firm size (FSZ) Log total assets Adams & Ferreira 
(2009), Alshamari & 
Alsaidi (2014), 
Campbell & Minguez-
Vera (2008), Carter et 
al. (2010), Erhardt et 
al. (2003), Gordini & 
Rancati (2017), Rose 
(2007) 
Capital IQ 
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Firm age (FA) Number of years of business 
operation  
Alshamari & Alsaidi 
(2014), Campbell & 
Minguez-Vera (2008), 
Erhardt et al. (2003), 
Gordini & Rancati 
(2017), Rose (2007) 
Boursa Kuwait 
Family firm 
(FF) 
Dummy variable for founding 
family members that equals one if 
the board has at least one founding 
family member, and zero otherwise 
Ebrahim & Abdel 
Fattah (2015) 
Annual report 
Board size 
(BSZ) 
Total number of directors  Adams & Ferreira 
(2009), Alshamari & 
Alsaidi (2014), 
Campbell & Minguez-
Vera (2008), Carter et 
al. (2010), Erhardt et 
al. (2003), Gordini & 
Rancati (2017), Rose 
(2007) 
 
Annual report 
Board 
independence 
(BID) 
The proportion of independent 
directors to total board 
Adams & Ferreira 
(2009), Alshamari & 
Alsaidi (2014), 
Campbell & Minguez-
Vera (2008), Carter et 
al. (2010), Erhardt et 
al. (2003), Gordini & 
Rancati (2017), Rose 
(2007) 
Annual report 
Role duality 
(DUAL) 
Director also holds the CEO 
position 
Adams & Ferreira 
(2009), Alshamari & 
Alsaidi (2014), 
Campbell & Minguez-
Vera (2008), Carter et 
al. (2010), Erhardt et 
al. (2003), Gordini & 
Annual report 
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Rancati (2017), Rose 
(2007) 
Leverage (L) Total debt divided by total equity Adams & Ferreira 
(2009), Alshamari & 
Alsaidi (2014), 
Campbell & Minguez-
Vera (2008), Carter et 
al. (2010), Erhardt et 
al. (2003), Gordini & 
Rancati (2017), Rose 
(2007) 
Annual report 
Liquidity (LQ) Measured by current ratio Abuzayed (2011), 
Omondi & Muturi 
(2013) 
Capital IQ 
Sales growth 
(SG) 
Percentage change in aggregate 
sales  
Amidu (2007) Capital IQ 
Cash flows 
(SF) 
Cash flow from operations Mackey et al. (2007) Capital IQ 
Dividends per 
share (DPS) 
Dividing the dividend by the actual 
number of shares 
Adams & Ferreira 
(2009), Alshamari & 
Alsaidi (2014), 
Campbell & Minguez-
Vera (2008), Carter et 
al. (2010), Erhardt et 
al. (2003), Gordini & 
Rancati (2017), Rose 
(2007) 
Capital IQ 
Industry (CID) Industry type ‘dummy’ Adams & Ferreira 
(2009), Alshamari & 
Alsaidi (2014), 
Campbell & Minguez-
Vera (2008), Carter et 
al. (2010), Erhardt et 
al. (2003), Gordini & 
Rancati (2017), Rose 
(2007) 
Annual report 
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Year Dummy Adams & Ferreira 
(2009), Alshamari & 
Alsaidi (2014), 
Campbell & Minguez-
Vera (2008), Carter et 
al. (2010), Erhardt et 
al. (2003), Gordini & 
Rancati (2017), Rose 
(2007) 
Annual report 
 
 
5.6 OLS Assumptions 
The main objective of this study is to test the effect of GD, AD and ND on EM and FP. In order 
to test its hypotheses, this study uses linear regression analysis, an OLS method of estimation, 
as its main statistical method. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) test is used to test the overall 
significance of the model. The adjusted R-squared measure is used to test the goodness of fit.  
 
OLS assumes the normality of residuals, linearity, constant error variance (homoscedasticity) 
and no severe multicollinearity, as shown in Figures 7, 8 and 9 and Tables 15 and 16. Any 
violation of these assumptions makes the estimate of the predictor variables biased, 
inconsistent and inefficient and the statistical tests invalid.  
 
5.6.1. Diagnosing and dealing with outliers 
The presence of outlier observations can adversely influence the model parameter estimates 
and the results of their significance. Outliers are detected using the studentised residual 
measure. Furthermore, a heavily skewed distribution of the dependent variable is not desirable 
in terms of outliers, normality of residuals and constant error variance assumption. Therefore, 
the dependent variable whose distribution is heavily skewed is transformed to reduce the 
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degree of skewness. For example, if the distribution of the dependent variable is positively 
skewed, then the log transformation is more likely to produce valid results that satisfy 
normality and other assumptions of the regression analysis (Baltagi, 1995, 2008; Baltagi et al., 
2003). (For example, see the regression tables below before Table 13 and after excluding the 
outlier and transformation, with 40 outliers from Table 14.) 
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Table 13: Before dealing with the outliers 
KothariABS    Coef.     St.Err.  t p-value Sig 
 Gender Diversity -0.005 0.011 -0.51 0.614  
 Age Diversity 0.006 0.002 3.37 0.001 *** 
 National Diversity -0.012 0.005 -2.13 0.034 ** 
 Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.30 0.762  
 Firm Age 0.000 0.000 -0.09 0.927  
 Leverage 0.000 0.000 1.00 0.319  
 Family firms -0.007 0.002 -3.66 0.000 *** 
 Board size -0.001 0.001 -0.92 0.360  
 Independent -0.007 0.013 -0.51 0.614  
 Duality -0.003 0.002 -1.44 0.150  
 Cash Flows 0.000 0.000 0.46 0.644  
 Current Ratio 0.000 0.000 -0.53 0.599  
Sales Growth 0.000 0.000 -0.81 0.418  
DividendsperShare -0.009 0.048 -0.18 0.859  
Firms Loss -0.004 0.002 -1.78 0.076 * 
 1.BasicMeterials -0.004    0.006 0.60 0.547  
 1.RealEstate -0.005 0.004 -1.20 0.231  
 1.Industrials 0.003 0.004 0.81 0.420  
 1.ConsumerGood -0.008 0.007 -1.30 0.195  
 1.ConsumerServic -0.003 0.004 -0.75 0.453  
 1.HealthCare -0.011 0.006 -1.74 0.083 * 
 1.Technology -0.009 0.010 -0.90 0.366  
 1.Telecom -0.010 0.006 -1.70 0.089 * 
 1.Y2011 -0.002 0.004 -0.43 0.665  
 1.Y2012 -0.002 0.004 -0.47 0.636  
 1.Y2013 -0.001 0.004 -0.38 0.706  
 1.Y2014 0.000 0.004 -0.04 0.970  
 1.Y2015 0.001 0.004 0.27 0.790  
 1.Y2016 0.001 0.004 0.38 0.702  
 1.Y2017 0.000 0.004 0.06 0.954  
 Constant 0.027 0.006 4.20 0.000 *** 
 
Adj R-squared 0.051 Number of obs       734 
R-squared  0.090 Prob > F 0.000 
F-test  2.322  
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 14: After dealing with the outliers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
logkothari    Coef.    St.Err.  t  p-value  Sig 
 Gender Diversity -0.275 0.335 -0.82 0.411  
 Age Diversity 0.178 0.060 2.96 0.003 *** 
 National Diversity -0.048 0.171 -0.28 0.780  
 Total Assets 0.000 0.000 2.09 0.037 ** 
 Firm Age -0.010 0.003 -3.78 0.000 *** 
 Leverage 0.001 0.000 2.26 0.024 ** 
 Family firms -0.216 0.064 -3.35 0.001 *** 
 Board size 0.034 0.021 1.63 0.104  
 Independent 0.324 0.413 0.79 0.432  
 Duality -0.006 0.058 -0.11 0.912  
 Cash Flows 0.002 0.002 1.30 0.195  
 Current Ratio -0.013 0.004 -3.60 0.000 *** 
Sales Growth 0.000 0.000 -1.36 0.175  
DividendsperShare 0.983 1.524 0.65 0.519  
 Firms Loss -0.154 0.069 -2.22 0.027 ** 
 1.BasicMeterials 0.502 0.187 2.68 0.008 *** 
 1.RealEstate -0.011 0.121 -0.09 0.928  
 1.Industrials 0.047 0.129 0.36 0.715  
 1.ConsumerGood -0.135 0.201 -0.67 0.503  
 1.ConsumerServic -0.178 0.142 -1.25 0.211  
 1.HealthCare -0.881 0.201 -4.38 0.000 *** 
 1.Technology 0.312 0.311 1.00 0.316  
 1.Telecom -0.644 0.183 -3.53 0.000 *** 
 1.Y2011 -0.014 0.113 -0.12 0.902  
 1.Y2012 0.015 0.112 0.13 0.894  
 1.Y2013 -0.095 0.113 -0.84 0.402  
 1.Y2014 -0.069 0.115 -0.60 0.550  
 1.Y2015 -0.016 0.113 -0.14 0.888  
 1.Y2016 0.062 0.114 0.55 0.583  
 1.Y2017 0.037 0.116 0.32 0.748  
 Constant -4.259 0.204 -20.83 0.000 *** 
 
Adj R-squared 0.138 Number of obs  694 
R-squared  0.176 Prob > F         0.000  
F-test  4.720  
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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5.6.2. Normality and linearity 
The linearity of the relationship is assessed by inspecting the plot of the residual values and the 
predicted values of the dependent variable. The residual plot indicates a random scatter of 
points with neither a nonlinear or a curvilinear pattern that indicates the linearity assumption 
is satisfied. This plot also shows no outliers or a random pattern that indicates an asymmetric 
distribution of residuals, which also means that the residuals are normally distributed (see the 
homoscedasticity figure number 8). Also, the literature argues that larger sample size can 
address non-normality. First, "for sample sizes that are sufficiently large, violation of the 
normality assumption is virtually inconsequential" (Brooks, 2008, p.164). Second, the null 
hypothesis of normality of data can be rejected by the large sample size (Abdel-Fattah, 2008, 
p.256). 
 
 
Figure 6: Normality test 
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Figure 7: Linearity test 
 
 
5.6.3. Heteroscedasticity 
The constant error variance or homoscedasticity assumption is critical for the valid use of the 
ANOVA in a regression analysis. The violation of constant error variance is termed 
heteroscedasticity. The residual plot is considered healthy when evidence exists of the constant 
error variance and linearity and when there is a random scatter of points with no visible 
curvilinear pattern, which indicates a non-linear association or a cone-shaped pattern implying 
the violation of the constant error variance or the problem of heteroscedasticity. The Brush-
Pagon test, which is a formal method of testing heteroscedasticity in regressions, is used to test 
heteroscedasticity. For the test to indicate no heteroscedasticity, the Bruch-Pagon test must be 
non-significant (p > 0.05) (Haier et al., 2010). If the results of the Brusch-Pagon test indicate 
heteroscedasticity, then the study uses the robust standard errors that are consistent with the 
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heteroscedastic error distribution. However, the result in the test below is P equals 0.5124, 
which is not significant and confirms that there is homoscedasticity.  
 
 
Figure 8: Heteroscedasticity test 
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5.6.4 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity refers to the problem of highly correlated predictor variables in the regression 
model. Highly correlated predictor variables can induce inflation in the standard error of the 
estimators of the effects from the predictor variable. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is used 
to measure the severity of multicollinearity. VIF is the number of times the variance of the 
estimator is inflated compared to a perfectly independent predictor variable scenario. VIF = 1 
/ TL, where TL is the tolerance level of the predictor variable. A cut-off value of five or higher 
for the VIF generally indicates severe multicollinearity in the regression model (Haier et al., 
2010). The VIF test below (Table 15) shows that the highest VIF is 4.63 for the dummy real 
estate and therefore there is no multicollinearity problem. Another test uses a correlation matrix 
and also confirms no multicollinearity. According to Bryman and Cramer (1997), Gujarati and 
Porter (2009) and Ho and Wong (2001), a serious collinearity problem exists when the 
correlation between any two independent variables exceeds 80%. The highest correlation in 
the correlation matrix (Table 16) is between board size and firm age at 30%, a percentage 
confirming that there is no multicollinearity. At the same time, this thesis seeks to solve the 
endogeneity problem via a fixed effect, a random effect and a pooled OLS and chooses a 
random test as most appropriate as per the Hausman test, which helps to solve the problem of 
heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation (Ait-Sahalia & Xie, 2019; Arellano, 2003; Baltagi, 
1995, 2008; Baltagi et al., 2003; Gujarati & Porter, 2009). In addition, this study uses GMM 
and 2SLS to solve the problems of endogeneity and causality (Ait-Sahalia & Xie, 2019; 
Baltagi, 1995, 2008; Baltagi et al., 2003). 
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Table 15: The variance inflation factor (VIF) test 
Variables VIF 
 Gender 1.17 
 Age Diversity 1.17 
 National D 1.29 
 Total Assets 1.06 
 Firm Age 1.41 
 Laverage 1.09 
 Family firms 1.34 
 Board size 1.19 
 Independent 1.14 
 Duality 1.08 
 CashFlows 1.10 
 Current ratio 1.10 
 Sales growth 1.05 
 Dividends per 
share 1.37 
 Firms Loss 1.23 
 i.BasicMeter~1 1.78 
 i.RealEstate1 4.63 
 i.Industrials1 3.97 
 i.ConsumerGo~1 1.63 
 i.ConsumerSe~1 2.74 
 i.HealthCare1 1.55 
 i.Technology1 1.26 
 i.Telecommun~1 2.31 
 i.Y2011 1.78 
 i.Y2012 1.83 
 i.Y2013 1.85 
 i.Y2014 1.82 
 i.Y2015 1.86 
 i.Y2016 1.88 
 i.Y2017 1.95 
 Mean VIF  1.69 
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Table 16: Correlation matrix 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 (1) logModified Jones 1 
 (2) log Kothari 1 1 
 (3) log ROA 0.20 0.20 1 
 (4) log ROE 0.20 0.20 0.92 1 
 (5) log Tobin Q 0.19 0.19 0.43 0.52 1 
 (6) Gender Diversity -0.06 -0.06 0.11 0.09 0.21 1 
 (7) Age Diversity 0.08 0.07 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.07 1 
 (8) National Diversity -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.04 -0.19 -0.10 0.00 1 
 (9) Total Assets 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.08 -0.10 0.08 0.06 1 
 (10) Firm Age -0.13 -0.13 0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.13 -0.04 -0.05 1 
 (11) Leverage 0.05 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.14 0.02 0.04 0.06 1 
 (12) family firms -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.13 0.03 0.00 0.24 0.02 1 
 (13) Board size -0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.11 -0.18 -0.02 -0.16 -0.07 -0.02 0.30 0.05 0.15 1 
 (14) Independent 0.08 0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.06 1 
 (15) Duality 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.14 -0.04 -0.17 -0.07 -0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.09 1 
 (16) Cash Flows 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.06 1 
 (17) Current RATIO -0.07 -0.07 0.11 0.08 0.08 -0.01 0.13 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.15 -0.11 -0.18 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 1 
 (18) SALES GROW 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.05 1 
 (19) DividendsperS~e 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 0.08 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.03 1 
 (20) Firms Loss -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.00 -0.10 0.04 -0.20 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.25 1 
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5.7 How to address endogeneity and causality problems? 
The endogeneity and causality effects are relatively significant points to consider in any study 
when the researcher is studying the relationship between BD and EM and between BD and FP. 
The reason for this consideration is because the two aspects can have relative effects on the 
results. In order to ensure that the results are consistent, there is a need to study these problems 
and how they affect the estimation between these relationships.  
 
First of all, endogeneity can be defined as explanatory variables that are simultaneously able 
to affect BD and EM and FP (Roberts & Whited, 2013, pp. 493-572; Wooldridge, 2010). In 
this regard, the independent variables’ error terms can be identified as related and the OLS 
regression can be regarded as ineffective in estimating how the parameters relate to each other 
in this equation (Al-Saidi, 2010; Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Roberts and Whited, 2013, pp. 
493-572; Thrikawala, Locke, & Reddy, 2017). Due to the endogeneity problem, the estimation 
of the relationships between BD and EM and between BD and FP do not comply with the 
presumptions of the OLS regression model (Solakoglu & Demir, 2016). Apparently, when the 
OLS regression is used to estimate the relationship of such a simultaneous equation, the effect 
of reverse causality can be identified. This explains why this estimation cannot be used. The 
OLS regression cannot be utilised in estimating a simultaneous equation because the 
endogeneity problem leads to the variables being related in a reverse causality. Consequently, 
this makes it difficult to establish the relationship between the parameters of the equation 
(Chbib, 2015; Roberts & Whited, 2013, pp. 493-572). 
 
According to Carter, D’Souza, Simkins and Simpson (2010), there is no significant relationship 
between BD and how a firm will perform in the future. BD and FP tend to be endogenous. This 
premise is additionally supported by the fact that the inclusion of women on a firm’s board 
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does not mean that the FP will be enhanced (Ionascu, Ionascu, Sacarin, & Minu, 2018). In this 
regard, BD is endogenous to FP. In this case, it is not only the EM and FP that affect BD; there 
also tend to be situations whereby firms whose boards are diversified perform well-indicating 
endogeneity (Boubaker, Dang, & Nguyen, 2014; Marinova, Plantenga, & Remery, 2015; 
Roberts & Whited, 2013, pp. 493-572). Therefore, when investigating the relationship between 
BD and FP, it is essential to eliminate the endogeneity problem. In order to address this 
endogeneity, the use of estimation techniques, such as 2SLS and 3SLS regression, GMM 
estimation and fixed effects, produce misleading information regarding the relationship 
(Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010). In a study of Nigerian firms, Shuaibu (2018) 
found no significant relationship between BD and EM. However, another study identified an 
exogenous relationship between BD and EM (Einer & Soderqvist, 2016). In addition, Wahid 
(2018) has confirmed that fewer instances of financial misconduct in diversified firms do not 
result from having more females on the board, but rather the group’s dynamics. This confirms 
that there is an endogenous relationship between BD and EM. 
  
Second, causality can be defined as the direction taken in relation to the effect between different 
parameters in an equation (Agrawal & Kneber, 1996; Wooldridge, 2010). Some authors have 
stated that the causal relationship between the two variables can be reversed, in which case EM 
and FP affect BD (Carter et al., 2003; Chiswick & Miller, 1995). Wahid (2018) has noted that 
BD may result from the group dynamics that arise from a lack of financial misconduct. Firms 
that have high performance and proper EM are likely to have significantly diversified boards 
that lead to reverse causality. Another study by Firoozi, Magnan and Fortin (2016) has found 
no relationship between BD and better financial reporting. In this regard, the empirical 
estimation of the effect of EM and FP from a single mechanism of BD can lead to inconsistent 
results. Firms that have better EM and FP are likely to elicit interest from diversified personnel. 
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This indicates that the relationship between BD and EM and between BD and FP can take any 
direction. The empirical results of regression analyses indicate that the causal effect of both 
variables in the equation can take any direction and, according to Gull (2018), this confirms 
endogeneity. Due to the causality explanation, there is an endogenous relationship between the 
two variables. On the other hand, as stated below, Gujarati (2009, pp. 652-653) state that 
causality is not necessary and the relationship may not be reverse and affectted: 
 
The time does not run backward. That is, if event A happens before event B, 
then it is possible that A is causing B. However, it is not possible that B is 
causing A. In other words, events in the past can cause events to happen today. 
Future events cannot. 
Based on the above arguments, OLS regression estimates create misleading results regarding 
the relationship between the two variables. This indicates that the empirical estimates may fail 
to give coefficients that are consistent with the model. This study investigates the association 
between BD and EM and between BD and FP and its variables are determined jointly during 
the estimation. In order to resolve the causality and endogeneity problems succinctly, previous 
studies (Ammari, Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes, & Laffarga, 2017; John, Makhija, & Ferris, 
2019; Kadria & Ellouze, 2014; Schultz et al., 2010; Thrikawala et al., 2017; Wellalage & 
Locke, 2012; Wellalage, Locke, & Acharya, 2018; Wintoki et al., 2012) have recommend the 
use of GMM and 2SLS (Abdullah, 2007; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Al-Saidi, 2010; Al-Saidi 
& Al-Shammari, 2013; Bahadur, 2016; Carter et al., 2003; Chen, Leung, & Goergen, 2017; Ho, 
Lim, Reza, & Xia, 2017; Solakoglu & Demir, 2016) and three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
(Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Gugler, 2003), which are dynamic and robust in eliminating the 
effects of using OLS regression and fixed effects techniques (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 
2008; Einer & Soderqvist, 2016; Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2015; Enache & Hussainey, 
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2019; Shuaibu, 2018). Additional studies (see Table 17) have helped produce plausible 
correlations. These models are discussed later in order to explain how they control the 
problems.  
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Table 17: Previous studies that show causality and endogeneity solutions 
Number Author (s) Region Method for testing 
causality and 
endogeneity 
Instrument test Variables 
1 
 
Gull (2018) France GMM Propensity score 
matching 
Earnings 
management 
2 Wellalage et al. (2018) Australia, 
France, UK, 
USA 
GMM None Earnings 
management  
3 John et al. (2019) England GMM None  Firm performance 
4 Ammari, Kadria & 
Ellouze (2014) 
France GMM ROA, ROE, 
Tobin’s Q and 
market to book 
Firm performance 
5 Chbib (2015) UK 2SLS None Board size and 
board independent 
ratio 
6 Low et al. (2015)  Hong Kong, 
South 
Korea, 
Malaysia,  
Singapore 
2SLS None Female managers 
7 Reguera-Alvarado, de 
Fuentes, & Laffarga 
(2017) 
Spain GMM None Firm performance 
8 Wellalage & Locke 
(2012) 
Sri Lanka GMM None Earnings 
management 
9 Agrawal & Knoeber 
(1996) 
USA 2SLS Tobin’s Q control 
mechanisms  
10 Abdullah (2007) UK 2SLS Hausman test Governance 
variables 
11 Campbell & Minguez-
Vera (2008) 
Spain Fixed effect and 2SLS Hausman test  Blau and Shannon 
indexes 
12 Carter et al. (2003) USA 2SLS None Governance 
variables 
13 Solakoglu & Demir 
(2016) 
Turkey 2SLS Tobin’s Q Firm performance 
14 Chen et al. (2017) UK 2SLS None Earnings 
management 
15 Gugler (2003) 
 
Austria 3SLS none Corporate 
governance 
variables 
16 Ho et al. (2015) China 2SLS None Firm performance 
17 Bahadur (2016) India 2SLS None Firm performance 
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18 Al-Saidi (2010) Kuwait 2SLS Hausman test Several corporate 
governance 
principles 
19 Al-Saidi & Al-
Shammari (2013) 
Kuwait 2SLS Hausman test Corporate 
governance 
variables 
20 Schultz et al. (2010) Australia GMM None Firm performance 
21 Shuaibu (2018) Nigeria Fixed effects None  Earnings 
management 
22 Enache & Hussainey 
(2019) 
USA Fixed effects None Governance 
variables 
23 Elshandidy et al. 
(2015) 
Germany, 
UK & USA 
Fixed effects None Various 
accounting 
measures  
24 Einer & Soderqvist 
(2016) 
Norway Fixed effects None Earnings 
management 
25 Ionascu et al. (2018) Romania Simultaneous 
equation models  
Tobin’s Q Firm performance 
26 Boubaker et al. (2014) France 2SLS Tobin’s Q Firm performance 
27 Bhagat & Bolton 
(2008) 
USA 3SLS Hausman Ownership, 
performance, 
governance and 
capital structure  
28 Gerged et al. (2019) Kuwait 2SLS, GMM & fixed 
effects 
None Earnings 
management 
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5.8 Summary 
This chapter has explained the methodology used in this research study in detail. First it 
described the sample and the data, followed by the study philosophy. Next it described and 
defined the dependent (EM and FP), independent (GD, AD and ND) and control variables (firm 
size, age, family firm, the board size, board independence, role duality, leverage, liquidity, 
sales growth, cash flows, dividends per share, firm losses and industry type) used in this study. 
Next the chapter presented the two research models, followed by the OLS assumptions used to 
test the effect of GD, AD, and ND on EM and FP. These assumptions were diagnosing and 
dealing with outliers, normality and linearity, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity. Finally, 
the chapter considered how to solve the problems of endogeneity and causality.  
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6.0 Chapter Six: Findings 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the impact of BD in the form of GD, AD and ND on EM 
and FP with respect to Kuwait’s non-financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait between 2010 
and 2017. This study uses the modified Jones and Kothari models to measure EM and ROA, 
ROE and TQ to measure FP. It then analyses the data using OLS, random effects, GMM, 2SLS 
and Tobit. Moreover, this chapter contains an additional analysis of standard deviation and 
range for AD. Finally, this study tests the effect of the interaction between independent 
directors and family firm with the independent variables on EM and FP.  
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are a coefficient of data analysis that statisticians use to present 
information in a meaningful way. These tools are used to show, describe and summarise 
patterns arising from specific data sets. Understanding raw data presents a significant 
challenge, especially where these are contained within large volumes of data sets. The simple 
interpretations that arise from descriptions give meaning to such data sets and relate them to 
real-life situations. Further, descriptive statistics focus on the specific aspects of data sets like 
their central tendency and their spread from the mean, minimum and maximum. It is easy to 
understand means and extremities when data are presented in a simple manner using real-life 
aspects. 
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Table 18: Descriptive statistics 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Min  Max 
 Modified Jones 824 .017 0 .277 
 Kothari 759 .017 0 .277 
 ROA 824 1.556 -48.645 33.515 
 ROE 824 2.198 -104.984 135.613 
 TQ 823 1.02 .252 8.072 
 Gender 824 .041 0 .6 
 Age Diversity 824 .535 0 1 
 National D 824 .113 0 .857 
 Total Assets 824 178.43 1.524 3709.937 
 Firm Age 824 24.723 2 63 
 Leverage 823 53.38 0 762.923 
 Family firms 824 .417 0 1 
 Board size 824 6.028 2 11 
 Independent D 824 .022 0 .5 
 Duality 824 .415 0 1 
 Cash Flows 817 -1.482 -217.576 103.352 
 Current ratio 812 3.008 .003 96.7 
 Sales growth 803 23.359 -397.345 3290.867 
 Dividendsp~e 823 .01 0 .2 
 Firms Loss 824 .267 0 1 
 Y2010 824 .125 0 1 
 Y2011 824 .125 0 1 
 Y2012 824 .125 0 1 
 Y2013 824 .125 0 1 
 Y2014 824 .125 0 1 
 Y2015 824 .125 0 1 
 Y2016 824 .125 0 1 
 Y2017 824 .125 0 1 
 BasicMeter~1 824 .039 0 1 
 RealEstate1 824 .398 0 1 
 Industrials1 824 .252 0 1 
 ConsumerGo~1 824 .029 0 1 
 ConsumerSe~1 824 .136 0 1 
 HealthCare1 824 .029 0 1 
 Technology1 824 .01 0 1 
 Telecommun~1 824 .049 0 1 
 OilGas1 824 .058 0 1 
 
 
 
Table 18 illustrates the values of different variables relating to firms. This information is 
critical in evaluating firms’ internal and external environments. The data set utilises the tools 
of descriptive statistics and includes means, maximums and minimums. The data set also 
incorporates observation values ranging from 759 to 824. As shown in Table 18, the first 
variable is the accrual detection of firm earnings from using the modified Jones model (1995). 
With regard to Table 18, this model shows a mean EM of 1.70%. The maximum EM is 
approximately 27.74% and the minimum EM is 0. In this regard, EM refers to the strategies 
that firms’ managers use to manipulate revenues and returns in order to achieve their goals. 
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Table 18 shows that some firms do not practise EM. In this regard, the aim of smoothing 
earnings is to present a desirable picture to analysts and prospective investors. Zalata and 
Roberts (2017) state that the misclassification of essential earnings is a method used to 
manipulate financial reports.  
 
As shown in Table 18, the average manipulation of earnings is 1.71% according to the modified 
Jones model. However, the Kothari model presents the same averages for EM. From the data 
set, the Kothari model’s results show an average of 1.71%. This model tries to enhance 
predictions by adding an intercept and managing the effects of FP (Kothari et al., 2005). 
However, the maximum EM of 27.74% is similar to the result of using the modified Jones 
model. The Kothari model results also show a higher minimum value of EM at 0.0000179. 
Nonetheless, due to their insignificant values, there are negligible differences in the minimum 
EM. 
 
From the data set, the ROA average, which is the measure that indicates FP, is 1.556. Firms 
that make effective use of their assets to generate income have high ROA. However, when 
firms make losses, the ROA can be negative. Table 18 shows that firms with the highest ROAs 
have values of 33.515 and that firms with the lowest ROAs have values of -48.645. The mean 
ROA value is 1.556 and shows that, when compared to its ROA, the firm makes little income. 
These figures offer essential information about the efficiency of both a firm and the industry. 
Therefore, the source of the above data may indicate an inefficient firm or an industry with a 
low income in comparison to its ROA.  
 
Table 18 indicates 2.198 returns on ROE. The maximum ROE is 135.613 and the minimum 
ROE is -104.984. The calculation of ROE involves dividing the net income by the 
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shareholders’ equity. A firm’s ROE represents the returns on its net assets. It is also an 
illustration of the firm’s ability to create profits with its assets. While the ROA indicates the 
ratio of income generation, ROE indicates the profits received by investors. As shown in Table 
18, the mean, minimum and maximum values for ROE are higher than those of ROA. The 
ROEs are always higher than those for ROAs because they represent the total assets after the 
removal of liabilities (Samphantharak & Townsend, 2010, p. 89-93). 
 
Table 18 shows that the TQ mean value is 1.02. The TQ ratio shows the relationship between 
the firm’s market valuation and its intrinsic value. When the TQ value is low (0 to 1), the cost 
of replacing assets is higher than the total amount of the stock. Such figures show that the 
firm’s stock is undervalued. As shown in Table 18, 1.02 indicates that the assets are slightly 
more valuable than the capital. Statisticians measure the TQ value by dividing the market value 
of the firm’s assets by its replacement costs. When the TQ value is greater than 1, the costs of 
replacing the assets are lower than their prices. Thus, high TQ values indicate that the firm’s 
stock is undervalued. Table 18 shows that the TQ’s maximum value is 8.07 and the minimum 
value is 0.25. 
 
As shown in Table 18, the mean GD is 4.12% or 0.0412. GD refers to the ratio of female 
managers and directors to the total size of a firm’s board. From the values in the above-
mentioned data, many firms have been unable to achieve gender equality. Men still dominate 
the firms’ top positions. According to past research, firms dealing with products such as 
sanitary pads have more women in their senior management positions, such as CFOs (Peni & 
Vähämaa, 2010). The maximum value of gender diversity is 0.6, while the minimum is 0. Zero 
suggests that firms have no female directors on their boards. Studies also indicate that there are 
a limited number of women in areas such as auditing (Ittonen et al., 2013).  
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Similarly, Gull et al.’s (2018) findings show a mean of 10.72%, a maximum of 75% and a 
minimum of zero. Consequently, the mean and maximum results are slightly higher and the 
minimum result is the same. In addition, Gull et al.’s (2018) findings have similar descriptive 
statistics in relation to the number of women on boards. Furthermore, a six-year-old Kuwaiti 
study covering the period from 2009 to 2011 has shown a mean of 47%, a maximum of 60% 
and a minimum of zero (Al-Shammari & Al-Saidi, 2014). Another Kuwaiti study covering the 
period from 2012 to 2014 has revealed that the number of female directors on boards is 0.492, 
which is about 50% (Issa et al., 2018). The same study reports evidence that the “number of 
women on boards indicates that women have very limited seats number in boardroom” (Issa et 
al., 2018). Overall, both gender equality and the empowerment of women have constituted 
significant issues for most firms. Despite the Kuwaiti Government’s legislative efforts, women 
continue to face substantial barriers in most firms. They must encounter discrimination, such 
as lower job groups, less pay for equal work and gender-insensitive company policies (Adel & 
Alqatan, 2019).  
 
Further, Table 18 shows a mean AD of 0.535, which is calculated by using the ratio of a 
director’s age to the average age of the board members. From the data set, there is high AD, 
with an average of 53.5%. The maximum AD is 1, while the minimum AD is 0. A value of 1 
illustrates that a director is younger than 48 years. On the other hand, the minimum age 
diversity is 0 when directors are aged 48 years old and above. In discussing AD, descriptive 
statistics use 0 or 1 as dummy figures. These form categories that are mutually exclusive and 
that are more effective in describing the influence of some statistical variables. Moreover, 
Carter et al.’s (2003) findings of American firms show that 59 years is the mean age of 
directors, about five years older than this study’s findings.  
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ND is the ratio of foreign directors to the size of the board. The average ND is 11.3%. The 
mean figure shows that the firm has a limited number of top foreign directors. As shown in 
Table 18, the maximum ND is 85.71% and the minimum is 0%. This means that there are firms 
with high numbers of non-Kuwaiti directors on their boards. However, some firms do not have 
any non-Kuwaiti directors on their boards. Furthermore, Gull et al.’s (2018) findings contain 
similar descriptive statistics showing the mean as 9.37 %, the maximum as 100% and the 
minimum as zero. These findings support this study’s descriptive statistics. The findings of 
another study examining the situation in the UK, the USA, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden show a mean of 18% with respect to ND on the BODs. 
 
The average board size from the data set is 6. Therefore, many firms’ BOD consist of six 
members. Board size has several effects on a firm. First, it determines the range of expertise 
that governs the firm. More directors mean a greater field of experience in different areas of 
management. According to the data set, the minimum number of board directors is two, 
whereas before the 2013 KCGC the minimum board size was three. Thereafter, five board 
members became the minimum number, with 11 the highest figure reported. These numbers 
are lower than Susanto’s (2016) findings of a maximum board membership of 15. 
 
As shown in Table 18, the average number of independent directors is 2.24%. Fifty per cent is 
the highest number of independent directors. In such cases, half of the members of the board 
are independent and do not have any material relationship with the firm apart from their role 
of sitting on the board. The minimum value of independent directors is 0.  
 
As shown in Table 18, the average rate of duality is 41.5%. The data show that nearly 50% of 
directors are also their firms’ CEOs. The maximum value for duality is 1 and the minimum 
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value is 0. These are mutually exclusive dummy figures. Cases with directors additionally 
operating as CEOs are represented with 1, while firms where the director is not a CEO are 
represented by 0. The average number of firms owned by families is 41.75%. 
 
A family firm is a firm in which at least one member of the founding family is on the board or 
holds a management position (Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015). Therefore, the variable can be 
represented by dummy figures where the maximum value is 1 and the minimum value is 0, 
which means that nearly half of the firms are family firms. 
 
According to the data set, the average firm age is 24.7 years. Firm age refers to the number of 
years that a firm has been in operation. Based on the data set, many Kuwaiti non-financial firms 
listed on Boursa Kuwait started around 25 years ago. From the data set, 63 is the longest 
number of years in which a firm has been active; the shortest period is two years. The firms’ 
average age offers essential information regarding the industry. The data mean that firms take 
more than 25 years to attain stability. Furthermore, 25 years may be the maximum age above 
which the rate of failure increases. Before 25 years, there is a high rate of closure among firms 
in the industries. 
 
The average value of firm size, as measured by firms’ total assets, is 178.43. A firm’s total 
assets represent its liabilities added to the shareholders’ equity. According to the data set, the 
maximum value of a firm’s total assets is 3,709.937 while the minimum is 1.52. These values 
are vital because they illustrate what firms own. Furthermore, a firm can convert assets into 
cash in order to increase its liquidity. These data also means that all firms have assets. 
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Table 18 also shows the degree of leverage in the industry. In order to obtain leverage, 
economists divide a firm’s total debt by its total equity. The data set shows an average leverage 
of 53.38, with 762.923 as the maximum and 0 as the minimum. Leverage is a vital indicator of 
a firm’s FP. The value shows the amount of debt that a firm uses to fund its activities. 
Investments that use leverage are also critical in increasing its value to shareholders. Besides, 
the data set shows that some firms do not have any leverage. 
 
The data set also illustrates a current average ratio of 3, a maximum value of 762.923 and a 
minimum value of 0. The identification of the current rates involves the division of the firm’s 
current assets by its liabilities. A firm’s current ratio indicates its liquidity or efficiency, which 
is the proxy of risk. This is critical information because it shows the firm’s ability to use its 
existing assets to meet its short-term liabilities. It can be seen from the data set that many firms 
have limited abilities to pay off their short-term debts. In most cases, firms have less time to 
raise funds for such needs. Therefore, it is of critical importance that a firm has readily available 
current assets like cash and other items. 
 
Sales growth is another critical variable when studying a firm’s FP and EM. Table 18 shows 
an average sales growth of 23.36. The maximum sales growth is 3,290.867 while the minimum 
value is -397.3448. Sales growth represents the volume increases in a firm’s sales from one 
year to another. The indicator is also of critical importance when analysing a firm’s 
performance. Sales growth shows the marketing team’s role in increasing the firm’s revenues 
over a specified period. Higher sales growth further indicates the firm’s survival and its 
financial growth path.  
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Cash flow refers to the amount of money coming in and out of a firm. The difference between 
the money present before a trading period and at the end of it can additionally be used as a 
method to measure the firm’s cash flow. Table 18 shows an average cash flow of -1.482, a 
maximum cash flow of 103.35 and a minimum cash flow of -217.56, meaning that the average 
of firms used their money, so there was no cash flow, but they used them out of the firm. 
 
The data set also shows that the average dividend per share is 1.05%. The maximum dividends 
are 20% while the minimum dividend is 0. This means that most firms have a dividend per 
share, while some do not provide shareholders with any dividend. From past research, the 
presence of board members can reduce the challenges that result from the effect of free cash 
flow on EM (Susanto, Pradipta, & Djashan, 2017).  
 
Firm losses are an indication of whether a firm is making either profits or losses. Table 18 
shows an average loss of 26.7%. The maximum and minimum losses are dummy figures 
represented by 0 or 1. A value of 0 indicates that a company is making profits, whereas a value 
of 1 indicates that it is making losses. According to the mean data, most firms (73%) have 
profits while 27% have losses. 
 
Descriptive statistics provide investors with an opportunity to gain an in-depth understanding 
of the firm’s activities and to evaluate the disclosed information. It can be tiresome and 
challenging to conceptualise large volumes of data. A detailed description additionally 
compares current data with past literature. The components of descriptive statistics vary 
depending on the kind of information. From a firm standpoint, the standard variables that 
statisticians explore include the number of board members, CEO duality, family ownership, 
BD, EM, ROA, ROE and TQ. Understanding these variables can offer insights into emerging 
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trends like GD, AD and ND. Consequently, the construction of descriptive statistics is an 
essential technique in relating data to real-life firm issues. 
 
6.3 Results and discussion  
6.3.1 Board diversity (BD) and earnings management (EM) 
Tables 19 and 20 show the OLS regression and random effects between BD in the form of GD, 
AD, ND and EM. As explained previously, this study used the modified Jones model and the 
Kothari model to measure the dependent variables because, for both models, this is the natural 
log of absolute discretionary accruals. The independent variables and the control variables are 
as described previously. 
 
Effect of gender diversity (GD) on earnings management (EM) 
Table 19 represents the OLS regression and random effects; as additional analyses, this study 
also used 2SLS, GMM and Tobit regression (Tables 21, 22 and 23). Random effects treats OLS 
in relation to the heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation problems (Arellano, 2003; Gujarati & 
Porter, 2009). Both the OLS and random regression models have highly significant levels of 
Prob > F: 0.000. The coefficient of determination, represented by R-squared in the OLS model, 
is 17.6%; in the random effects model it is 16.6; in the adjusted R-squared model 1 it is 13.8%, 
consistent with most of the existing literature (e.g. Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Both models have 
the same number of observations: 694. 
 
Table 19 shows the OLS regression. First, the coefficient for the GD variable is negative and 
statically insignificant (B1 = -0.262). This indicates that GD on boards may not be a 
determinant of EM. However, the random effect has a significant negative relationship at 5% 
(B1 = -0.262) between GD and the modified Jones model. Nevertheless, all the additional 
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analyses confirm the OLS regression result, which is more accurate, because 2SLS and GMM 
solve endogeneity and causality problems and Tobit deals with a limited dependent variable. 
Consequently, according to this finding, H1 can be rejected. This finding means that the 
number of females on a board does not affect EM. 
 
Furthermore, agency theory is inconsistent with this result. Given that shareholders are a mix 
of men and women, the BOD should also consist of a mix of men and women in order to 
provide BD and to solve the agency theory problem such as conflicts of interest (Adams et al., 
2010; Osma & Noguer, 2007; Terjesen et al., 2016; Thiruvadi & Huang 2011). Das (2019) 
agrees that for firms’ CG practices, it is necessary to use agency theory through GD. Similar 
to agency theory, there is a negative relationship between GD; in other words, GD reduces EM 
(Hoffmann et al., 2018). Moreover, it is confirmed that because women demonstrate greater 
insights, resource dependence theory does not support the findings; in addition, a BOD with 
GD is better able to understand the needs of the entire market (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Hillman 
et al., 2007). Therefore, it is recognised that female representatives on the board are better able 
to understand women’s needs and, similarly, male representatives are better able to understand 
men’s needs (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Hillman et al., 2007). In addition, social capital theory 
does not support this finding, which suggests that BD means that members are able to use their 
backgrounds to provide the board with different types of social capital (Niu & Chen, 2017). 
For instance, given that there are considerable differences between genders in terms of social 
capital, females on the board are likely to have more social capital than male directors. 
 
This result is inconsistent with the findings of most studies relating to the USA, Canada, Spain, 
France, Sweden, Finland, South Korea, Nigeria, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Palestine and Iraq that 
demonstrate a negative relationship between GD and EM (Clikean et al., 2001; Enofe et al., 
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2017; Hinz et al., 1997; Labelle et al., 2010; Lakhal et al., 2015; Omoye et al., 2014; Powell & 
Ansic, 1997; Riley & Chow, 1992; Susanto, 2016; Triki Damak, 2018; Zalata et al., 2018). In 
relation to making decisions, these studies’ findings show that when compared to men, women 
are more cautious and careful, take fewer risks and are more likely to consider alternatives and 
other opportunities. Moreover, women are more ethical than men, accounting for why they 
represent higher earnings quality when sitting on the BOD. 
 
In different circumstances, this finding is inconsistent with the findings of previous studies 
(Arioglu et al., 2018; Gull et al., 2018; Srinidhi et al., 2011) that there is a positive relationship 
between GD and EM. These findings show that firms that have women on their BODs have 
more EM. This is contrary to the agency, resource dependence and social capital theories (see 
section 4.3.1).  
 
In Kuwait, most women on boards work within their own family firms, so they may lack the 
experience, knowledge and education to affect board decisions. Furthermore, according to 
descriptive statistical data, women have a low percentage, which means that the weight of 
women on boards cannot affect them, because in Arab culture in general, they don't have the 
ability to let a woman on board, lesson and follow her order. Moreover, women on boards are 
often afraid of making risky decisions out of fear of losing their job. Indeed, Adel and Alqatan 
(2019) have shown that women in Kuwait suffer from discrimination such as occupation and 
pay inequalities, making them afraid to lose their position and work. This explains why there 
was no relation found between women on the board and EM.  
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Effects of age diversity on earnings management (EM) 
Table 19 shows the OLS and random effects regression. First, the coefficient for the AD 
variable is significant and positive at the 5% level (B2=0.166). This is consistent with the 
random effect, which is significant and positive at the 5% level (B2 = 0.166) with respect to 
the relationship between AD and the modified Jones model. This is contrary to H2, which can 
be rejected. This finding means that AD on the board increases the opportunities for AD 
managers to manipulate EM and, in other words, reduce earnings quality. 
 
The finding is contrary to resource dependence theory, which is based on the principle that in 
order to acquire resources, firms must sell their goods and services and be aware of their 
environment (Pfeffer, 1982). By doing so, the firm minimises its dependence on ‘rare source’ 
supplies (Hillman et al., 2009). Furthermore, it better to have a good, young director on the 
board rather than allow another firm to appoint him/her (Umitey, 2018). It is also essential to 
have board members of different ages to meet the needs of the market with regard to all age 
perspectives. This is consistent with Drees and Heugens’ (2013) and Hillman et al.’s (2007) 
arguments. This finding is additionally inconsistent with the social capital theory argument that 
all of a person’s or a group’s resources, whether real or implicit, are accrued through the 
possession of a long-lasting network of shared contacts and respectful institutionalised 
relationships (Sealy & Vinnicombe, 2007). Therefore, a board that has various diverse aspects 
is likely to possess more social capital and should perform better than a board that has no 
diversity (Carter et al., 2010). However, there is insufficient relevant literature examining this 
relationship between AD and EM in order to make comparisons.  
 
This study’s findings are also inconsistent with those of Umitey (2018), who found a negative 
relationship between AD and EM. Moreover, Nyoka’s (2018) and Victor and Edwin’s (2019) 
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findings show that AD does not influence EM. However, the present study’s findings are 
consistent with those of Musyoka et al. (2015), who found a positive association between AD 
and EM from his investigation of Kenyan firms. 
 
Kuwaiti young directors are more risky than senior directors, which they used EM, to have 
more bonus, incentive, remuneration and record in their CV. Furthermore, young directors 
suffer from a lack of experience, confidence and good networking compared to senior directors. 
 
Effects of national diversity (ND) on earnings management (EM) 
Table 19 shows the OLS and random effects regression. First, the coefficient for the ND 
variable is negative and statically insignificant (B3 = -0.421). This is consistent with the 
random effect (B3 = -0.048) and indicates that ND on the board may not be a determinant of 
EM. Consequently, H3 is rejected. This finding means that foreign directors on the board do 
not affect EM. As this study has already stated, this finding is inconsistent with the arguments 
of resource dependency and social capital theories. 
 
On the other hand, when this study replaced the proxy of EM by using the Kothari model as a 
measurement tool, it produced similar results. This finding is consistent with Dechow et al.’s 
(1995), Jones’ (1991) and Kothari et al.’s (2005) findings that the use of a different type of 
measurement for EM does not change the results. As Tables 19 and 20 below show, the EM 
measurements of both the modified Jones and Kothari models confirm these findings. 
Therefore, based on these findings, H1, H2 and H3 are all rejected. 
 
According to the descriptive statistical data, foreign directors in Kuwait have a low percentage 
on boards, which don’t affect the board decision. A possible explanation is differences in 
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culture, CG code and background. Furthermore, because they live abroad, they do not attend 
board meetings. Moreover, they are afraid of Kafeel that can fire him/her, so they live under 
stress and their lives are not stable. In addition, many firms have stopped hiring non-Kuwaiti 
nationalities, this figure being just 36% (Alhurra, 2016; Adel & Alqatan, 2019; Longva, 2019), 
so they do not affect board decisions as a result. Finally, most firms have stopped hiring non-
Kuwaiti foreigners and they call it Takuwait to increase Kuwaiti people’s employment 
opportunities (Adel & Alqatan, 2019; Akzaiby, 2019; Alhurra, 2016; Longva, 2019). 
 
 
In addition, this study has used other types of regression to support the OLS regression results, 
such as 2SLS, GMM and Tobit analysis, as shown in Tables 21, 22 and 23. These reinforce our 
explanations of the results of BD and EM. 
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Table 19: Modified Jones model 
 (1) (2) 
Log-modified Jones OLS Random effects 
   
Gender -0.262 -0.262** 
   
Age diversity 0.166*** 0.166** 
   
National diversity -0.0421 -0.0421 
   
Total assets 0.000137** 0.000137*** 
   
Firm age -0.00930*** -0.00930*** 
   
Leverage 0.000707** 0.000707*** 
   
Family firms -0.205*** -0.205*** 
   
Board size 0.0327* 0.0327 
   
Independent D 0.265 0.265*** 
   
Duality -0.00233 -0.00233 
   
Cash flows 0.00194 0.00194*** 
   
Current ratio -0.0119*** -0.0119*** 
   
Firm losses -0.157** -0.157*** 
   
Constant -4.210*** -4.210*** 
Observations 
Prob > F 
694 
0.000 
694 
0.000 
R-squared 0.173 0.172 
Firm FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
   
Significant at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20: Kothari model 
 (1) (2) 
Log Kothari OLS Random Effect 
   
Gender -0.275 -0.275* 
 
Age diversity 0.178*** 0.178** 
 
National diversity -0.0479 -0.0479 
 
Total assets 0.000145** 0.000145*** 
 
Firm age -0.00975*** -0.00975*** 
 
Leverage 0.000750** 0.000750*** 
 
Family firms -0.216*** -0.216*** 
 
Board size 0.0337 0.0337 
 
Independent D 0.324 0.324*** 
 
Duality -0.00644 -0.00644 
 
Cash flows 0.00196 0.00196** 
 
Current ratio -0.0130*** -0.0130*** 
 
Sales growth -0.000214 -0.000214*** 
 
Dividends per share 0.983 0.983*** 
 
Firm losses -0.154** -0.154*** 
 
Constant -4.259*** -4.259*** 
Observations 
Prob > F 
694 
0.000 
694 
0.000 
R-squared 0.176 0.176 
Firm FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
   
Significant at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 21: 2SLS for EM models 
2SLS (1) (2) 
Variables Modified Jones Kothari 
   
Gender diversity -0.250 -0.275 
Age diversity 0.172*** 0.178*** 
National diversity -0.0507 -0.0479 
Total assets 0.000138** 0.000145** 
Firm age -0.00916*** -0.00975*** 
Leverage 0.000722** 0.000750** 
Family firms -0.210*** -0.216*** 
Board size 0.0325* 0.0337* 
Independent 0.305 0.324 
Duality -0.00776 -0.00644 
Cash flows 0.00184 0.00196 
Current ratio -0.0122*** -0.0130*** 
Sales growth -0.000205 -0.000214 
Dividends per share 0.932 0.983 
Firm losses -0.144** -0.154** 
Constant -4.221*** -4.259*** 
Observations 694 694 
R-squared 0.176 0.176 
Industry FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Significant at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 22: GMM for EM models 
GMM (1) (2) 
Variables Modified Jones Kothari 
   
Gender diversity -0.250 -0.275 
Age diversity 0.172*** 0.178*** 
National diversity -0.0507 -0.0479 
Total assets 0.000138*** 0.000145*** 
Firm age -0.00916*** -0.00975*** 
Leverage 0.000722** 0.000750** 
Family firms -0.210*** -0.216*** 
Board size 0.0325* 0.0337* 
Independent 0.305 0.324 
Duality -0.00776 -0.00644 
Cash Flows 0.00184 0.00196 
Current ratio -0.0122*** -0.0130*** 
Sales growth -0.000205 -0.000214 
Dividends per share 0.932 0.983 
Firm losses -0.144** -0.154** 
Constant -4.221*** -4.259*** 
Observations 694 694 
R-squared 0.176 0.176 
Industry FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Significant at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 23: Tobit for EM models 
Tobit (1) (2) 
Variables Modified Jones Kothari 
Gender -0.227 -0.323 
Age diversity 0.119* 0.174** 
National diversity -0.191 -0.161 
Total assets 0.000175** 0.000167** 
Firm age -0.00142 -0.00773*** 
Leverage 0.000606 0.000691* 
Family firms -0.235*** -0.198*** 
Board size -0.0117 0.0198 
Independent 0.125 0.230 
Duality -0.0731 -0.00774 
Cash flows 0.00174 0.00189 
Current ratio -0.00597 -0.00904** 
Sales growth -0.000196 -0.000159 
Dividends per share 0.890 0.278 
Firm losses -0.117 -0.129 
Constant -4.078*** -4.200*** 
Observations 798 734 
Industry FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Significant at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.3.2 Board diversity (BD) and firm performance (FP)  
 
Table 24 shows the OLS regression and random effects results. In addition, Tables 25 and 26 
present the GMM and 2SLS regressions regarding BD in the form of GD, AD, ND and FP. 
This study has used three ways to measure the dependent variables, namely ROA and ROE, as 
the natural log of accounting measures and TQ as the natural log of a market measure. The 
independent variables are as described previously. 
 
Effects of gender diversity (GD) on firm performance (FP) 
Table 24 shows GD at the 1% significance level of B1 = -0.187. Accordingly, there is a 
statistically significant link between the board’s GD and the firm’s ROA. Thus, the findings 
indicate that FP reduces as the board’s GD increases. However, the negative sign on the value 
is contrary to this study’s expectation. Firms may perform poorly because women on their 
boards are more likely to avoid risks due to their moral values (Gull et al., 2018; Omoye & 
Eriki, 2014). A primary goal of diversity studies has been to understand the impact of diversity 
on firms (Gonzalez, 2013). Nonetheless, many firms have been slow to ensure equal gender 
representation on their BODs (Labelle, Francoeur & Lakhal, 2015). 
 
These findings contradict agency theory, which states that a firm’s individuals take care of their 
interests (Susanto, 2016). Agency theory supports internal and external mechanisms to ensure 
that a firm has effective CG, balancing the interests of its agents and principals (Nzulwa & 
Wagana, 2017). Therefore, proponents of agency theory believe that having a balanced board 
reduces conflicts, prevents groups from dominating the deliberation process and improves a 
firm’s performance. Hence, agency theory advocates that a board include female directors in 
order to improve FP (Nzulwa & Wagana, 2017). By showing a negative link between GD and 
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ROA, these findings are contrary to agency theory. Similarly, many research studies show that 
few women participate in firms’ higher levels of management (Ittonen et al., 2013). 
 
The findings are also inconsistent with those of resource dependency theory. This theory states 
that firms must control resources that have a critical impact on their FP (Herdhayinta, 2014). 
According to resource dependency theory, diversity offers vital knowledge that helps firms’ 
top-level management when making decisions (Herdhayinta, 2014). Consequently, as shown 
in Table 24, by indicating that there is a negative relationship between GD and a firm’s FP, our 
findings are contrary to resource dependency theory. Moreover, the findings are inconsistent 
with social capital theory, which defines social capital as all the resources – whether real or 
implicit – that a person or group accrues through possessing a long-lasting network of shared 
contacts and respectful institutionalised relationships (Sealy & Vinnicombe, 2007). For 
instance, given that there are significant differences between men and women in terms of social 
capital, a gender-diverse board is likely to have more social capital than a single-gender board. 
This is also the case with gender-diverse boards (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), because different 
nationalities’ skills and experiences are likely to result in substantially diverse social capital 
(Luckerath-Rovers, 2013). In contrast to those shown in Table 24, the findings of similar 
American studies show that, by using ROA and TQ, there is a significant positive relationship 
between GD and FP (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Jurkus et al., 2011; Robbiano, 
2019). Having examined Italian firms, Gordini and Rancati’s (2017) findings study show a 
significant positive relationship between BD and TQ. Another study examining firms in Africa, 
Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America and Oceania has found a positive relationship 
between GD and TQ (Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez, 2019). According to Jurkus et al. 
(2011), there is evidence that a board with a large number of men and women has a positive 
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impact on the country’s economy. On the contrary, the findings of a Danish study for the period 
from 1998 to 2001 show no relationship between GD and TQ (Rose, 2007).  
 
With regard to the literature on Kuwaiti firms, only two studies by Al-Shammari and Al-Saidi 
(2014) and Issa et al. (2019) have examined the same relationship. Al-Shammari and Al-Saidi’s 
(2014) findings show that, in relation to women, there is an insignificant relationship between 
GD and TQ and a significant negative between GD and ROA. However, Issa et al.’s (2019) 
findings show that, when using TQ, there is a positive relationship between Kuwaiti firms’ GD 
and FP. In addition, having examined the situation before the implementation of the KCGC, 
both studies show mixed results, as does this study. Nevertheless, other studies report that GD 
affects the quality of a firm’s financial reporting (Peni & Vähämaa, 2010).  
 
According to the gender percentage, which is about 5% of females does not affect a board’s 
decisions. According to the results of GD and EM, which end with no effect with this relation 
in both the modified Jones and Kothari models, which means that females are afraid and do 
not make risky decisions. Furthermore, Adel and Alqatan (2019) have confirmed that women 
in Kuwait suffer from discrimination, affecting FP negatively in the short term in accounting 
measure ROA and ROE. However, in the long term, women influence the performance of the 
firm positively, which means that women focus on future performance, as shown in market 
measure TQ. Furthermore, women on the board provides a positive sign to investors because 
women are generally more ethical and less likely to take risks as men, reflecting the future of 
the firm: in other words, the true value of the firm TQ positively. 
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Effects of age diversity (AD) on firm performance (FP) 
As shown in Table 24, there is a relationship at the 1% level of significance (B2 = 0.0343) 
between the AD of a firm’s board and ROA. The value is positive and hence supports this 
study’s expectations. H5 states that there is a positive relationship between the AD of a firm’s 
board and its performance. When calculating AD, statisticians compare the age of the firm’s 
director to the average age of the board’s other members. AD is a dummy variable represented 
by 1 or 0. For instance, the value can be 1 when a company director is younger than a particular 
age. It will be 0 if the firm’s director is older than the set age limit. According to Table 24’s 
results, a firm performs better if, in terms of age, it has a highly diverse board.  
 
Table 24’s results are inconsistent with both resource dependency theory and social capital 
theory. Increased AD of the firm’s board leads to more ideas and different experiences. 
Resource dependency theory suggests that a firm is likely to be successful if it controls the 
external factors that affect its operations and is able to make independent strategic decisions 
(Ali et al., 2014). The variables that determine a firm’s independence may include skills, 
expertise and experience. All of these are proxies of AD. Social capital theory states that people 
benefit from the relationships they form with team members (Callahan, Libarkin, McCallum, 
& Atchison, 2015). More specifically, board members use relationships to meet the firm’s 
employees’ needs and support one another through shared respect and understanding 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992). Therefore, a board with diverse aspects is more likely to possess 
social capital and hence it is more likely to perform better than a board that has no diversity 
(Carter et al., 2010).  
 
Moreover, from their examinations of American, Swedish and Indonesian firms, Choi and 
Rainey’s (2010), Dagsson and Larsson’s (2011) and Darmadi’s (2011) findings show a positive 
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relationship between AD and FP. However, some studies’ findings show that, compared with 
younger directors, older directors are more motivated in their actions to ensure that the firm is 
successful (Tanikawa et al., 2017). Other studies (e.g. Abdullah et al., 2017; Ali & Kulik, 2014; 
Ali et al., 2014; Diepen, 2015; Eulerich et al., 2014; Kunze et al., 2013; Petersson & Wallin, 
2017; Shahata et al., 2017 ; Tanikawa et al., 2017) examining firms in the USA, UK, Germany, 
Sweden and Australia have indicated a negative relationship between AD and FP. Furthermore, 
Diepen’s (2015) findings show no relationship between AD and FP.  
 
Young directors are more risky than senior directors, which they used EM, to have more 
money, that affects FP. Shareholders will buy more shares because FP reflects positively, as 
shown in the result. Additionally, this leads shareholders to allow young directors to stay on 
the board and receive greater remuneration and experience and further their careers. However, 
young directors suffer from a lack of experience, confidence and good networking compared 
to senior directors, which is why they have a negative sign in the long term (TQ).  
 
Effects of national diversity (ND) on firm performance (FP) 
ND refers to the ratio of foreign directors on a firm’s board. As shown by the results in Table 
24, there is a positive relationship between a firm’s ND and its FP. Statistically, the value is 
insignificant (B3 = 0.0181) and contrary to this study’s expectations in H6, which states that 
there is a positive relationship between ND and a firm’s FP. Table 24’s results indicate that 
ND may not be an essential factor affecting a firm’s FP, contrary to both resource dependency 
theory and social capital theory. On the one hand, resource dependency theory states that a firm 
is likely to be successful if it controls the external factors that affect its operations and is able 
to make independent strategic decisions (Ali et al., 2014). The increased ND of a firm’s board 
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usually leads to it having different experiences and it can use these to create more ideas to 
improve its operations 
 
Furthermore, the results are inconsistent with social capital theory, which states that people 
benefit from the relationships they form with team members (Callahan et al., 2015). More 
specifically, board members use relationships to meet a firm’s employees’ needs and to support 
one another through shared respect and understanding (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992). Therefore, 
a board that possesses social capital is more likely to perform better than a board that has none 
(Carter et al., 2010).  
 
These results are inconsistent with several other research findings. For instance, previous 
studies have shown that an internationally diverse BOD is more likely to have a positive 
influence on a firm’s FP (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Delis et al., 2016; Diepen, 2015; 
Erhardt et al., 2003; Harjoto et al., 2015; Kaczmarek, 2009). Moreover, these results, contrary 
to Diepen’s (2015) and Hart’s (2014) findings, show that immigrant entrepreneurs have a 
negative effect on FP. Nevertheless, this study is consistent with examinations of Indonesian 
and Omani firms by Darmadi (2011) and Al-Matari et al. (2014), respectively, which indicate 
that when measured by ROA and TQ, international diversity has no influence on FP. 
 
On the other hand, when this study replaced the FP proxy by using different measurements, 
namely ROE as the accounting measure and TQ as the market measure, it was able to confirm 
the ROE result, which was similar to the ROA result. However, the use of TQ as a market 
measure yielded the exact opposite results to those shown in Table 24. Between GD and TQ, 
these were significant and positive at the 10% level (B1 = 1.038). Therefore, based on this 
result, H4 can be rejected. Nevertheless, while the AD and ND were statistically significant, 
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they were negative at B2 = -0.153 and B3 = -0.397, respectively. This indicates that besides 
ND, a board’s AD has a negative relationship with TQ at the 1% significance level. As Table 
24 below shows, these results are contrary to this study’s hypotheses, theories and key studies 
in the literature. Based on these results, H5 can be rejected, which states that there is a positive 
association between AD and FP. Furthermore, H6, which states that there is a positive 
association between ND and FP, can be rejected. Therefore, in view of these mixed findings, 
this study has rejected H4, H5 and H6.  
 
A foreign director does not have an impact (and in TQ only negatively), possibly due to the 
fact that non-Kuwaiti directors represent a very low percentage, affecting their decisions on 
boards. Furthermore, they may miss board meetings because they live outside the country and 
it hard to come quickly if there is an emergency meeting that affects FP. Finally, most firms 
have stopped hiring non-Kuwaiti employees under a policy called Takuwait as a means of 
increasing Kuwaiti employees’ opportunities (Adel & Alqatan, 2019; Akzaiby, 2019; Alhurra, 
2016; Longva, 2019). 
 
In order to confirm the random effects results and make the explanation of the result robust 
between BD and FP, this study has used 2SLS and GMM as additional analyses, as shown in 
Tables 25 and 26 below, which confirm and support the results of both the OLS and random 
effects regressions. 
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Table 24: OLS & random effects for FP models 
OLS & random effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables ROA-OLS ROA-RE ROE-OLS ROE-RE TQ-OLS TQ-RE 
       
Gender diversity -0.187*** -0.187*** -0.0573*** -0.0573*** 1.034*** 1.034* 
Age diversity 0.0343*** 0.0343*** 0.0100*** 0.0100*** -0.153*** -0.153*** 
National diversity 0.0186 0.0186 0.00760 0.00760 -0.394*** -0.394*** 
Total assets -4.79e-1*** -4.79e-05 -1.65e-1*** -1.65e-05* 0.00022*** 0.00022*** 
Firm age -0.000587 -0.00059** -0.000110 -0.00011*** 0.000147 0.000147 
Leverage 0.000104** 0.00010*** 2.32e-05 2.32e-05*** -3.87e-05 -3.87e-05 
Family firms -0.00848 -0.00848** -0.000792 -0.000792 -0.0615 -0.0615 
Board size -0.00152 -0.00152 -0.00113 -0.00113 -0.0715*** -0.0715*** 
Independent D -0.103 -0.103 -0.0276 -0.0276 -0.372 -0.372 
Duality -0.0206** -0.0206 -0.00322 -0.00322 0.0990*** 0.0990 
Cash flows 3.17e-05 3.17e-05 -9.47e-07 -9.47e-07 -0.000867 -0.000867* 
Current ratio -0.00139** -0.0014*** -0.000312* -0.00031*** 0.000789 0.00079*** 
Sales growth -2.25e-06 -2.25e-06 -6.51e-07 -6.51e-07 -7.85e-05 -7.85e-05* 
Dividends per share -0.183 -0.183 0.0208 0.0208 -1.278 -1.278*** 
Constant 4.216*** 4.216*** 6.014*** 6.014*** 0.198 0.198*** 
Observations 
Prob>F 
694 
0.000 
694 
0.000 
694 
0.000 
694 
0.000 
693 
0.000 
693 
0.000 
R-squared 0.150  0.118  0.278  
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Significant at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 25: 2SLS for FP models 
2SLS (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
    
Gender diversity -0.187*** -0.0573*** 1.034*** 
Age diversity 0.0343*** 0.0100*** -0.153*** 
National diversity 0.0186 0.00760 -0.394*** 
Total assets -4.79e-05*** -1.65e-05*** 0.000219*** 
Firm age -0.000587 -0.000110 0.000147 
Leverage 0.000104** 2.32e-05 -3.87e-05 
Family firms -0.00848 -0.000792 -0.0615 
Board size -0.00152 -0.00113 -0.0715*** 
Independent -0.103 -0.0276 -0.372 
Duality -0.0206** -0.00322 0.0990*** 
Cash flows 3.17e-05 -9.47e-07 -0.000867 
Current ratio -0.00139** -0.000312* 0.000789 
Sales growth -2.25e-06 -6.51e-07 -7.85e-05 
Dividends per share -0.183 0.0208 -1.278 
Constant 4.216*** 6.014*** 0.198 
Observations 694 694 693 
R-squared 0.150 0.118 0.278 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Significant at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 26: GMM for FP models 
GMM (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
    
Gender diversity -0.187*** -0.0573*** 1.034*** 
Age diversity 0.0343*** 0.0100*** -0.153*** 
National diversity 0.0186 0.00760 -0.394*** 
Total assets -4.79e-05*** -1.65e-05*** 0.000219*** 
Firm age -0.000587 -0.000110 0.000147 
Leverage 0.000104** 2.32e-05* -3.87e-05 
Family firms -0.00848 -0.000792 -0.0615 
Board size -0.00152 -0.00113 -0.0715*** 
Independent -0.103* -0.0276* -0.372 
Duality -0.0206** -0.00322 0.0990** 
Cash flows 3.17e-05 -9.47e-07 -0.000867 
Current ratio -0.00139*** -0.000312*** 0.000789 
Sales growth -2.25e-06 -6.51e-07 -7.85e-05 
Dividends per share -0.183 0.0208 -1.278 
Constant 4.216*** 6.014*** 0.198 
Observations 694 694 693 
R-squared 0.150 0.118 0.278 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Significant at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 176 
Table 27: The study’s overall expectations and findings 
Research hypotheses Expected Results 
H1: There is a negative 
association between gender 
diversity and earnings 
management 
- X 
H2: There is a negative 
association between age diversity 
and earnings management 
- + 
H3: There is a negative 
association between national 
diversity and earnings 
management 
- X 
H4: There is a positive association 
between gender diversity and firm 
performance 
+ Mixed 
H5: There is a positive association 
between age diversity and firm 
performance 
+ Mixed 
H6: There is a positive association 
between national diversity and 
firm performance 
+ Mixed 
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6.4 Additional analyses 
6.4.1 Other measurements of age diversity 
 
For its purpose of analysis, this study has used Tobit analysis for EM, as the fact that EM has 
positive values and the GMM analysis to solve endogeneity and causality problems for FP 
(further details in section 5.7) and has used standard deviation and range to measure AD rather 
than the average. The additional analysis measured by standard deviation follows the examples 
of Ahn and Walker (2007), Bohren and Strom (2010), Harrison and Klein (2007) and Kunze 
et al. (2013). The standard deviation has been used for all directors per year in each firm. 
Moreover, the range has formed the third measure of AD, which is the maximum age director 
minus the youngest director on the board each year. After changing the measurement of age 
diversity, the result remained the same as the additional analysis results, as shown in Tables 28 
and 29. 
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Table 28: Measuring AD by STD 
EM: Tobit; FP: 2SLS (1)    (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Modified Jones Kothari ROA ROE TQ 
      
Gender diversity -0.206 -0.284 -0.143*** -0.0437*** 1.090*** 
STD 0.0157** 0.0181** 0.000560* 0.000116* -0.0104** 
National diversity -0.102 -0.0746 0.0347 0.0104 -0.432*** 
Total assets 0.000220*** 0.000223*** -4.44e-05*** -1.54e-05*** 0.000200*** 
Firm age -0.00142 -0.00838*** -0.000535 -7.97e-05 0.00156 
Leverage 0.000348 0.000473 7.86e-05 1.49e-05 0.000190 
Family firms -0.201*** -0.151** -0.0157* -0.00245 -0.0370 
Board size 0.00260 0.0363 -0.00344 -0.00182** -0.0480*** 
Independent 0.301 0.523 -0.0692 -0.0200 -0.308 
Duality -0.0209 0.0361 -0.0210** -0.00390 0.0892** 
Cash flows 0.00155 0.00160 5.64e-05 7.15e-06 -0.000821 
Current ratio -0.00767* -0.0104*** -0.00136** -0.000305* 0.00169 
Sales growth -0.000187 -0.000131 -2.45e-06 -3.98e-07 -0.000126 
Dividends per share 0.768 0.167 -0.123 0.0330 -1.079 
Firm losses -0.0909 -0.0611    
Constant -4.445*** -4.566*** 4.240*** 6.021*** -0.163 
Observations 779 718 779 779 778 
R-squared   0.132 0.108 0.244 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
                 Significant at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 179 
Table 29: Measurement of age diversity by Range 
EM: Tobit; FP: 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Modified Jones Kothari ROA ROE TQ 
      
Gender diversity -0.205 -0.282 -0.143*** -0.0438*** 1.092*** 
Range 0.00542* 0.00648** 3.37e-1* 3.54e-1* -0.00302* 
National diversity -0.103 -0.0782 0.0339 0.0101 -0.429*** 
Total assets 0.000219*** 0.000221*** -4.40e-05*** -1.52e-05*** 0.000198*** 
Firm age -0.00129 -0.00819*** -0.000529 -7.66e-05 0.00160 
Leverage 0.000348 0.000469 7.72e-05 1.44e-05 0.000195 
Family firms -0.201*** -0.153** -0.0161* -0.00259 -0.0363 
Board size 0.00123 0.0350 -0.00343 -0.00182** -0.0487*** 
Independent 0.298 0.516 -0.0682 -0.0196 -0.314 
Duality -0.0211 0.0352 -0.0210** -0.00392 0.0893** 
Cash flows 0.00153 0.00158 5.44e-05 6.32e-06 -0.000821 
Current ratio -0.00768* -0.0104*** -0.00135** -0.000304* 0.00168 
Sales growth -0.000189 -0.000135 -2.97e-06 -6.13e-07 -0.000125 
Dividends per share 0.882 0.280 -0.138 0.0278 -0.993 
Firm losses -0.0850 -0.0543    
Constant -4.418*** -4.543*** 4.235*** 6.019*** -0.131 
Observations 779 718 779 779 778 
R-squared   0.132 0.108 0.242 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Significant at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.4.2 Interaction between board independence and family firms with independent variables 
 
The additional analyses have checked the impacts of the interactions between each board 
independent and family firm with independent variables (Table 30). Table 31 shows a positive 
relationship at 1% significance between females in family firms and TQ. In other words, the 
more family director in the family firm the better performance in the long term and this gives 
strong evidence and confirms all the previous analyses between GD and TQ. Amran (2011) 
has studied the relationship between GD in family firms and TQ in Malaysia using 182 listed 
firms between 2003 and 2007, finding a positive relationship at 5% significance, confirming 
the present study’s result. 
 
Furthermore, this analysis has found a positive relationship at the 10% level of significance 
between foreign directors in family firms and the Kothari model, although this was not 
significant with the modified Jones model. In other words, family firms that are run by foreign 
directors are more able to manipulate EM. However, this was not the case with the previous 
analysis, which found no relationship between foreign directors on the board and EM. 
Moreover, this test has yielded the same results between independent variables and EM, 
besides FP, except the relationship between ND and both EM models that have the same sign 
which is negative but turn in to significant at %10. In addition, the relationship between GD 
and TQ have the same sign statistically, but this is insignificant.  
 
Table 30: Interaction between board independence and family firms with independent variables 
Additional control variables  Definition 
GD * ID Female independent directors 
AD * ID Young independent directors 
ND * ID Foreign independent directors 
GD * FF Female directors in Family firm 
AD * FF Young directors in Family firm 
ND * FF Foreign directors in Family firm 
 
 181 
Table 31: Robust analysis using interaction 
EM: Tobit; FP: GMM (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Modified Jones Kothari ROA ROE TQ 
Gender diversity -0.725 -0.803 -0.106* -0.0302* 0.274 
Age diversity 0.171* 0.263*** 0.0355*** 0.00992** -0.151*** 
National diversity -0.406* -0.444* 0.0372 0.0138 -0.295** 
GD * ID 0.0880 -0.639 -0.666 -0.166 0.307 
AD * ID 0.368 -0.0550 0.160 0.0295 -0.504 
ND * ID - - - - - 
GD * FF 1.091 0.997 -0.0752 -0.0305 1.808*** 
AD * FF -0.132 -0.191 -0.0188 -0.00474 0.0576 
ND * FF 0.520 0.596* -0.00580 -0.0154 -0.331 
Total assets 0.000184** 0.000177** -4.67e-05*** -1.62e-05*** 0.000195*** 
Firm age -0.000515 -0.00673** -0.000434 -4.86e-05 0.00134 
Leverage 0.000615 0.000670* 9.55e-05** 1.90e-05 0.000226 
Family firms -0.280** -0.218* -0.000210 0.00475 -0.108 
Board size -0.0130 0.0165 -0.00279 -0.00173* -0.0471*** 
Independent -0.0607 0.230 -0.130 -0.0295 -0.0950 
Duality -0.0673 0.00711 -0.0199** -0.00380 0.0812** 
Cash flows 0.00189 0.00206 8.78e-05 3.76e-06 -0.00106** 
Current ratio -0.00615 -0.00952** -0.00144*** -0.000326*** 0.00184 
Sales growth -0.000202 -0.000175 -5.09e-06 -1.24e-06 -0.000101 
Dividends per share 1.010 0.405 -0.187 0.0532 -0.625 
Firm losses -0.108 -0.121    
Constant -4.071*** -4.198*** 4.209*** 6.009*** 0.0175 
Observations 798 734 779 779 778 
R-squared   0.152 0.125 0.277 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Significant at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.5 Summary  
 
This chapter has examined the association between GD and EM in detail, revealing that one 
does not exist. By contrast, the chapter has demonstrated that there is a positive relationship 
between AD and EM, although this was not supported by the additional analyses. Turning to 
FP, this study has used different measurements to consider the relationships between gender, 
age, ND and FP. The findings have revealed no conclusive evidence of a positive or negative 
correlation between gender, age, ND and FP because different measurements produced 
different results. Furthermore, after changing the AD measurements such as standard deviation 
and range, the result remained the same. Finally, as an additional analysis, this thesis has 
checked the impact of the interaction between each independent and family firm with 
independent variables, revealing a positive relationship at 1% significance between females in 
family firms and TQ. In order words, family firms with female directors (women business 
owners) show better performance in the long term and this give strong evidence and confirms 
all the previous analyses of GD and TQ. Furthermore, this analysis has found a positive 
relationship at 10% significance between family firms with foreign directors and the Kothari 
model, but this was not significant with the modified Jones model. Stated differently, family 
firms run by foreigner directors are more able to manipulate EM. However, this was not 
supported by the previous analysis, which found no relationship between foreign directors on 
boards and EM. The next chapter is the conclusion. 
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7.0 Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
This study has aimed to examine the impacts of BD in the form of GD, AD and ND on EM 
and FP. This chapter starts by summarising the study’s key findings. Next, it presents the 
study’s implications. Moreover, it highlights its contributions to the literature. It then explains 
the study’s limitations. Last but not least, the chapter presents recommendations for future 
studies. 
 
7.1 Summary of this study’s key findings  
This study was designed to ascertain if GD, AD and ND affect both the EM and FP of Kuwaiti 
non-financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait. For the purpose of this study, these firms were 
analysed between 2010 and 2017.  
 
The findings show that with respect to such firms, one relationship could be found between 
BD and EM. The study’s first result indicates that when using the modified Jones model, there 
is a negative sign statistically, but an insignificant relationship between GD and EM. Therefore, 
this study’s first hypothesis is rejected. The study’s second result indicates that when using the 
modified Jones model, there is a positive relationship between AD and EM. The third result 
indicates that when using the modified Jones model, ND has no impact on EM. The use of the 
Kothari model produced similar results. This study therefore rejects H1, H2 and H3.  
 
Furthermore in terms of FP in the form of ROA, ROE and TQ, the findings show that GD has 
a negative relationship with ROA, while AD has a significant positive correlation with ROA. 
Moreover, the findings show that there is no association between ND and ROA.  
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When this study replaced the FP proxy by using different measurements, namely ROE as the 
accounting measure and TQ as the market measure, it confirmed that the ROE result was 
similar to the ROA result. However, the use of TQ as a market measure yielded the exact 
opposite results to those shown Table 24. Between GD and TQ there was a significant and 
positive relationship, with different results garnered by different measures. 
 
However, atlhough the AD and ND were statistically significant, they operated in a negative 
relationship. This indicated that, besides ND, the board’s AD has a negative relationship with 
TQ. These results were contrary to this study’s hypotheses as well as existing theories and 
studies. Given that different measures produced different results, this study therefore rejects 
H4, H5 and H6.  
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7.2 Implications 
The practical empirical findings indicate that GD on the board do not affect EM. Furthermore, 
it is more important to have senior directors on the board rather than AD to reduce EM. 
However, in terms of accounting measures (ROA and ROE), while GD on the board reduces 
FP, it increases FP in terms of the market measure (TQ). Moreover, in terms of accounting 
measures (ROA and ROE), while AD, through having younger directors on the board, increases 
FP, in terms of the market measure (TQ), it reduces FP. There is no need to employ any 
foreigners on the board because no relationship was found with ROA or ROE, while ND did 
not affect EM. However, having foreign directors on the board has been found to reduce FP 
measured by TQ. Moreover, the findings show that there is a significant negative relationship 
between family firms and EM. This indicates that family firms have a lower level of EM and 
that the same variable reduces FP. Furthermore, having more independent directors on Kuwaiti 
listed companies’ boards does not affect their level of EM and FP. Having more liquidity, 
which is a proxy of risk, also reduces the level of both a firm’s EM and FP in the short term. 
Larger company size increases EM and, in terms of FP, there are mixed results. The size of the 
board is significantly positive at the 10% level and therefore the more directors on the board, 
the greater the EM in firms. Size does not however affect a firm’s accounting measure 
performance (ROA and ROE). However, it is significant and negative at the 1% level only 
when measured by TQ. Consequently, when using TQ as a measurement of the market, there 
is a reduction in FP. This means that having many directors on the board delays the decision-
making process and it is generally not good for a firm. Besides, the duality of the chairman’s 
and the CEO’s roles does not affect EM. There is also a significant negative relationship 
between firm losses and EM. This means that the greater the firm’s losses, the lower the level 
of EM. 
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7.3 Study contributions  
By investigating board diversity’s effects on EM and FP, this study has extended the existing 
literature about their respective relationships. In addition, by demonstrating the vital roles 
played by women, young people and foreign directors in improving BODs’ monitoring role 
on EM and FP, this study has contributed more widely to the existing literature on GD, AD 
and ND. More specifically, this study’s findings can be summarised as: first, adding to 
existing knowledge; second, providing a theoretical framework for the purpose of studying 
the relationships between BD and EM and FP; and third, providing a methodology for doing 
so. 
 
As shown by the results in Figure 6 and Table 1, which support this study’s hypotheses, this 
study’s findings have also made significant contributions to the use of social capital theory in 
relation to the BD of Kuwaiti non-financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait. 
 
Finally, when deciding on the appropriate methodology for the research, this study used new 
variables that affected both these firms’ EM and FP. These variables were firm age, family 
firm, liquidity, dividends per share, sales growth and cash flow (for further details, please see 
section 3.2.3). In the context of GCC countries and, more specifically as a control variable in 
relation to Kuwaiti non-financial firms listed on Boursa Kuwait, this study used a new measure: 
the founding family members of a family firm (Ebrahim & Abdel Fattah, 2015). Furthermore, 
this study used the largest sample and the longest period since the KCGC was implemented in 
2013, increasing the validity of its findings. 
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7.4 Limitations 
The main limitations of this study’s methods can be summarised as follows. First of all, 
diversity data were unavailable and the researcher found it difficult to obtain this information 
from the database. Consequently, data were collected manually, which took a long time. The 
second limitation was the quantitative methods indicating whether or not there was a 
relationship between the variables. However, these methods did not provide an explanation 
about any such relationship. The third limitation was the wide range of unavailable data in 
Kuwait, making it difficult to collect data before 2010. Furthermore, the data of both audit and 
audit committee characteristics were not available. In terms of AD and EM, there were also 
few available resources, making it difficult to make comparisons with the available data. 
Moreover, there are very few previous EM and diversity studies in Kuwait and GCC countries. 
This study has measured GD by percentage, but it would have been more interesting to measure 
this in terms of education degrees and experiences. Moreover studies like Gull et al. (2018) 
have highlighted the importance of using education and experience as a proxy of GD. Finally, 
as this study is limited to Kuwait, its findings cannot be generalised to other regions.  
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7.5 Recommendations for future research 
With regard to this study’s results, it is recommended that they form the basis for many future 
studies. This study used a sample of 103 Kuwaiti listed firms over eight years and which 
included 824 observations. Based on the existing literature, future studies of emerging counties 
like GCC countries are recommended, using larger samples to provide greater clarification and 
stronger evidence of similarities and differences.  
 
Additionally, previous research studies (e.g. Abdullah & Ismail, 2017) have found that GCC 
countries have different CGCs and practices, concentrating on non-financial firms. 
Consequently, it is recommended that future studies investigate the impact of BD on EM and 
on FP in financial industries, as these have different CGCs.  
It is also recommended that a comparative study be conducted between Kuwait and a developed 
country in order to identify the similarities and differences arising from their backgrounds and 
disciplines (Fischer et al., 2010). 
Moreover, it would be useful to conduct a study using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. In addition, it is recommended that, based on this study’s findings, an analysis be 
conducted between firm age, leverage, family firm and liquidity with EM and FP to test these 
relationships and to establish whether or not there is a significant relationship between them 
(more information can be found in section 3.2.3).  
Previous studies have provided essential evidence regarding the use of other measures of GD, 
such as education and experience (Gull et al., 2018; Issa et al., 2019). According to Gull et al.’s 
(2018) findings, firms appoint women according to their education, experience and behaviour 
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and thereby gain a new perspective on the effectiveness of GD. Consequently, it is 
recommended that further studies be conducted to measure GD by means of education and 
experience. Additionally, one might study CEO diversity in the form of GD, AD and ND. 
Previous investigations have also shown the importance of studying classification shifting to 
manipulate EM (Zalata et al., 2018). Therefore, it is recommended that a future study use other 
proxies of EM, such as real earnings management and classification shifting, to establish 
whether or not these proxies confirm existing results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 190 
8.0 Chapter Eight: References 
 
Abdelwahed, G. M. M. G. (2018). Earnings management constraints in the UK and the US: the 
moderating role of CEO compensation (Doctoral dissertation, University of Portsmouth). 
Abdul Rahman, R., & Haniffa, R. M. (2005). The effect of role duality on corporate 
performance in Malaysia. Corporate Ownership and Control, 2(2), 40–47.  
Abdul Rahman, R., & Ali, F. (2006). Board, Audit committee, Culture and Earnings 
Management: Malaysian Evidence. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(7), 783-804.  
Abdullah, S. N., & Ku Ismail, K. N. I. (2012). Do women directors constraint accrual 
management? Malaysian evidence. In 3rd International Conference on Business and 
Economics Victoria & Alfrred Waterfront Hotel, Cape Town, South Africa. 
Abdullah, S. N., & Ismail, K.N.I.K. (2013). Gender, Ethnic and Age Diversity of the Boards 
of Large Malaysian Firms and Performance. Jurnal Pengurusan, 38, 27-40. 
Abdallah, A. A. N., & Ismail, A. K. (2017). Corporate governance practices, ownership 
structure, and corporate performance in the GCC countries. Journal of International Financial 
Markets, Institutions and Money, 46, 98-115. 
 
Abdullah, A., Naser, K., & Fayez, F. (2018). Obstacles toward adopting electronic government 
in an emerging economy: Evidence from Kuwait. Asian Economic and Financial Review, 8(6), 
832-842.  
 
Abed, S., Al-Attar, A., & Suwaidan, M. (2012). Corporate governance and earnings 
management: Jordanian evidence. International Business Research, 5(1), 216. 
 
Abowd, J. M. (1990). Does performance-based managerial compensation affect corporate 
performance?. ILR Review, 43(3), 52-S. 
 
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance 
and performance. Journal of financial economics, 94(2), 291-309.  
 191 
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010). The role of boards of directors in 
corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey. Journal of economic 
literature, 48(1), 58-107. 
 
Adel, R., & Alqatan, A. (2019). Gender employment discrimination: A comparison between 
the banking sectors of Kuwait and the United Kingdom. Corporate Board: Role, Duties and 
Composition, 15(3), 43-57. 
Adler, P.S. and Kwon, S. (2002), Social capital: prospects for a new concept. The Academic of 
Management Review, 27(1), p. 27.  
Aguilera, R. V., Filatotchev, I., Gospel, H., & Jackson, G. (2008). An organizational approach 
to comparative corporate governance: Costs, contingencies, and complementarities. 
Organization Science, 19(3), 475-492. 
 
Aguilera, R. V., & Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2009). Codes of Good Governance. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 376-387. 
 
Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. (2010). Comparative and international corporate governance. 
The Academy of Management Annals, 4(1), 485-556. 
 
Aguilera, R., & Jackson, G. (2003). The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: 
Dimensions and Determinants. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 447-465.  
Aguilera, R. (2005), Corporate governance and director accountability: an institutional 
comparative perspective. British Journal of Management, 16, S39-S53.  
Aguilera, R., Florackis, C., & Kim, H. (2016). Advancing the Corporate Governance Research 
Agenda. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 24(3), 172-180.  
 
Ahmed, F., Advani, N., & Kanwal, S. (2018). Earnings management and dividend policy: 
Empirical evidence from major sectors of Pakistan. International Journal of Economics and 
Financial Issues, 8(3), 182. 
 
 192 
Ahmed, K., Hossain, M., & Adams, M. B. (2006). The effects of board composition and 
board  size on the informativeness of annual accounting earnings. Corporate governance: an 
international review, 14(5), 418-431. 
 
Ahn, S., & Walker, M. D. (2007). Corporate governance and the spinoff decision. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 13, 76-93.  
 
Ait-Sahalia, Y., & Xiu, D. (2019). A Hausman test for the presence of market microstructure 
noise in high frequency data. Journal of Econometrics, 211(1), 176-205. 
 
Akhtaruddin, M. (2005). Corporate mandatory disclosure practices in Bangladesh. The 
International Journal of Accounting, 40(4), 399-422. 
 
Aktan, B., Turen, S., Tvaronavičienė, M., Celik, S., &Alsadeh, H. A. (2018). Corporate 
governance and performance of the financial firms in Bahrain. Polish Journal of Management 
Studies, 17(1), 39-58. 
Akzaiby, A. (2019). Kuwait: 5 government agencies exclude foreigners next year. Alaraby. 
Evidence from https://www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/2019/11/19/ -ينغتست-ةیموكح-تاھج-5-تیوكلا
لبقملا-ماعلا-نیدفاولا-نع , Link access date: 05.01.2020. 
Alanezi, F. S., Alfraih, M. M., & Alshammari, S. S. (2016). Operating Segments (IFRS 8)-
Required Disclosure and the Specific-Characteristics of Kuwaiti Listed 
Companies. International Business Research, 9(1), 136. 
 
AlAli, M. S., Bash, A. Y., AlForaih, E. O., AlSabah, A. M., & AlSalem, A. S. (2018). The 
Adaptation Of Zmijewski Model In Appraising The Financial Distress Of Mobile 
Telecommunications Companies Listed At Boursa Kuwait. Management, 5(4), 129-136.  
 
Al-Absy, M. S. M., Ismail, K. N. I. K., & Chandren, S. (2018). Accounting expertise in the 
audit committee and earnings management. Business & Economic Horizons, 14(3). 
 
AlDabbous, N. (2012). Corporate governance transformation: the case of Kuwait (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Aberdeen). 
 193 
 
Alessa, S. Y. (2017). The manpower problem in Kuwait. Routledge. 
 
Alfaraih, M., & Alanezi, F. (2011). The usefulness of earnings and book value for equity 
valuation to Kuwait stock exchange participants. International Business & Economics 
Research Journal (IBER), 10(1). 
 
Alfraih, M. M., & Almutawa, A. M. (2017). Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance: 
empirical evidence from Kuwait. International Journal of Law and Management.  
 
Al-Ghanem, W., & Hegazy, M. (2011). An empirical analysis of audit delays and timeliness 
of corporate financial reporting in Kuwait. Eurasian Business Review, 1(1), 73-90. 
 
Algharaballi, E., & Albuloushi, S. (2008). Evaluating the specification and power of 
discretionary accruals models in Kuwait. Journal of Derivatives & Hedge Funds, 14(3-4), 251-
264. 
 
Algharaballi, E. (2013). Earnings management practices and subsequent firm performance of 
companies listing on the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE). (Doctoral dissertation, University of 
Southern Queensland). 
 
Al-Habshan, K. S. (2017). Current Practices and Improvement of Saudi Corporate Governance 
Framework. J. Pol. & L., 10, 81.  
 
Alkazemi, D. U., & Jackson, R. (2019). Breastfeeding exposure is associated with better 
knowledge of and attitudes toward BF in Kuwaiti women. BMJ Nutrition, Prevention & 
Health. 
 
Al-Mamun, A., Yasser, Q. R., Entebang, H., & Nathan, T. M. (2013). Gender diversity and 
economic performance of firms: Evidences from emerging market. Journal of Economic 
Development, Management, IT, Finance and Marketing, 5(2), 100–110. 
 
Al-Moosa, A., & McLachlan, K. (2017). Immigrant labour in Kuwait. Routledge. 
 
 194 
Al Mutairi, M., Tian, G., Hasan, H., & Tan, A. (2012). Corporate governance and corporate 
finance practices in a Kuwait Stock Exchange market listed firm: a survey to confront theory 
with practice. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society.  
 
Al-Matari, E. M., Al-Swidi, A. K., & Fadzil, F. H. B. (2014). The moderating effect of board 
diversity on the relationship between executive committee characteristics and firm 
performance in Oman: Empirical Study. Asian Social Science, 10(12), 6-20. 
 
Al-Shammari, B. A. (2005). Compliance with international accounting standards by listed 
companies in the Gulf Co-operation Council member states: an empirical study. (University of 
Western Australia). 
 
Al-Shammari, B. & Al-Sultan, W. (2010). Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in 
Kuwait. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 7(3), 262- 280.  
 
Al-Saidi, M., & Al-Shammari, B. (2013). Board composition and bank performance in Kuwait: 
an empirical study. Managerial Auditing Journal, 28(6), 472-494. 
 
Al-Shammari, B., & Al-Saidi, M. (2014). Kuwaiti women and firm performance. International 
Journal of Business and Management, 9(8), 51. 
 
Al -Shammari, S. (2014). Corporate governance and audit quality: the case of 
Kuwait (Doctoral dissertation, Bond University). 
 
Al-Saidi, M., & Al-Shammari, B. (2014). Corporate governance in Kuwait: An analysis in 
terms of grounded theory. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 11(2), 128-
160. 
 
Alareeni, B.  & Aljuaidi, O. (2014). The Modified Jones and Yoon Models in Detecting 
Earnings Management in Palestine Exchange (PEX). International Journal of Innovation and 
Applied Studies, 9, 2028-9324. 
 
Albrecht, M. H. (2004). International HRM: Managing diversity in the workplace. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
 195 
 
Alesina, A., & Ferrara, E. L. (2005). Ethnic diversity and economic performance. Journal of 
economic literature, 43(3), 762-800. 
Alhurra, (2016). Kuwait Stops hiring. Evidence from http://www.kuwaitlaborlaw.com/private-
sector-kuwait-labor-law-detailed/, Link access date: 05.01.2020. 
Ali Shah, S. Z., Butt, S. A., & Hassan, A. (2009). Corporate governance and earnings 
management an empirical evidence form Pakistani listed companies. European Journal of 
Scientific Research, 26(4), 624-638.     
Ali, SM, Salleh, NM & Hassan, MS. (2008). Ownership structure and earnings management 
in Malaysian listed companies: the size effect. Asian Journal of Business and Accounting, 1(2), 
89-116.  
Ali, M., Alireza, A. & Jalal, A. (2013). The association between various Earnings and cashflow 
measures of firm performance and stock returns: some Iranian evidence. International Journal 
of accounting and financial reporting, 3(1), 24 – 39. 
 
Ali, M., Ng, Y. L., & Kulik, C. T. (2014). Board age and gender diversity: A test of competing 
linear and curvilinear predictions. Journal of Business Ethics, 125(3), 497-512. 
 
Ali, U., Noor, M., Khurshid, M. K., & Mahmood, A. (2015). Impact of firm size on earnings 
management: A Study of Textile Sector of Pakistan. European Journal of Business and 
Management, 7(28). 
 
Ali, L. M. A. B. (2018). Enforcement in financial regulation: an analysis of mechanisms in 
Kuwait and the UK. the 5th International Annual Conference Research.  
 
Almujamed, H., Tahat, Y., Omran, M., & Dunne, T. (2017). Development of Accounting 
Regulations and Practices in Kuwait: An Analytical Review. Journal of Corporate Accounting 
& Finance, 28(6), 14-28. 
 
Alnufaishan, S., & Alrashidi, A. (2019). Democracy and Education through the Eyes of 
Kuwaiti Politicians: A Phenomenological Study. Education Sciences, 9(1), 60. 
 196 
 
Alotaibi, B. M. (2014). Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in Kuwait (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Bedfordshire). 
 
Alowaihan, A. K. (2004). Gender and business performance of Kuwait small firms: A 
comparative approach. International Journal of Commerce and Management, 14(3/4), 69-82. 
 
Al-Sabah, Y. S. F. (2017). The oil economy of Kuwait. Routledge. 
Alsaeed, K. (2006). The association between firm-specific characteristics and disclosure: The 
case of Saudi Arabia. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(5), 476-496. 
Alsaeed, K . (2006). The association between firm-specific characteristics and disclosure: The 
case of Saudi Arabia’, Journal of American Academy of Business, 7(1), 310−321.  
Alsharairi M and Salama A. (2012). Does High Leverage Impact Earnings Management? 
Evidence from Non-cash Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of Financial and Economic 
Practice, 12(1), 17-33. 
Altaher, N. A., Dyball, M. C., & Evans, E. (2014). A study of the emergence of the Kuwaiti 
Association of Accountants and Auditors. Accounting History, 19(1-2), 255-278.  
 
Al-Wasmi, M. E. (2011). Corporate governance practice in the GCC: Kuwait as a case 
study. (Doctoral dissertation). 
 
Al-Yatama, S. K., AlAli, M. S., AlIbtahim, N. F., & Al Abdulhadi, A. J. (2020). Investors risk 
perception effect on share prices: A case study on Kuwaiti cement companies. 
 
Ammari, A., Kadria, M., & Ellouze, A. (2014). Board Structure and Firm Performance: 
Evidence from French Firms Listed in SBF 120. International Journal Of Economics And 
Financial Issues, 4(3), 580-590. 
 
Amores, S. J. (2014). Environmental innovation and firm performance: A natural  resource-
based view. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 197 
Amran, N. A. (2011). The effect of owner’s gender and age to firm performance: a review on 
Malaysian public listed family businesses. Journal of global business and economics, 2(1), 
104-116. 
 
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding‐family ownership and firm performance: 
evidence from the S&P 500. The journal of finance, 58(3), 1301-1328. 
 
Ararat, M., Aksu, M. H., & Tansel Cetin, A. (2010). The impact of board diversity on boards' 
monitoring intensity and firm performance: evidence from the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
Working paper, 1-33. 
 
Ardi, S., &Murwaningsari, E. (2018). Financial Performance Determination, Earnings Quality, 
Capital and Company Value. South East Asia Journal of Contemporary Business, Economics, 
and Law, 15(5), 1-16. 
Arıoglu, E. (2018). Female Directors and Earnings Management: Director Characteristics, 1-
37. Retractive from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329443984_Female_Directors_and_Earnings_Man
agement_Director_Characteristics/stats, Link access date: 01.10.2019. 
Armstrong, P., & Braedley, S. (2017). Troubling Care: Critical Perspectives on Research  and 
Practices. Toronto, ON: Canadian Scholars’ Press: Toronto. 
Arun, T. G., Almahrog, Y. E. & Aribi, Z. A. (2015). Female directors and earnings 
management: evidence from UK companies. International Review of Financial Analysis, 39, 
137-146.  
Arellano, M. (2003). Panel data econometrics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Ascioglu, A., Hegde, S. P., Krishnan, G. V., & McDermott, J. B. (2012). Earnings management 
and market liquidity. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 38(2), 257-274. 
Ashtiani, A.R. (2005). The study of relationship between accounting ratios and operating cash 
flows, investments financing and stock returns in TSE. Mashhad, Islamic Azad University of 
Mashhad, Iran. 
 198 
 
Athanasakou, V. E., Strong, N. C., Walker, M. (2009). Earnings management or forecast 
guidance to meet analyst expectations? Accounting and Business Research, 39, 3-35.  
 
Azutoru, et al. (2017). Effect of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Financial 
Performance of Insurance Companies in Nigeria. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 5(3), 93-
103. doi: 10.12691/jfa-5-3-4. 
 
Baatour, K., Ben Othman, H., & Hussainey, K. (2017). The effect of multiple directorships on 
real and accrual-based earnings management: Evidence from Saudi listed firms. Accounting 
Research Journal, 30(4), 395-412. 
 
Bachmann, S. D., & Sanden, J. (2013). Eco threats as security threats and the protection of the 
environment during hostilities. Amicus Curiae, (95). 
 
Bahadur, S. (2016). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from 
India. Journal Of Business And Management Research, 1(2), 48-65. doi: 
10.3126/jbmr.v1i2.15663 
 
Baker, M., & Stein, J. C. (2004). Market liquidity as a sentiment indicator. Journal of Financial 
Markets, 7(3), 271-299. 
 
Baltagi, B. H. (1995). Econometric analysis of panel data (Vol. 2). New York: Wiley. 
 
Baltagi, B. H., Bresson, G., & Pirotte, A. (2003). Fixed effects, random effects or Hausman–
Taylor?: A pretest estimator. Economics letters, 79(3), 361-369. 
 
Baltagi, B. (2008). Econometric analysis of panel data. John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2001). Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and common 
stock investment. The quarterly journal of economics, 116(1), 261-292. 
 
Barney, J.B. and Clark, D.N. (2007). Resource-based theory: Creating and sustaining 
competitive advantage. Oxford University Press on Demand, 327. 
 199 
 
Barroso-Castro, C., Villegas-Periñan, M. D. M., & Casillas-Bueno, J. C. (2016). How boards’ 
internal and external social capital interact to affect firm performance. Strategic Organization, 
14(1), 6-31 
 
Barton, J., & Simko, P. J. (2002). The balance sheet as an earnings management constraint. 
The accounting review, 77(s-1), 1-27. 
 
Bassiouny, S. W., Soliman, M. M., & Ragab, A. (2016). The impact of firm characteristics on 
earnings management: an empirical study on the listed firms in Egypt. The Business & 
Management Review, 7(2), 91. 
 
Becker, C. L., DeFond, M. L., Jiambalvo, J., & Subramanyam, K. R. (1998). The effect of audit 
quality on earnings management. Contemporary accounting research, 15(1), 1-24. 
 
Begley, T. M., & Boyd, D. P. (1985). Company and chief executive officer characteristics 
related to financial performance in smaller business. Frontiers of Entrepreneurship 
Research, 2(1), 79-93. 
Bernardi, R. A. and D. F. Arnold. (1997). An Examina- tion of Moral Development within 
Public Accounting by Gender, Staff Level, and Firm. Contemporary Accounting Research 
14(4), 653–668.  
Bertelsen, B. (2011). Everything you need to know about the importance of diversity in the 
workplace. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. BrainMass Incorporated. 
 
Berthome, P., Tixier, R., Briand, J., Geoffroy, O., Babuty, D., Mansourati, J., ... & Guyomarch, 
B. (2019). Clinical presentation and follow-up of women affected by Brugada syndrome. Heart 
rhythm, 16(2), 260-267. 
 
Betz, M., O'Connell, L., & Shepard, J. M. (1989). Gender differences in proclivity for unethical 
behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 8(5), 321-324. 
 
 200 
Bhattacharya, P. S., & Graham, M. (2007). Institutional ownership and firm performance: 
Evidence from Finland. Working paper, 1-33. Available at SSRN 1000092. 
 
Bigelli, M., & Sánchez-Vidal, J. (2012). Cash holdings in private firms. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 36(1), 26-35. 
 
Bilimoria, D., & Piderit, S. K. (1994b). Qualifications of corporate-board committee members. 
Group & Organization Management, 19, 334-362. 
 
Biygautane, M., Hodge, G., & Gerber, P. (2018). The Prospect of Infrastructure Public‐Private 
Partnerships in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar: Transforming Challenges into 
Opportunities. Thunderbird International Business Review, 60(3), 329-346. 
 
Blundell, R., Bond, S., Devereux, M., & Schiantarelli, F. (1992). Investment and Tobin's Q: 
Evidence from company panel data. Journal of Econometrics, 51(1-2), 233-257. 
 
Boguth, O., & Simutin, M. (2018). Leverage constraints and asset prices: Insights from mutual 
fund risk-taking. Journal of Financial Economics, 127(2), 325-341. 
 
Bohren, O., & Strom, R. O. (2010). Governance and politics: Regulating independence and 
diversity in the board room. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 37, 1281-1308.  
 
Booth-Bell, D. (2018). Social capital as a new board diversity rationale for enhanced corporate 
governance. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 18(3), 
425-439.  
 
Boubaker, S., Dang, R., & Nguyen, D. (2014). Does board gender diversity improve the 
performance of French listed firms?. Gestion 2000, 31(1), 259.  
 
Boursa Kuwait. (2020). Kuwait the emerging economic landmark globally recognized and 
upgraded by the world’s leading indices. Retrieved 
from https://www.boursakuwait.com.kw/MSCI/index_en.html, access date; 25.01.2020 
 
 201 
Braam, G., Nandy, M., Weitzel, U., & Lodh, S. (2015). Accrual-based and real earnings 
management and political connections. The International Journal of Accounting, 50(2), 111-
141. 
 
Brush, T. H., Bromiley, P., & Hendrickx, M. (2000). The free cash flow hypothesis for sales 
growth and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 21(4), 455-472. 
 
Burgman, R. J., & Van Clieaf, M. (2012). Total Shareholder Return (TSR) and Management 
Performance: A Performance Metric Appropriately Used, or Mostly Abused?. Rotman 
International Journal of Pension Management, 5(2). 
 
Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and 
losses. Journal of accounting and economics, 24(1), 99-126. 
 
Burton, C. (1991), The Promise and the Price: The Struggle for Equal Opportunity in Women’s 
Employment, Allen & Unwin, North Sydney xiv, 184-222. 
Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D. C., & Schafer, W. D. (1999). Gender differences in risk taking: A 
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 125(3), 367-383. 
Cadbury Committee. (1992). Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance. London, UK: Gee Publishing Ltd. 
 
Callahan, C. N., Libarkin, J. C., McCallum, C. M., & Atchison, C. L. (2015). Using the lens of 
social capital to understand diversity in the earth system sciences workforce. Journal of 
Geoscience Education, 63(2), 98-104. 
 
Capital Standards. (2010). CSR’s Corporate Governance Code – Kuwait, April 2010. Retrieved 
from http://www.capstandards.com/CSR_CG-Code(2).pdf 
 
Capital Markets Authority. (2013). Decision No. (25) of 2013 to the Board of Commissioners 
of the Capital Markets Authority on issuing corporate governance rules subject to the 
supervision of the Capital Markets Authority. Relative from 
 202 
https://www.cma.gov.kw/ar/web/cma/cma-board-releases/-
/cmaboardreleases/detail/320009#, Link access date: 25-03-2019 
 
Capital Market Authority. (2016). Corporate governance. Retrieved from 
https://www.cma.gov.kw/documents/20622/30845/%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%83%D9%85%
D8%A9+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA.pdf/52dab2
bd-44b1-46f3-993a-a1b80a37687d, access date 22.02.2020 
 
Capital Market Authority. (2019). Corporate governance. Retrieved from 
https://www.cma.gov.kw/pdfviewer/?file=/documents/20622/981436/CMA+15+AR+2019+
A96+%26+118+%281%29/cc22b794-5a19-4445-8bc1-c79361124811#page=1&zoom=page-
fit,-22,849, access date 04.03.2020 
 
Cardoso, F. T., Martinez, A. L., & Teixeira, A. J. (2014). Free Cash Flow and Earnings 
Management in Brazil: The Negative Side of Financial Slack. Global Journal of Management 
and Business Research, 14(1), 85-96. 
 
Carnes, C. M., Xu, K., Sirmon, D. G., &Karadag, R. (2019). How Competitive Action Mediates 
the Resource Slack–Performance Relationship: A Meta‐Analytic Approach. Journal of 
Management Studies, 56(1), 57-90. 
 
Carroll, M. C., & Stanfield, J. R. (2003). Social capital, Karl Polanyi, and American social and 
institutional economics. Journal of Economic Issues, 37(2), 397-404.  
 
Carter, D. A., D’souza, F., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2010). The diversity of 
corporate board committees and firm financial performance. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 18, 396–414. 
 
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2003). Corporate governance, board diversity, 
and firm value. Financial review, 38(1), 33-53.  
 
Carter, S., Shaw, E., Lam, W. and Wilson, F. (2007), Gender, entrepreneurship, and bank 
lending: the criteria and processes used by bank loan officers in assessing applications, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 31(3), 427-44.  
 203 
Carter, D., D'Souza, F., Simkins, B., & Simpson, W. (2010). The Gender and Ethnic Diversity 
of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 18(5), 396-414. doi: 10.1111/j.1467 
8683.2010.00809.x 
 
Central Statistical Bureau. (2020). Education Statistics. Retractive from 
https://www.csb.gov.kw/Pages/Statistics_en?ID=58&ParentCatID=70, Date access 
19.03.2020 
 
Chadha, P. (2016). Exploring the financial performance of the listed companies in Kuwait 
Stock Exchange using Altman’s Z-score model’. International Journal of Economics & 
Management Sciences, 5(3), 3-18. 
 
Chandani, S., Mabood, M., & Mahmood, W. (2018). The effect of women director on banks 
performance: Evidence from Pakistan. Independent Journal of Management & 
Production, 9(3), 958-983. 
 
Chapman, C. J. (2017). Dragon Soup and earnings management. Wiesbaden: Springer.  
 
Charfeddine, L., Rabeb, R., & Omri, A. (2013). The Determinants of Earnings Management in 
Developing Countries: A Study in the Tunisian Context. IUP Journal of Corporate 
Governance, 12(1), 35-50. 
 
Chanavat, A., & Ramsden, K. (2013). Mining the metrics of board diversity. Thomson 
Reuters.  
 
Charfeddine, L., Riahi, R., & Omri, A. (2013). The Determinants of Earnings Management in 
Developing Countries: A Study in the Tunisian Context. IUP Journal of Corporate 
Governance, 12(1). 
 
Chavis, L., Klapper, L., & Love, I. (2010). International differences in entrepreneurial 
finance. Age, 1, 2. 
 
 204 
Chbib, I. (2015). An investigation into the Impact of Board Composition and Ownership 
Structure on Corporate Performance: the case of the FTSE All Share Listed 
Companies (Doctoral dissertation, University of Portsmouth). 
 
Cheikh, N. B., Naceur, S.B., Kanaan, O., & Rault, C. (2018). Oil Prices and GCC Stock 
Markets: New Evidence from Smooth Transition Models. IMF Working Papers, 18(98), 2-34. 
 
Chen, T. (2010). Analysis on accrual-based models in detecting earnings 
management. Lingnan Journal of Banking, Finance and Economics, 2(1), 5. 
 
Chen, J., Leung, W., & Goergen, M. (2017). The impact of board gender composition on 
dividend payouts. Journal Of Corporate Finance, 43, 86-105. doi: 
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.01.001 
Chen, K., Elder, R. and Hsieh, Y. (2007). Corporate governance and earnings management: 
the implications of corporate governance best-practice principles for Taiwanese listed 
companies. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 3(2), 73-105.  
Chen, X., Yang, W., & Huang, D. (2010). Corporate life cycle and the accrual model: An 
empirical study based on Chinese listed companies. Frontiers of Business Research in 
China, 4(4), 580-607. 
 
Chisholm, A., & Nielsen, K. (2010). Social Capital and the Resource Based View of the Firm. 
International Studies of Management and Organization, 39(2). 7-32. 
 
Chung, R, Firth M & Kim, J-B. (2002). Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings 
management, Journal of Corporate Finance, 8, 29-48.  
Chung, R & Firth, M & Kim, J. (2005). Earnings management, surplus free cash flow and 
external monitoring’, Journal of business research, 58(6), 766-776.  
Choi, S., & Rainey, H. G. (2010). Managing diversity in U.S. federal agencies: Effects of 
diversity and diversity management on employee perceptions of organizational 
performance. Public Administration Review, 70(1), 109–121.  
 205 
 
Clikeman, P. M., Geiger, M. A., & O'Connell, B. T. (2001). Student perceptions of earnings 
management: the effects of national origin and gender. Teaching Business Ethics, 5(4), 389-
410. 
 
Coffey, B.S. and Wang, J. (1998). Board diversity and managerial control as predictors of 
corporate social performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(14), 1795-1603.  
 
Cohen, D. (2008), Does information risk really matter? An analysis of the determi- nants and 
economic consequences of financial reporting quality, Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & 
Economics, 15(2), 69-90.  
Cohen, D. A., Dey, A., & Lys, T. Z. (2008). Real and accrual-based earnings management in 
the pre-and post-Sarbanes-Oxley periods. The accounting review, 83(3), 757-787.  
 
Cohen, D., Pandit, S., Wasley, C., & Zach, T. (2011). Measuring real activity 
management. Contemporary Accounting Research. 
 
Cohen, D. A., & Zarowin, P. (2010). Accrual-based and real earnings management activities 
around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of accounting and Economics, 50(1), 2-19. 
 
Connolly, R. A., &Hirschey, M. (2005). Firm size and the effect of R&D on Tobin's q. R&d 
Management, 35(2), 217-223. 
 
Cordesman, A. H. (2018). Kuwait: Recovery and security after the Gulf War. Routledge, 6. 
 
Cornforth, C. (2004). The governance of cooperatives and mutual associations: A paradox 
perspective. Annals of public and cooperative economics, 75(1), 11-32. 
Craig, B. R. (2019). The Souk al-Manakh Crash. Economic Commentary. 1-8. DOI: 
10.26509/frbc-ec-201920.  
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic 
literature, 47(2), 448-74. 
 206 
 
Crystal, J. (2016). Kuwait: The transformation of an oil state. Routledge. 
Cupic, M &Todorovic, M. (2011). Total shareholder return-decomposition, internal equivalent, 
and alternatives. Problems of Competitiveness of Contemporary Economies. University of Nis. 
Accessed from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321170733_Total_shareholder_return_-
_decomposition_internal_equivalent_and_alternatives. Link access date: 01.10.2019. 
Cyert, R.M. and March, J.G. (1963). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, 2nd ed., Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 2(4), 169-187.  
Daghsni, O., Zouhayer, M., & Mbarek, K. B. H. (2016). Earnings management and board 
characteristics: evidence from French listed firms. Account and Financial Management 
Journal, 1(2), 92-110. 
Dagsson, S., Larsson, E. (2011). How age diversity on the board of directors affects firm 
performance. MS Thesis, Business Administration, Blekinge Institute of Technology School of 
Management, 1–61.  
Dalton, D.R.,   Daily, C.M., Johnson, J.L., Ellstrand. A.E.  (1999). Number of directors and 
financial performance: a meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 42, 674-686 
Damodaran, A. (2009). Breach of trust: Valuing financial service firms in the post-crisis era, 
Working paper1-33. Relative from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1798578. Link access date: 13-06-2019. 
Darmadi, S. (2011). Board diversity and firm performance: The Indonesian evidence. 
Corporate Ownership and Control. 9(1), 524-539.  
Darmadi, S. (2013). Board members' education and firm performance: evidence from a 
developing economy. International Journal of Commerce and Management, 23(2), 113-135. 
Das, P.K. (2019). Impact of Women Directors on Corporate Financial Performance- Indian 
Context. American Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Research, 3(2), 29-36. 
 207 
Davidson, R., Goodwin-Stewart, J., & Kent, P. (2005). Internal governance structures and 
earnings management. Accounting and Finance, 45, 241–267.  
Davis, S. J., Haltiwanger, J., Handley, K., Jarmin, R. S., Lerner, J., & Miranda, J. (2018). 
Private Equity, Jobs, and Productivity: Reply to Ayash and Rashad. Harvard Business School 
Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper, 18-074. 
 
Dechow, P. M., & Skinner, D. J. (2000). Earnings management: Reconciling the views of 
accounting academics, practitioners, and regulators. Accounting horizons, 14(2), 235-250. 
 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1995). Detecting earnings 
management. Accounting review. 70(2), 193-225. 
DeFond, ML & Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulations of accruals, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, 145-176.  
Degeorge, F., Patel, J., & Zeckhauser, R. (1999). Earnings management to exceed thresholds. 
The Journal of Business, 72(1), 1-33. 
Diepen, N. van. (2015). The effect of gender, age and nationality diversity on company 
performance – Evidence from the Netherlands Supervisors: Evidence From Indonesian 
Publicly- Listed Financial Firms a Thesis Submitted To the University of Canberra for the 
Degree of Doctor of Business Administration. 
Dore, R. (1973). British Factory–Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in 
Industrial Relations. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Drees, J & Heugens, P. (2013). Synthesizing and extending resource dependence theory: A 
meta-analysis. Journal of Management, 39, 1666-1698. 
 
Dreher, A., Gaston, N., & Martens, P. (2008). Measuring globalisation: Gauging its 
consequences. Springer Science & Business Media. New York. 
 
Dubai Women Establishment. (2020). Women on boards. Evidence from 
https://dwe.gov.ae/en/dwe-initiatives/women-boards, access date: 02.04.2020. 
 208 
 
Dunne, P., & Hughes, A. (1994). Age, size, growth and survival: UK companies in the 
1980s. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 42(2), 115-140. 
 
Dutta, P, & Bose, S. (2007). Gender diversity in the boardroom and financial performance of 
commercial banks. Evidence from https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/12015783.pdf, Link access 
date: 25-03-2019. 
 
Dwyer, S., Richard, O. C., & Chadwick, K. (2003). Gender diversity in management and firm 
performance: The influence of growth orientation and organizational culture. Journal of 
Business Research, 56(12), 1009-1019. 
 
Ebrahim, A., & Fattah, T. A. (2015). Corporate governance and initial compliance with IFRS 
in emerging markets: The case of income tax accounting in Egypt. Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 24, 46-60. 
 
Economist Intelligence Unit. (2017). Relative from https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-
438/images/Democracy_Index_2017.pdf, Link access date: 01-10-2019. 
 
Einer, M., & Soderqvist, J. (2016). Earnings Management and female Representation on the 
Board of Directors (Masters). University of Gothenburg. 
 
El, M. (2018). Introduction to earnings management. Springer. Relative from 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=b9sxDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP6&dq=
El,+M.+(2018).+%22Introduction+to+earnings+management.%22+&ots=ShGFYE5eOI&sig
=Uehh-
o78I1iUoE0eVYBhE0RUhe4#v=onepage&q=El%2C%20M.%20(2018).%20%22Introductio
n%20to%20earnings%20management.%22&f=false, Link access date: 01-10.2019. 
El Issawi, F. (2013). Libya media transition: heading to the unknown. POLIS—Media and 
Communications. London School of Economics. 
Elkalla, T. (2017). An empirical investigation of earnings management in the MENA 
region. (Doctoral dissertation, University of the West of England). 
 209 
 
Elsayed, M. A. M. (2020). Preferences of institutional investors: Evidence from the Arab 
region. (Doctoral dissertation, American University in Cairo). 
 
Elshandidy, T., Fraser, I., & Hussainey, K. (2013). Aggregated, voluntary, and mandatory risk 
disclosure incentives: Evidence from UK FTSE all-share companies. International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 30, 320-333. 
 
Enofe, A. O., Iyafekhe, C., & Eniola, J. O. (2017). Board ethnicity, gender diversity and 
earnings management: evidence from quoted firms in Nigeria. International Journal of 
Economics, Commerce and Management, 6, 78-90. 
 
Enomoto, M., Kimura, F., & Yamaguchi, T. (2015). Accrual-based and real earnings 
management: An international comparison for investor protection. Journal of Contemporary 
Accounting & Economics, 11(3), 183-198. 
 
Epstein, M. J. (2018). Making sustainability work: Best practices in managing and measuring 
corporate social, environmental and economic impacts. Routledge. 
Relative from 
http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/20081/Making_sustainability_work_
Best_practices_in.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, Link access date: 01-10-2019. 
 
Erhardt, N. L., Werbel, J. D., & Shrader, C. B. (2003). Board of director diversity and firm 
financial performance. Corporate governance: An international review, 11(2), 102-111. 
 
Erickson, M., & Wong, S. (1999). Earnings management by acquiring firms in stock for stock 
mergers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 25, 149−176 
 
Estélyi, K. S., and Nisar, T. M. (2016). Diverse boards: Why do firms get foreign nationals on 
their boards? Journal of Corporate Finance, 39, 174-192.  
 
Eulerich, M., Velte, P., & van Uum, C. (2014). The impact of management board diversity on 
corporate performance. An empirical analysis for the German two-tier system. An Empirical 
 210 
Analysis for the German Two-Tier System (November 8, 2013). Problems and Perspectives in 
Management (PPM), 12, 25-39. 
 
Fan, Y., Barua, A., Cready, W. M., Thomas, W. (2010). Managing earnings using classification 
shifting: Evidence from quarterly special items. The Accounting Review, 85, 1303-1323.  
 
Ferreira, D. (2015). Board diversity: should we trust research to inform policy?. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 23(2), 108-111. 
 
Ferrero-Ferrero, I., Fernández-Izquierdo, M. Á., & Muñoz-Torres, M. J. (2015). Age diversity: 
An empirical study in the board of directors. Cybernetics and Systems, 46(3-4), 249-270.  
Filatotchev, Igor, Jackson, Gregory, Gospel, Howard and Allcock, Deborah. (2007). Key 
drivers of 'good' corporate governance and the appropriateness of UK policy responses: final 
report. Project Report. The Department of Trade and Industry and King's College London, 
London, UK. Available at SSRN 961369. Retrieved from 
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/473/1/AllcockKey.pdf, Link access date: 01.10.2019. 
Filatotchev, I., & Boyd, B. (2009). Taking Stock of Corporate Governance Research while 
Looking to the Future. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 257- 265.  
 
Filatotchev, I., Jackson, G., & Nakajima, C. (2013). Corporate governance and national 
institutions: A review and emerging research agenda. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
30(4), 965-986. 
 
Firoozi, M., Magnan, M., & Fortin, S. (2016). Board Diversity and Financial Reporting 
Quality, 1-56. Montreal. 
 
Fischer, M., Völckner, F., & Sattler, H. (2010). How important are brands? A cross-category, 
cross-country study. Journal of Marketing Research, 47(5), 823-839. 
Fondas, N. and Sassalos, S. (2000). A different voice in the boardroom: how the presence of 
women directors affects board influence over management, Global Focus, 12(1), 13-22.  
 211 
Francis, J., & Wang, D. (2004). Investor protection, auditor conser- vatism and earnings 
quality: Are Big 4 auditors conservative only in the United States? Working Paper, University 
of Missouri-Columbia.  
Freeman, D. C., (1984). Board diversification strategy; realising competitive advantage and 
shareholder value. Organisational science. 15(3). 
 
Freeman, R. E. (1999). Divergent stakeholder theory. Academy of management 
review, 24(2), 233-236. 
French, J.R.P. and Raven B.H. (1960). The Basis of Social Power. In D. Cartwright and A. 
Zander (eds.), Group Dynamics, Research and Theory (2nd ed.), 607–623. New York: Row, 
Peterson. 
García‐Meca, E., & Sánchez‐Ballesta, J. P. (2009). Corporate governance and earnings 
management: A meta‐analysis. Corporate governance: an international review, 17(5), 594-
610. 
 
García-Meca, E., García-Sánchez, I. M., & Martínez-Ferrero, J. (2015). Board diversity and its 
effects on bank performance: An international analysis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 53, 
202-214. 
 
Gavious, I., Segev, E., & Yosef, R. (2012). Female directors and earnings management in high-
technology firms. Pacific Accounting Review, 24(1), 4-32. 
 
Gerged A., Al-Haddad L., and Al-Hajri M. (2019). Is earnings management associated with 
corporate environmental disclosure? Evidence from Kuwaiti listed firms. Accounting Research 
Journal. DOI: 10.1108/ARJ-05-2018-0082 (In press).  
 
Giannetti, M., G. Liao, and X. Yu. (2015). The Brain Gain of Corporate Boards: Evidence from 
China. The Journal of Finance, 70(4),1629–1682. 
 
Giannetti, M., & Zhao, M. (2019). Board Ancestral Diversity and Firm-Performance 
Volatility. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 54(3), 1117-1155. 
 
 212 
Goel, S. (2012). Demystifying earnings management through accruals management: An Indian 
Corporate Study. Vikalpa, 37(1), 49-56. 
 
Golden, B. R., & Zajac, E. J. (2001). When will boards influence strategy? Inclination × power 
= strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 22, 1087-1111.  
 
Goldstein, I., & Guembel, A. (2008). Manipulation and the allocational role of prices. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 75(1), 133-164. 
 
Gombola, M. J., Ho, A. Y. F., & Huang, C. C. (2016). The effect of leverage and liquidity on 
earnings and capital management: Evidence from US commercial banks. International Review 
of Economics & Finance, 43, 35-58. 
 
Gonzalez, J. A. (2013). Matchmaking: Community and business unit racial/ethnic diversity 
and business unit performance. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 24, 
4063–4081. 
 
González, J. S., & García-Meca, E. (2014). Does corporate governance influence earnings 
management in Latin American markets?. Journal of Business Ethics, 121(3), 419-440. 
 
Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., & Boeker, W. (1994). The effects of board size and diversity on 
strategic change. Strategic management journal, 15(3), 241-250. 
 
Gordini, N., & Rancati, E. (2017). Gender diversity in the Italian boardroom and firm financial 
performance. Management Research Review, 40(1), 75-94. 
 
Gottardo, P., & Moisello, A. M. (2019). Capital Structure, Earnings Management, and Risk of 
Financial Distress: A Comparative Analysis of Family and Non-family Firms. New York: 
Springer. 
 
Guedes, M. J., Gaio, C., & Soares, N. (2018). Exploring the Relationship Between Gender 
Diversity and Earnings Management: Does Critical Mass Matter? In International Conference 
on Gender Research, 181-188. Academic Conferences and publishing limited. 
 
 213 
Guest, P. M. (2019). Does Board Ethnic Diversity Impact Board Monitoring Outcomes?. 
British Journal of Management, 30(1), 53-74. 
 
Gujarati, D. N. (2009). Basic econometrics. Tata McGraw-Hill Education, 591-613. 
 
Gul, F. A., Fung, S. Y. K., & Jaggi, B. (2009). Earnings quality: Some evidence on the role of 
auditor tenure and auditors’ industry expertise. Journal of accounting and Economics, 47(3), 
265-287. 
Gul, F., Srinidhi, B. and Ng, A. (2011). Does board gender diversity improve the in 
formativeness of stock prices? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(3), pp. 314-338. 
Gull, A. A. (2018). Gender-diverse boards and financial statements quality: the role of female 
directors’ attributes (Doctoral dissertation, Université du Maine). 
 
Gull, A. A., Nekhili, M., Nagati, H. & Chtioui, T. (2018). Beyond gender diversity: How 
specific attributes of female directors affect earnings management. The British Accounting 
Review, 50(3), 255-274. 
 
Guna, W. I., & Herawaty, A. (2010). Pengaruh Mekanisme Good Corporate Governance, 
Independensi Auditor, Kualitas Audit dan Faktor Lainnya Terhadap Manajemen Laba. Jurnal 
bisnis dan akuntansi, 12(1), 53-68. 
Habbash M, Sindezingue C, Salama A. (2013). The Effect of Audit Committee Characteristics 
on Earnings Management: Evidence from the United Kingdom. International Journal of 
Disclosure and Governance,10, 13-38. 
Habbash M, Xiao L, Salama A, Dixon R. (2014). Are Independent Directors and Supervisory 
Directors Effective in Constraining Earnings Management?. Journal of Finance, Accounting 
and Management, 5(1), 125-160. 
Hail, L. (2002). The impact of voluntary corporate disclosures on the ex-ante cost of capital 
for Swiss firms, European Accounting Review, 11(4), 741-773.  
 214 
Hambrick, D.C. and Mason, P.A. (1984). Upper echelons: the organization as a reflection of 
its top managers. The Academic of Management Journal, 9(2), 193-206.  
Hamdan, A. M., & Al-Sartawi, A. M. (2013). Corporate governance and institutional 
ownership: Evidence from Kuwait's financial sector. Jordan Journal of Business 
Administration, 153(954), 1-26. 
 
Haque, A., Patnaik, A. K., & Hashmi, S. Z. (2017). Foreign direct investment and growth: A 
study in the context of Kuwait. International Journal of Financial Research, 8(1), 9-15. 
 
Harjoto, M., Laksmana, I. & Lee, R. (2015). Board diversity and corporate social 
responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 132(4), 641–660.  
 
Harrison, D. A., & Klein, K. J. (2007). What's the difference? Diversity constructs as 
separation, variety, or disparity in organizations. Academy of management review, 32(4), 1199-
1228. 
 
Hart, D. M. (2014). Founder nativity, founding team formation, and firm performance in the 
U.S. high-tech sector. International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, 10(1), 1–22. 
 
Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica: Journal of the 
econometric society, 1251-1271. 
 
Healy, P. (1985). The impact of bonus schemes on the selection of accounting principles. 
Journal of Accounting andEconomics,7, 85−107. 
 
Healy, P. M., & Wahlen, J. M. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature and its 
implications for standard setting. Accounting horizons, 13(4), 365-383. 
 
Herb, M. (2002). Emirs and parliaments in the gulf. Journal of Democracy, 13(4), 41-47. 
 
Herdhayinta, H. (2014). The influence of board diversity on financial performance: An 
empirical study of Asia-Pacific companies (Master's thesis, Universitet i Agder/University of 
Agder). 
 215 
Hermalin, B.E., & Weisbach, M.S. (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined 
institution: a survey of the economic literature. FRBNY Economic Policy Review 9, 7–26. 
Hernández-Carrión, C., Camarero-Izquierdo, C., & Gutiérrez-Cillán, J. (2020). The internal 
mechanisms of entrepreneurs’ social capital: A multi-network analysis. BRQ Business 
Research Quarterly, 23(1), 1-19. 
 
Hessels, J., & Terjesen, S. (2010). Resource dependency and institutional theory perspectives 
on direct and indirect export choices. Small business economics, 34(2), 203-220. 
Higgs, D. (2003). Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non- Executive Directors. 
London: Department of trade and Industry/ HMSo. Available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/higgsreport.pdf, Link access date: 01-10-2019. 
Hillman, A. J., Shropshire, C., & Cannella Jr, A. A. (2007). Organizational predictors of 
women on corporate boards. Academy of Management Journal, 50(4), 941-952. 
 
Hillman, A., Cannella, J. & Paetzold, R. (2000). The resource dependent role of corporate 
directors: Strategic adoption of board composition in response to environmental change. 
Journal of Management Studies, 37(2), 235-255.  
 
Hillman, A., Withers, M., & Collins, B. (2009). Resource dependence theory: A review. 
Journal of Management, 35, 1404-1427. 
 
Hinz, R. P., McCarthy, D. D., & Turner, J. A. (1997). Are women conservative investors? 
Gender differences in participant-directed pension investments. Positioning pensions for the 
twenty-first century, 91, 103. 
Hitt, L.M., Wu, D.J. and Zhou, X.G. (2002). Investment in enterprise resource planning: 
business impact and productivity measures. Journal of Management Information Systems, 
19(1), 71-98.  
Ho, L. C. J., Liao, Q., & Taylor, M. (2015). Real and accrual‐based earnings management in 
the pre‐and post‐IFRS periods: Evidence from China. Journal of International Financial 
Management & Accounting, 26(3), 294-335. 
 216 
 
Ho, T., Lim, N., Reza, S., & Xia, X. (2017). OM Forum—Causal Inference Models in 
Operations Management. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 19(4), 509-525. 
doi: 10.1287/msom.2017.0659. 
 
Holmstrom, B., & Tirole, J. (1993). Market liquidity and performance monitoring. Journal of 
Political Economy, 101(4), 678-709. 
 
Holthausen, R. W., Larker, D., & Sloan, R. (1995). Annual bonus schemes and the 
manipulation of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics,19, 29−74. 
 
Hoffman, J. J. (1998). Are women really more ethical than men? Maybe it depends on the 
situation. Journal of Managerial Issues, 10(1), 60-73. 
 
Hoffmann, S., & Rodrigo, P. (2018). Board of Director Gender Diversity and Its Impact on 
Earnings Management: An Empirical Analysis for Selected European Firms, 1-37. 
 
Hooghiemstra, R., Hermes, N., Oxelheim, L., & Randøy, T. (2016). The impact of board 
internationalization on earnings management. Working Paper Series 1096, Research Institute 
of Industrial Economics. 
 
Huang, K., Lao, B., & McPhee, G. (2017). Does Stock Liquidity Affect Accrual‐based 
Earnings Management?. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 44(3-4), 417-447. 
 
Hughes, P., Hodgkinson, I. R., Elliott, K., & Hughes, M. (2018). Strategy, operations, and 
profitability: the role of resource orchestration. International Journal of Operations & 
Production Management, 38(4), 1125-1143. 
 
Idris, M., Siam, Y. A., & Nassar, M. (2018). Board independence, earnings management and 
the moderating effect of family ownership in Jordan. Management & Marketing, 13(2), 985-
994. 
 
 217 
International Federation of Accountants. (2019) Legal and mandatory environment in Kuwait. 
Retrieved from https://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/membership/country/kuwait, access date; 10-
02.2020. 
 
Ionascu, M., Ionascu, I., Sacarin, M., & Minu, M. (2018). Women on Boards and Financial 
Performance: Evidence from a European Emerging Market. Sustainability, 10(5), 1644.  
 
Isa, M. A., & Farouk, M. A. (2018). A study of the effect of diversity in the board and the audit 
committee composition on earnings management for low and high leveraged banks in 
Nigeria. Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies, 4(1), 14-39. 
 
Islam, M. A., Ali, R., & Ahmad, Z. (2011). Is modified Jones model effective in detecting 
earnings management? Evidence from a developing economy. International Journal of 
Economics and Finance, 3(2), 116-125. 
 
Issa, A, Fang, H. X., & Elfeky, M. I. (2018). The Impact of Board Gender Diversity on Firm 
Value: Evidence from Kuwait. Working paper, 1-16. 
 
Ittonen, K., Vähämaa, E., & Vähämaa, S. (2013). Female auditors and accruals 
quality. Accounting Horizons, 27(2), 205-228. 
 
Jackson, A. B. (2018). Discretionary Accruals: Earnings Management... or 
Not?. Abacus, 54(2), 136-153. 
 
Jadiyappa, N., Jyothi, P., Sireesha, B., & Hickman, L. E. E. (2019). CEO Gender, Firm 
Performance and Agency Costs: Evidence from India. Journal of Economic Studies, (just 
accepted). 
 
Jafaar, A. H., Juma, M. Y., Habib, J. M., & Al-Sartawi, A. M. M. (2019). Bahraini Women's 
Voices in the Boardroom: The Effect of Gender Diversity on Firm Performance. In Handbook 
of Research on Women in Management and the Global Labor Market, 336-350. IGI Global. 
 
 218 
Jaggi, B., Leung, S., & Gul, F. (2009). Family control, board independence and earnings 
management: Evidence based on Hong Kong firms. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 28(4), 281-300. 
 
Jia, Y. P., & Liu, R. Z. (2012). Study of the energy and environmental efficiency of the Chinese 
economy based on a DEA model. Procedia Environmental Sciences, 13, 2256-2263. 
Jiang, W, Lee, P & Anandarajan, A. (2008), The association between corporate governance 
and earnings quality: Further evidence using the GOV-score, Advances in Accounting 
incorporating Advances in International Accounting, 24, 191-201.  
Jiraporn, P., Kim, Y. S., & Davidson III, W. N. (2008). Multiple directorships and corporate 
diversification. Journal of Empirical Finance, 15(3), 418-435. 
 
Jiraporn, P., Miller, G. A., Yoon, S. S., & Kim, Y. S. (2008). Is earnings management 
opportunistic or beneficial? An agency theory perspective. International Review of Financial 
Analysis, 17(3), 622-634. 
 
Joecks, J., Pull, K., & Vetter, K. (2013). Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm 
performance: What exactly constitutes a “critical mass?”. Journal of business ethics, 118(1), 
61-72. 
 
John, K., Makhija, A., & Ferris, S. (2019). International corporate governance and regulation, 
27-31. Bingley, UK: Emerald. 
 
Johnson, S. G., Schnatterly, K., & Hill, A. D. (2013). Board composition beyond independence: 
Social capital, human capital, and demographics. Journal of management, 39(1), 232-262.  
 
Jones, K., Krishnan, V., & Melendrez, D. (2007). Do models of discretionary accruals detect 
actual cases of fraud. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(2), 499-531. 
Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of 
accounting research, 29(2), 193-228. 
 
Joyce, M. (2014). Kuwait, 1945-1996: An Anglo-American Perspective. Routledge.  
 219 
 
Judge, W. Q., Douglas, T. J., & Kutan, A. M. (2008). Institutional antecedents of corporate 
governance legitimacy. Journal of Management, 34(4), 765-785. 
 
Julizaerma, M. K., & Sori, Z. M. (2012). Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm 
performance of Malaysian public listed companies. Procedia-Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, 65, 1077-1085. 
 
Jurkus, A. F., Park, J. C., & Woodard, L. S. (2011). Women in top management and agency 
costs. Journal of Business Research, 64(2), 180-186. 
 
Kaczmarek, S. (2009). Nationality, international experience diversity and firm 
internationalisation: The implications for performance. University of St. Gallen, Business 
Dissertations, (3629), 1–217. 
 
Kadioglu, E., Kilic, S., & Yilmaz, E. A. (2017). Testing the relationship between free cash flow 
and company performance in Borsa Istanbul. International Business Research, 10(5), 148-158. 
 
Kamarudin, K. A., Ismail, W. A. W., & Samsuddin, M. E. (2012). The influence of CEO duality 
on the relationship between audit committee independence and earnings quality. Procedia-
Social and Behavioral Sciences, 65, 919-924. 
Kao, L., & Chen, A. (2004). The effects of board characteristics on earnings management. 
Corporate Ownership & Control, 1(3), 96–107.  
Kaplan, S., Pany, K., Samuels, J., & Zhang, J. (2009). An examination of the association 
between gender and reporting intentions for fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 87(1), 15e30.  
Karandikar, S., Kapoor, H., Fernandes, S., & Jonason, P. K. (2019). Predicting moral decision-
making with dark personalities and moral values. Personality and Individual Differences, 140, 
70-75. 
 
Kasanen, E., Kinnunen, J., & Niskanen, J. (1996). Dividend-based earnings management: 
Empirical evidence from Finland. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22(1-3), 283-312. 
 220 
 
Khadafi, M., Heikal, M., & Ummah, A. (2014). Influence analysis of return on assets (ROA), 
return on equity (ROE), net profit margin (NPM), debt to equity ratio (DER), and current ratio 
(CR), against corporate profit growth in automotive in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social 
Sciences, 4(12). 
 
Khaleej Times. (2017). More women to get board positions in UAE firms. Available at 
https://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/more-women-to-get-board-positions-in-uae-firms, Link 
access date: 24-09-2019. 
 
Khalil, M., & Ozkan, A. (2016). Board independence, audit quality and earnings management: 
evidence from Egypt. Journal of Emerging Market Finance, 15(1), 84-118. 
 
Khan, H. (2011). A Literature Review of Corporate Governance. International Conference on 
E-business, Management and Economics, 1-5. Singapore: IACSIT Press. 
 
Khanna, N., & Sonti, R. (2004). Value creating stock manipulation: feedback effect of stock 
prices on firm value. Journal of financial markets, 7(3), 237-270. 
 
Khanh, H. T. M., & Nguyen, V. K. (2018). Audit quality, firm characteristics and real earnings 
management: The case of listed vietnamese firms. International Journal of Economics and 
Financial Issues, 8(4), 243. 
 
Khamis, R., Elali, W., & Hamdan, A. (2015). The effect of dividends and institutional 
ownership on performance of companies listed in Bahrain stock exchange. Jordan Journal of 
Business Administration, 11(4), 921-941. 
Khoury, T., Junkunc, M. and Deeds, D. (2013). The social construction of legitimacy through 
signaling social capital: exploring the conditional value of alliances and underwriters at IPO, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 37(3), 569-601.  
Kim, J. B., Chung, R., & Firth, M. (2003). Auditor conservatism, asymmetric monitoring, and 
earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research, 20(2), 323-359. 
 221 
Kim, Y., Liu, C., Rhee, S.G. (2003), The effect of firm size on earnings management. Journal 
College of Business Administration University of Hawai, 6, 1-30. 
Kim, Y. (2005). Board network characteristics and firm performance in Korea. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 13(6), 800-808.  
 
Kim, N.B. & Yi, C.H. (2006). Ownership structure, business group affiliation, listing status, 
and earnings management: Evidence from Korea. Contemporary Accounting Research, 23, 
427-464. 
 
Kim, Y., & Cannella Jr, A. A. (2008). Toward a social capital theory of director selection. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16(4), 282-293.  
Kim, H., & Lim, C. (2010). Diversity, outsider directors’ and firm valuation: Korean evidence. 
Journal of Business Research, 63, 284-291. 
Kim, S., & Jung, D. (2020). CSR and Accounting Transparency: Comparison with Korean 
Chaebol. Review of Integrative Business and Economics Research, 9(2), 1-23. 
 
Kinninmont, J. (2012). Kuwait's Parliament: An Experiment in Semi-democracy. London, 
England: Chatham House. 
 
Kirkpatrick, G. (2009). The corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis. OECD 
Journal: Financial Market Trends, (1), 61-87. 
Klein, A. (2002). Audit Committee, Board of Directors’ Characteristics, and Earnings 
Management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 375-400. 
Kolbjørnsrud, V. (2017). Agency problems and governance mechanisms in collaborative 
communities. Strategic Organization, 15(2): 141-173. 
 
Koshy, N. J. (2016). Patent filing strategies: perspectives from the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf. Pharmaceutical patent analyst, 5(4), 217-226. 
 
 222 
Kostopoulos, K. C., Spanos, Y. E., & Prastacos, G. P. (2002). The resource-based view of the 
firm and innovation: identification of critical linkages. In The 2nd European Academy of 
Management Conference, 1-19. 
 
Kostova, T., & Roth, K. (2003). Social capital in multinational corporations and a micro-macro 
model of its formation. Academy of Management Review, 28(2), 297-317.  
 
Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J., & Wasley, C. E. (2005). Performance matched discretionary 
accrual measures. Journal of accounting and economics, 39(1), 163-197. 
 
Kothari, S. P., Mizik, N., & Roychowdhury, S. (2012). Managing for the moment: The role of 
real activity versus accruals earnings management in SEO valuation. Working paper. 
 
Kouaib, A. and Jarboui, A. (2014). External audit quality and ownership structure: interaction 
and impact on earnings management of industrial and commercial Tunisian sectors, Journal of 
Economics, Finance and Administrative Science, 19(37), 78–89.  
 
Krishnan, G. V., & Parsons, L. M. (2008). Getting to the bottom line: An exploration of gender 
and earnings quality. Journal of Business Ethics, 78(1-2), 65-76. 
 
Kunze, F., Boehm, S. A., & Bruch, H. (2011). Age diversity, age discrimination climate and 
performance consequences—a cross organizational study. Journal of organizational 
behavior, 32(2), 264-290. 
 
Kunze, F., Boehm, S., & Bruch, H. (2013). Age, resistance to change, and job 
performance. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 28(7/8), 741-760. 
Kunze, F., Boehm, S., & Bruch, H. (2013). Organizational performance consequences of age 
diversity: Inspecting the role of diversity‐friendly HR policies and top managers’ negative age 
stereotypes. Journal of Management Studies, 50(3), 413-442. 
Kyaw, K., Olugbode, M. & Petracci, B., (2015). Does gender diverse board mean less earnings 
management? Finance Research Letters, 14, 135-141.  
 223 
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2000). Agency problems 
and dividend policies around the world. The journal of finance, 55(1), 1-33. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002). Investor Protection and 
Corporate Valuation. Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1147-1170.  
 
Labelle, R., Francoeur, C. & Lakhal, F. (2015). To Regulate Or Not To Regulate? Early 
Evidence on the Means Used Around the World to Promote Gender Diversity in the 
Boardroom. Gender, Work and Organization, 22(4), 339-363. 
Labelle, R., Gargouri, R. M. & Francoeur, C. (2010). Ethics, diversity management, and 
financial reporting quality. Journal of Business Ethics, 93(2), 335-353.  
Lakhal, F., Aguir, A., Lakhal, N., & Malek, A. (2015). Do women on boards and in top 
management reduce earnings management? Evidence in France. Journal of Applied Business 
Research, 31(3), 1107. 
Langenstein, T., Uzik, M., &Glova, J. (2018). Influence of managerial decisions to invest in 
innovations on the stock market performance: an empirical analysis. Polish Journal of 
Management Studies, 18. 
 
Lausten, M. (2002). CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: empirical 
evidence on Danish firms. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(3), 391-414. 
 
Lee, C. W. J., Li, L. Y., & Yue, H. (2006). Performance, growth and earnings management. 
Review of Accounting Studies, 11(2-3), 305-334. 
 
Lee, J. (2009). Does size matter in firm performance? Evidence from US public 
firms. international Journal of the economics of Business, 16(2), 189-203. 
Li, Xiaoyang, Low, Angie, Makhija, Anil K. (2011). Career concerns and the busy life of the 
young CEO. Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center For Research in Financial 
Economics Working Paper No. 2011–4.  
 224 
Liao, L., Luo, L., & Tang, Q. (2015). Gender diversity, board independence, environmental 
committee, and greenhouse gas disclosure. The British Accounting Review, 47(4), 409-424.  
 
Lin, B., & Luan, R. (2020). Do government subsidies promote efficiency in technological 
innovation of China's photovoltaic enterprises?. Journal of Cleaner Production, 120108. 
Lin, N., Vaughn, J.C. and Ensel, W. (1981), Social resources and occupational status 
attainment, Social Forces, 59(4), 1163-1181.  
Lin, N. (2002). Social capital: A theory of social structure and action, 19. Cambridge: 
Cambridge university press.  
 
Lindenberg, E. B., & Ross, S. A. (1981). Tobin's q ratio and industrial organization. Journal of 
Business, 1-32. 
Liu, J., Shively, G. E., & Binkley, J. K. (2014). Access to variety contributes to dietary diversity 
in China. Food Policy, 49, 323-331. 
Liu, Q. M., Lee, C. C., & Zhang, R. (2018). Economic Policy Uncertainty and Firms’ Cash 
Dividend Policies. In 2018 3rd International Conference on Education, E-learning and 
Management Technology (EEMT 2018). Atlantis Press. 
 
Liu, X., Vredenburg, H., & Steel, P. (2019). Exploring the Mechanisms of Corporate 
Reputation and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis. Academy of Management, 2019(1), 
p. 17903. 
 
Longva, A. N. (2019). Walls built on sand: Migration, exclusion, and society in Kuwait. 
Routledge. 
Low, D.C.M., Roberts, H., and Whiting, R.H. (2015). Board gender diversity and firm 
performance: Empirical evidence from Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore. 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 35, 381-401.  
Lückerath-Rovers, M. (2013). Women on boards and firm performance. Journal of 
Management and Governance, 17, 491–509. 
 225 
 
Mabogunje, A. L., & Kates, R. W. (2020). Sustainable development in Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria: The 
role of social capital, participation, and science and technology. CID Working Paper Series. 
 
Mahr, F. (2010). Aligning information technology, organization, and strategy: Effects on firm 
performance. Wiesbaden: Gabler. 
 
Makhlouf, M. H., Laili, N. H. B., Basah, M. Y. A., & Siam, Y. I. S. A. (2015). Board Members’ 
age, Gender Diversity and Firm Performance, Proposing Conceptual Framework. Kuala 
Lumpur International Business, Economics and Law Conference (KLIBEL6), Kuala Lumpur.  
 
Marinova, J., Plantenga, J., & Remery, C. (2015). Gender diversity and firm performance: 
evidence from Dutch and Danish boardrooms. The International Journal Of Human Resource 
Management, 27(15), 1777-1790. doi: 10.1080/09585192.2015.1079229 
 
Martín‐Ugedo, J. F. & Mínguez‐Vera, A. (2014). Firm performance and women on the board: 
Evidence from Spanish small and medium‐sized enterprises, Feminist Economics, 20(3), 136–
162. 
 
Matsumoto, D. A. (2002). Management's incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. The 
Accounting Review, 77(3), 483-514. 
 
Matthiesen, T. (2014). Mysticism, Migration, and Clerical Networks: Ahmad al-Ahsaʾi and the 
Shaykhis of al-Ahsa, Kuwait, and Basra. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 34(4), 386-409. 
 
McVay, S. (2006). Earnings management using classification shifting: An examination of core 
earnings and special items. The Accounting Review, 81, 501-531.  
 
Meek, G. K., Roberts, C. B., & Gray, S. J. (2007). Factors influencing voluntary annual 
report  disclosures by US, UK and continental European multinational corporations. Journal 
of international business studies, 26(3), 555-572. 
 
 226 
Miller, T., & del Carmen Triana, M. (2009). Demographic diversity in the boardroom: 
Mediators of the board diversity–firm performance relationship. Journal of Management 
studies, 46(5), 755-786.  
 
Mohd., N.S., Iskandar, T.M. and Rahmat, M.M. (2005). Earnings management and board 
characteristics: Evidence from Malaysia. Journal of Pengurusan, 24, 77-103. 
 
Mohammad, W. M. W., Wasiuzzaman, S., & Zaini, R. M. (2011). Panel data analysis of the 
relationship between earnings management, bank risks, loan loss provision and dividend per 
share. Journal of Business and Policy Research, 6(1), 46-56. 
Moses, O. D. (1987). Income Smoothing and Incentives: Empirical Tests Using Accounting 
Changes. The Accounting Review, 4, 358-377. 
Mujahid, M., & Akhtar, K. (2014). Impact of capital structure on firms’ financial performance 
and shareholders wealth: Textile Sector of Pakistan. International Journal of Learning & 
Development, 4(2), 27-33. 
 
Musyoka, A. M., Ramki, S., Kimenju, G. N., Ithibu, A. W., Simiyu, S. N., Imalingat, S., ... & 
Kimathi, O. M. (2015). The effect of board structure on earnings management of companies 
listed at the nairobi securities exchange (Doctoral dissertation, Doctoral Dissertation, School 
Of Business, University Of Nairobi). 
 
Na, K., & Hong, J. (2017). CEO gender and earnings management. Journal of Applied Business 
Research, 33(2), 297. 
Nakano, M., & Nguyen, P. (2011). Do older boards affect firm performance? An empirical 
analysis based on Japanese firms. Working paper. Retrieved from 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1879825, Link access date: 01.10.2019. 
Neill, J.D. & Pourciau, S.G. & Schaefer, T.F. (1995). Accounting method choice and IPO 
valuation. Accounting Horizons, 9, 68-80. 
 
 227 
Nekhili, M., Amar, I. F. B., Chtioui, T., & Lakhal, F. (2016). Free cash flow and earnings 
management: The moderating role of governance and ownership. The Journal of Applied 
Business Research, 32(1), 255-268. 
 
NEVCO Education & Kanopy. (2017). Cultural Diversity in the Workplace. Washington: 
Springer.  
 
New Kuwait. (2020). New Kuwait. Retrieved from http://www.newkuwait.gov.kw, Link 
access date: 01.10.2019. 
 
Nwanyanwu, L. (2015). Cash flow and Organizational performance in Nigeria: Hospitality and 
Print media industries perspectives. European Journal of Business, Economics and 
Accounting, 3(3), 66-70. 
 
Nyoka, O. (2018). Effect of board diversity on earnings management in listed manufacturing 
and allied companies in Kenya. Master dissertation, University of Nairobi, Kenya. 
 
Nzulwa, J. D., & Wagana, D. M. (2017). Corporate governance, board gender diversity and 
corporate performance: A critical review of literature. European Scientific Journal, 12(7), 221-
223. 
 
Obigbemi, I. F., Omolehinwa, E. O., Mukoro, D. O., Ben-Caleb, E., & Olusanmi, O. A. (2016). 
Earnings management and board structure: evidence from Nigeria. Sage Open, 6(3), 
2158244016667992. 
 
Odine, M. (2013). Role of social media in the empowerment of Arab women. Global Media 
Journal, 12(22), 1-30. 
 
OECD, O. (2004). The OECD principles of corporate governance. Contaduría y 
Administración, 216. 
 
Oegema, S. (2017). The Impact of Gender Diversity and Culture on Earnings Management. 
Retrieved from https://orgtheory.wordpress.com/2011/08/03/what-happened-to-resource-
dependence-theory/, Link access date: 01.10.2019. 
 228 
Ogbonnaya, A. K., Ekwe, M. C. and Uzoma, I. J. (2016). Relationship of cash flow ratios and 
financial performance of listed banks in emerging economies – Nigeria example. European 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance Research, 4(4), 89-97. 
 
Omar, A., & Davidson, M. J. (2001). Women in management: a comparative cross-cultural 
overview. Cross Cultural Management: An International Journal, 8(3/4), 35-67.  
 
Omoye, A. S., & Eriki, P. O. (2014). Corporate governance Determinants of earnings 
management: Evidence from Nigerian quoted companies. Mediterranean Journal of Social 
Sciences, 5(23), 553. 
 
Ooi, C. A., Hooy, C. W., & Mat Som, A. P. (2017). The influence of board diversity in human 
capital and social capital in crisis. Managerial Finance, 43(6), 700-719.  
 
Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R., Williamson, R. (1999). The determinants and implications 
of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 52, 3–46. 
 
Orlitzky, M., Schmidt, F. L., &Rynes, S. L. (2003). Corporate social and financial 
performance: A meta-analysis. Organization Studies, 24(3), 403-441. 
 
Osma, B. G., & Noguer, B. G. D. A. (2007). The effect of the board composition and its 
monitoring committees on earnings management: Evidence from Spain. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 15(6), 1413-1428.  
 
Oxelheim, L., & Randoy, T. (2003). The impact of foreign board membership on firm value. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 27, 2369-2392.   
 
Palmer, D. and Barber, B.M. (2001). Challengers, elites, and owning families: a social class 
theory of corporate acquisitions in the 1960s, Administrative Science Quarterly, 46(87), 120.  
 
Panda, B. & Leepsa, N. M. (2017). Agency theory: Review of Theory and Evidence on 
Problems and Perspectives. Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, 10(1), 74–95. 
 
 229 
Park, Y. W., & Shin, H. H. (2004). Board composition and earnings management in 
Canada. Journal of corporate Finance, 10(3), 431-457. 
 
Parker, J. (2016). A Report into the Ethnic Diversity of UK Boards. The Parker Review 
Committee, 56.  
Peasnell, KV, Pope, PF & Young, S. (2000). Accrual management to meet earnings targets: 
UK evidence pre- and post-Cadbury, British Accounting Review, vol.32, pp415-445.  
Peasnell, K. Pope, P. & Young, S. (2000). Detecting Earnings Management using Cross-
Sectional Abnormal Accruals Models, Accounting and Business Research, 30(4), 313-326. 
 
Peck-Ling, T., Nai-Chiek, A. and Chee-Seong, L. (2016). Foreign ownership, foreign directors 
and profitability of Malaysian listed companies. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 
219, 580-588.  
 
Peni, E. & Vähämaa, S. (2010). Female executives and earnings management. Managerial 
Finance, 36(7), 629-645. 
 
Peters, K., Smith, R. R., & Thomas, H. (2018). Rethinking the Business Models of Business 
Schools: A Critical Review and Change Agenda for the Future. Emerald Publishing Limited. 
ISBN: 978-1-78754-875-6. Available at: 
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/978-1-78754-874-
920181011/full/pdf?title=prelims, Link access date: 01.10.2019. 
 
Peterson, M. A. (2011). Connected in Cairo: Growing up cosmopolitan in the modern Middle 
East. Indiana University Press. 
 
Petersson, C., & Wallin, F. (2017). Three Types of Age Diversity in Boards of Directors and 
the Relationship to Firm Performance. Uppsala University. Available at: https://uu.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1111350/FULLTEXT01.pdf, link access date: 01.10.2019. 
 
Pfeffer, J. (1982). Organizations and organization theory. Marshfield, MA, Pitman. 
 
 230 
Pfeffer, J. & Salancik, G. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence 
perspective. Herper & Row, New York.  
 
Piskin, A., & Kamali, A. (2020). The Financial Performance-Corporate Reputation Nexus in 
Turkey in the Institutional Theory Context. Doğuş Üniversitesi Dergisi, 21(1), 117-132. 
 
Pitts, David W. (2005). Diversity, Representation, and Performance: Evidence about Race and 
Ethnicity in Public Organizations. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory. 15(4), 615–631. 
 
Polovina, N. & Peasnell, K. (2015). The Effects of Foreign Management and Board 
Membership on the Performance of Foreign Acquired Turkish Banks. International Journal of 
Managerial Finance, 17(43), 32-40.  
Portes, A. (1998). Social capital: its origins and applications in modern sociology, Annual 
Review of Sociology, 24(1), 1-24.  
Portes, A., & Landolt, P. (2000). Social capital: promise and pitfalls of its role in 
development. Journal of Latin American Studies, 32(2), 529-547.  
 
Post, C., Rahman, N., & Rubow, E. (2011). Green governance: Boards of directors’ 
composition and environmental corporate social responsibility. Business & Society, 50, 189-
223. 
Powell, M., & Ansic, D. (1997). Gender differences in risk behaviour in financial decision-
making: An experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Psychology, 18(6), 605e628. 
Pouraghajan, A., Malekian, E., Emamgholipour, M., Lotfollahpour, V., & Bagheri, M. M. 
(2012). The relationship between capital structure and firm performance evaluation measures: 
Evidence from the Tehran Stock Exchange. International journal of Business and 
Commerce, 1(9), 166-181. 
 
Prencipe, A., Markarian, G., & Pozza, L. (2008). Earnings management in family firms: 
Evidence from R&D cost capitalization in Italy. Family Business Review, 21(1), 71-88. 
 
 231 
Pucheta-Martínez, M. C., & Gallego-Álvarez, I. (2019). Do board characteristics drive firm 
performance? An international perspective. Review of Managerial Science, 1-47. 
Rahman, H. U., Ibrahim, M. Y., & Ahmad, A. C. (2015). Corporate governance, firm financial 
performance, and shareholder’s confidence: A proposed analysis of MCCG 2012. Global 
Business and Management Research: An International Journal, 7(1), 139-147. 
Rahman, H. (2018). The Impact of Boardroom National Diversity on Firms Performance and 
Boards Monitoring in Emerging Markets: A Case of Malaysia. International Journal of 
Managerial Science, 8(6), 13-18. 
 
Ramaswamy, K., & Li, M. (2001). Foreign investors, foreign directors and corporate 
diversification: an empirical examination of large manufacturing companies in India. Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management, 18(2), 207-222. 
 
Ratnawati, V., Abdul-Hamid, M. A. & Popoola, O. M.J. (2016). The Influence of Agency 
Conflict Types I and II on Earnings Management. International Journal of Economics and 
Financial Issues, 6(S4), 126-131. 
 
Rauf, F. H. A., Johari, N. H., Buniamin, S., & Rahman, N. R. A. (2012). The impact of 
company and board characteristics on earnings management: Evidence from Malaysia. Global 
Review of Accounting and Finance, 3(2), 114-127. 
 
Raut, S. (2018). Corporate Governance – Concepts and Issues. Retrieved from Institute of 
Directors: 
http://www.iodonline.com/Articles/Corporate%20Governance%20and%20Sustainability%20
Concepts%20Sreeti%20Raut.pdf, Link access date: 24-09-2019. 
 
Reguera-Alvarado, N., de Fuentes, P., & Laffarga, J. (2017). Does Board Gender Diversity 
Influence Financial Performance? Evidence from Spain. Journal Of Business Ethics, 141(2), 
337-350.  
 
Riahi, Y., Lamiri, I., & Arab, M. B. (2013). The impact of earnings management on liquidity: 
case of the Tunisian stock market. Journal of Finance & Economics, 1(4), 10-29. 
 232 
 
Riley, W.B. & Chow, K.V. (1992). Asset allocation and individual risk aversion. Financial 
Analyst Journal, 48, 32-7. 
 
Robbiano, M. (2019). Different approaches toward gender diversity in European boards: a 
comparison between Germany, Italy and United Kingdom (Doctoral dissertation). 
 
Ronen, J., & Yaari, V. (2011). Earnings management: Emerging insights in theory, practice, 
and research. New York: Springer. 
 
Rose, C. (2007). Does female board representation influence firm performance? The Danish 
evidence. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2), 404-413. 
 
Rowley, T. J., Shipilov, A. V., & Greve, H. R. (2017). Board reform versus profits: The impact 
of ratings on the adoption of governance practices. Strategic Management Journal, 38(4), 815-
833. 
 
Roychowdhury, S. (2006). Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal 
of accounting and economics, 42(3), 335-370. 
 
Sadeghi, M. (2011). Investment opportunities and stock liquidity: evidence from DJIM index 
additions in the Persian Gulf states. Investment, Management, and Financial Innovations, 8(1), 
53-62. 
 
Saito, T. (2008). Family firms and firm performance: Evidence from Japan. Journal of the 
Japanese and International Economies, 22(4), 620-646. 
 
Samphantharak, K., & Townsend, R. M. (2010). Households as corporate firms: an analysis of 
household finance using integrated household surveys and corporate financial accounting, 46. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sanda, A. U., Garba, T. and Mikailu, A.S. (2008). Board independence and financial 
performance: evidence from Nigeria. Paper presented at the Centre for the Study of African 
Economics at St Catherine’s College, University of Oxford. (pp. 1-18). Retrieved from 
 233 
https://www.africaportal.org/publications/board-independence-and-firm-financial-
performance-evidence-from-nigeria, Link access date: 02-03-2020. 
 
Sanad, J. A., & Tessler, M. A. (1988). The Economic Orientations of Kuwaiti Women: Their 
nature, Determinats, And Consequences. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 20(4), 
443-468. 
 
Santiago, A., Pandey, S., & Manalac, M. T. (2019). Family presence, family firm reputation 
and perceived financial performance: Empirical evidence from the Philippines. Journal of 
Family Business Strategy, 10(1), 49-56. 
 
Sarin, N., & Summers, L. H. (2018). On Market-Based Approaches to the Valuation of 
Capital. Retrieved from 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nsarin/files/sarin_summers_on_market_based_march_2018.p
df, link access date: 01.10.2019. 
 
Schimmer, M. (2012). Competitive dynamics in the global insurance industry: Strategic 
groups, competitive moves, and firm performance. Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler. 
 
Schmidt, I. M. (2019). Board Gender Diversity and Firm performance: How do Educational 
Levels and Board Gender Quotas affect this Relationship? Evidence from Europe. University 
of Groningen, 1-42. Retrieved from http://www.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1289104/FULLTEXT02, link access date: 01.10.2019. 
 
Scholtens, B., & Kang, F. C. (2013). Corporate social responsibility and earnings management: 
Evidence from Asian economies. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Management, 20(2), 95-112. 
 
Schultz, E., Tan, D., & Walsh, K. (2010). Endogeneity and the corporate governance - 
performance relation. Australian Journal Of Management, 35(2), 145-163. 
 
Sealy, R. & Vinnicombe. (2007). The female FTSE report 2007. Cranfield University, 52.  
 
 234 
Seibert, S. E., Kraimer, M. L., & Liden, R. C. (2001). A social capital theory of career 
success. Academy of management journal, 44(2), 219-237.  
 
Shehata, N., Salhin, A. & El-Helaly, M. (2017). Board diversity and firm performance: 
evidence from the UK SMEs. Applied Economics, 49(48), 4817-4832. 
 
Short, H. and Keasey, K. (1999). Managerial ownership and the performance of firm: evidence 
from the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5(1), 79‐101. 
 
Shu, P. G., Yeh, Y. H., Chiu, S. B., & Yang, Y. W. (2015). Board external connectedness and 
earnings management. Asia Pacific Management Review, 20(4), 265–274.  
 
Shuaibu, H. (2018). Impact of Board Characteristic on Earning Management. Presentation, 
Kaduna. Working paper. Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327106390_Impact_of_Board_Characteristic_on_E
arning_Management, link access dtate:01.10.2019. 
 
Singh, S., Tabassum, N., Darwish, T. K., & Batsakis, G. (2018). Corporate governance and 
Tobin's Q as a measure of organizational performance. British Journal of Management, 29(1), 
171-190. 
 
Singh, V. (2007). Ethnic diversity on top corporate boards: a resource dependency 
perspective. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 18(12), 2128-2146.  
 
Solakoglu, M., & Demir, N. (2016). The role of firm characteristics on the relationship between 
gender diversity and firm performance. Management Decision, 54(6), 1407-1419. doi: 
10.1108/md-02-2015-0075 
 
Solomon, J. (2007). Corporate Governance and Accountability, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, West 
Sussex, 143. 
 
Spierdijka, L., & Zaourasa, M. (2018). Measuring banks’ market power in the presence of 
economies of scale: A scale-corrected Lerner index. Journal of Banking & Finance, 87,  40-
48. 
 235 
Srivastava, A. (2019). Improving the measures of real earnings management. Review of 
Accounting Studies, 24(4), 1277-1316. 
 
Srinidhi, B., Gul, F. A. & Tsui, J. (2011). Female directors and earnings quality. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 28(5), 1610-1644.  
 
Stephenson, C. (2004). Leveraging diversity to maximum advantage: The business case for 
appointing more women to boards. Ivey Business Journal, 69(1), 1-5. 
 
Stevenson, W. B., & Radin, R. F. (2009). Social capital and social influence on the board of 
directors. Journal of Management Studies, 46(1), 16-44. 
 
Strobl, S., Rama, D. V., & Mishra, S. (2016). Gender diversity in compensation committees. 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 31(4), 415–427.  
 
Subramanyam, K. R. (1996). The pricing of discretionary accruals. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 22, 249−281 
 
Subrahmanyam, A., & Titman, S. (2001). Feedback from stock prices to cash flows. The 
Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2389-2413. 
 
Sun, N., Salama, A., Hussainey, K., and Habbash, M. (2010). Corporate environmental 
disclosure, corporate governance and earnings management, Managerial Auditing Journal, 
25(7), 679-700.  
Sundaramurthy, C., Pukthuanthong, K. and Kor, Y. (2014). Positive and negative synergies 
between the CEO’s and the corporate board’s human and social capital: a study of 
biotechnology firms, Strategic Management Journal, 35(6), 845-868.  
Susanto, Y. K. (2016). The effect of audit committees and corporate governance on earnings 
management: evidence from Indonesia manufacturing industry. International Journal of 
Business, Economics and Law, 10(1), 32-37. 
 
 236 
Susanto, Y. K., Pradipta, A., & Djashan, I. A. (2017). Free cash flow and earnings 
management: board of commissioner, board independence and audit quality. Corporate 
Ownership and Control, 14(4-1), 284-288. 
 
Sutrisno, P. (2017). Earnings Management: An Advantage or Disadvantage? Accounting  and 
Finance Review, 2(2). 64-72.  
 
Talab, H. R., Flayyih, H. H., & Ali, S. I. (2018). Role of Beneish M-score model in Detecting 
of Earnings Management Practices: Empirical Study in listed banks of Iraqi Stock Exchange. 
International journal of Applied Business and Economic Research. 16. 
 
Tanikawa, T., Kim, S. & Jung, Y. (2017). Top management team diversity and firm 
performance: exploring a function of age. Team Performance Management: An International 
Journal, 23(3/4), 156-170. 
 
Tasheva, S., & Hillman, J. (2019). Integrating Diversity at Different Levels: Multileval Human 
Capital, and Demographic Diversity and Their Implications for Team Effectivness. Academy 
of Management Review, 44(4), 12-22. 
 
Terjesen, S., Sealy, R., & Singh, V. (2009). Women directors on corporate boards: A review 
and research agenda. Corporate Governance: An international Review, 17, 320-337. 
 
Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., & Wong, T. J. (1998). Earnings management and the underperformance 
of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial economics, 50(1), 63-99. 
 
Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., & Wong, T. J. (1998a). Earnings management and the long-run market 
performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance, 53, 1935−1975. 
 
Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., & Wong, T. J. (1998b). Earnings management and the long-run market 
performance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50, 63−90. 
 
Terjesen, S., Couto, E. B., & Francisco, P. M. (2016). Does the presence of independent and 
female directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study of board diversity. Journal 
of Management & Governance, 20(3), 447-483.  
 237 
 
Teshima, N. and Shuto, A. (2008). Managerial ownership and earnings management: Theory 
and empirical evidence from Japan. Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting, 19(2), 107-132.  
 
The Public Authority for civil information. (2019). Retrieved from 
https://www.paci.gov.kw/stat/SubCategory.aspx?ID=2 
 
Thiruvadi, S., & Huang, H. W. (2011). Audit committee gender differences and earnings 
management. Gender in Management: An International Journal, 26(7), 483-498.  
 
Thrikawala, S., Locke, S., & Reddy, K. (2017). Dynamic endogeneity and corporate 
governance-performance relationship. Journal Of Economic Studies, 44(5), 727-744. doi: 
10.1108/jes-12-2015-0220 
 
Trabelsi, D., &Chikh, S. (2018). Do Financial Markets Reward Eco-Efficiency?. Working 
paper.  Available at SSRN 3172773. 
         
Triki Damak, S. (2018). Gender diverse board and earnings management: evidence from 
French listed companies. Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, 9(3), 
289-312. 
 
Umitey, K. (2018). The Relationship Between Board of Directors Characteristics, Ownership 
Structure and Earnings Management of Kazakhstani Listed Companies. Master dissertation, 
St. Petersburg University. Retrieved from 
https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/12892/1/Master_Thesis__Koralasbayeva_final.pdf, 
link access date:01.10.2019. 
Van der Walt, N. and Ingley, C. (2003), Board dynamics and the influence of professional 
background, gender and ethnic diversity of directors, Corporate Governance, 1(3), 218-234.  
Vickers, J. & Yarrow, G. (1991). Economic perspectives on privatization. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 5(2), 111-132. 
 
 238 
Victor, O., & Edwin, O. A. (2019). Board age diversity and financial reporting quality: the case 
of Malaysian corporations. Paripex-Indian Journal Of Research, 8(4), 234-240. 
 
Vladu, A. B. (2015). Managerial preferences between accrual-based versus real earnings 
management. Hyperion International Journal of Econophysics & New Economy, 8(2), 409-
417. 
 
Wahid, A. (2018). The Effects and the Mechanisms of Board Gender Diversity: Evidence from 
Financial Manipulation. Journal Of Business Ethics, 1-21. doi: 10.1007/s10551-018-3785-6 
 
Walsh, A. (2016). Entrepreneurship and firm performance. New York: Springer. 
 
Wang, B.C., & Cliff, B. (2009). Is there a “business case” for board diversity?. Pacific 
Accounting Review, 21.  
 
Wang, D. H., & Huynh, Q. L. (2013). Complicated relationships among audit committee 
independence, nonfinancial and financial performance. Journal of knowledge management, 
economics and information technology, 3(5), 1-2.  
 
Wang, Z., Ettinger, M., Xie, Y., & Xu, L. (2018). The cost of capital: US-based multinational 
corporations versus US domestic corporations. Global Finance Journal. (Accepted). 
 
Wegge, J., Roth, C., Neubach, B., Schmidt, K. H. & Kanfer, R. (2008). Age and gender 
diversity as determinants of performance and health in a public organization: The role of task 
complexity and group size. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93(6), 1301-1313. 
 
Wellalage, N., & Locke, S. (2012). Women on board, firm financial performance and agency 
costs. Asian Journal Of Business Ethics, 2(2), 113-127. doi: 10.1007/s13520-012-0020-x 
 
Wellalage, N., Locke, S., & Acharya, S. (2018). Does the composition of boards of directors 
impact on CSR scores?. Social Responsibility Journal, 14(3), 651-669. doi: 10.1108/srj-03-
2017-0039 
 
 239 
Xiao, L. Q., Hou, B., Wang, Z. F., & Wu, Y. H. (2014). Random weighting approximation for 
Tobit regression models with longitudinal data. Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, 79, 
235-247. 
 
Xie, B., Davidson, N. W., & DaDalt, P. (2003). Earnings Management and Corporate 
Governance: The Roles of the Board and the Audit Committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, 
9(3), 295-316.  
 
Xu, Y., Zhang, L., & Chen, H. (2017). Board age and corporate financial fraud: An 
interactionist view. Long Range Planning, 30, 1e16. 
 
Yammeesri, J., & Kanthi Herath, S. (2010). Board characteristics and corporate value: evidence 
from Thailand. Corporate Governance. The international journal of business in society, 10(3), 
279-292. 
 
Yang, M. L. (2010). The impact of controlling families and family CEOs on earnings 
management. Family Business Review, 23(3), 266-279. 
Yang, C-Y, Lai, H-N & Tan, BL. (2008). Managerial ownership structure and earnings 
management, Journal of Financial Reporting & Accounting, 16(1), 35-53.  
Yates, K. (2016). Earnings management: Global perspectives, performance and future 
research. N.J: Springer. 
 
Yom, S. L., & Gause III, F. G. (2012). Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang 
on. Journal of Democracy, 23(4), 74-88.  
 
Yoon, S. Jiraporn, P. & Miller, G. (2006). Earnings Management Vehicles for Korean Firms. 
Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 17(2).  
 
Yu, X., & Zheng, Y. (2020). Why do investors not punish politically connected firms for 
financial misrepresentation?. Accounting Research Journal. 
 
 240 
Zahlan, R. S. (2016). The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Routledge. 
 
Zahra, S. A., & Stanton, W. W. (1988). The implications of the board of directors composition 
for corporate strategy and performance. International journal of management, 5(2), 229-236. 
 
Zalata, A., & Roberts, C. (2016). Internal corporate governance and classification shifting 
practices: An analysis of UK corporate behavior. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & 
Finance, 31(1), 51-78. 
 
Zalata, A. M., Tauringana, V., & Tingbani, I. (2018). Audit committee financial expertise, 
gender, and earnings management: Does gender of the financial expert matter?. International 
Review of Financial Analysis, 55, 170-183. 
 
Zalata, A. M., Ntim, C., Aboud, A., & Gyapong, E. (2018). Female CEOs and core earnings 
quality: new evidence on the ethics versus risk-aversion puzzle. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-
20. 
 
Zalata, A. M., Ntim, C. G., Choudhry, T., Hassanein, A., & Elzahar, H. (2019). Female 
directors and managerial opportunism: Monitoring versus advisory female directors. The 
Leadership Quarterly, 101309. 
 
Zhou, H., S. Yang and M. Zhang. (2012). Relationship between free cash flow and financial 
performance. Evidence from listed real estate companies in China. IPCSI, 36, 331-335. 
 241 
 
